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Director: Dr. James P. Bliss 
This field experiment tested the effects of two systems on speeding, mental 
workload, and driver acceptance of the systems. Using GPS technology integrated with 
GIS referenced speed limit information, eight vehicles were instrumented in a manner 
that allowed real time knowledge of vehicle speed relative to the speed limit. Fifty 
participants drove these vehicles, with each individual driving his or her assigned vehicle 
for a four week trial. During one week, 40 participants experienced an automated 
feedback system, which provided visual and auditory alerts when they sped five or more 
mph over the limit. Twenty of these 40 individuals experienced a monetary incentive 
system during their second and third weeks of driving. Ten participants were in a control 
group that experienced neither system. Results indicated that the incentive system 
resulted in dramatic reductions in speeding over the posted limit, and the feedback 
system led to modest reductions in speeding. In the condition in which drivers 
experienced the feedback and incentive, reductions in speeding were similar to those 
found during the incentive only condition. Drivers perceived that both systems 
increased mental workload. Ratings of trust and acceptance were generally positive, 
although drivers reported the feedback system was annoying and displeasing. The 
results indicate that these systems could significantly benefit traffic safety by reducing 
crashes caused by speeding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Each year, traffic crashes claim 1.2 million lives across the world (World Health 
Organization, 2004) and more than 40,000 lives in the United States (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 2007). These events are the number one cause of 
death for Americans under age 35 (Centers for Disease Control, 2006). Crashes occur for 
a variety of reasons, including distraction, speed, aggressive driving, impaired driving, 
perceptual errors, and fatigue. Many emerging in-vehicle technologies are designed to 
improve safety by preventing contributing factors from occurring or minimizing the 
adverse effects of their occurrence. For example, adaptive cruise control (ACC) reduces 
tailgating (Rudin-Brown & Parker, 2004). With the system engaged, drivers maintain 
following distances based on distances to lead vehicles. Although the safety advantages 
of such automation are clear, systems require thorough testing to validate benefits and 
assess unintended negative consequences such as over-reliance on the system (Lee & 
See, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Rudin-Brown and Parker reported that the 
tested adaptive system reliably increased following distance, yet drivers were more 
likely to engage in a distracting secondary task when driving with ACC than driving 
without it. The focus of the current project, Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA), is similar 
to ACC because it reacts to the environment in a dynamic manner to reduce an unsafe 
driving behavior. However, the basic notion of ISA is dynamic reaction to changes in 
speed limits, whereas ACC adapts to the speed of a lead vehicle. ISA uses Global 
Positioning Systems to compare the speed of the vehicle to the speed limit of the roads 
on which the driver is travelling. In areas where databases of speed limits exist, ISA 
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systems are feasible, and the systems provide an opportunity to reduce speeding by 
informing the driver about speed, introducing mechanical resistance to make speeding 
quite effortful, or preventing the driver from speeding (Carsten & Tate, 2005). 
There is empirical support for the effectiveness of ISA (Regan, et al., 2006; 
Varhelyi, Hjalmdahl, Hyden, Draskoczy, 2004), but some researchers have noted the 
potential for driver habituation (Dingus, Klauer, Neal, Petersen, & Lee et al. 2006). A 
possible factor related to this habituation is an inadequate feedback structure (Toledo & 
Lotan, 2006). For example, feedback provided by the system only when the driver 
chooses to access it may receive initial attention by the driver and then a gradual 
decrease in attention as time progresses. The current project evaluated a strategy for 
decreasing speeding behavior by manipulating auditory and visual feedback and 
behavior-based incentives. The feedback and incentive schedules were structured so 
that drivers experienced real-time warnings, received an economic incentive, or 
received warnings and the incentive for keeping within preset speeding parameters. The 
speeding of these drivers was compared to a control group that experienced neither 
warnings nor economic incentives. In addition to speeding behavior, driver workload 
and acceptance of the system was analyzed. Acceptance and workload are important: if 
drivers dislike the system they will be unlikely to use it voluntarily. Alternatively, if some 
aspect of workload, such as temporal demand, increases when driving with ISA, then a 
reduction in speeding may be offset by a negative behavioral adaptation, such as 
tailgating. Theoretically, there is concern among human factors researchers that 
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exposure to automation may lead to unintended behavior change (Comte, 2000; 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
ISA systems are a relatively new technology. They have been field tested in 
Europe and Australia, but not in the United States. Evaluations indicate that the systems 
are promising, but the benefit may not generalize to the United States driving 
population. In addition to the applied nature of the study, theoretical perspectives 
helped to guide the proposed feedback and incentive structures, to make predictions 
about potential negative consequences such as increased mental workload, and to 
explain why drivers speed. 
Speeding 
Speeding appears to be a universally accepted behavior in several Westernized 
countries. Shinar, Schechtman, and Compton (1999) analyzed self-report data that were 
collected annually over 11 years. The sample size of adults from the United States was 
relatively large, 1,250 respondents per year, and the questions asked related to general 
health behaviors such as diet and smoking and to traffic safety behaviors such as 
wearing seat belts, drinking and driving, and speeding. In general, the authors reported 
that the respondents in the later years of the study period placed more importance on 
health habits than respondents in the first years of the study period. Similarly, the 
respondents indicated the importance of buckling seatbelts and driving sober increased 
over time. However, the respondents' attitude toward speeding did not follow this 
pattern. At the beginning of the measurement period, respondents indicated that 
speeding was less of a threat to safety than driving while impaired or unbuckled. 
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Moreover, Shinar et al. (1999) report that the perceived relevance of speeding to safe 
driving continued to decrease as the 11 year period progressed. In a separate analysis of 
self report data Blincoe, Jones, Sauerzapf, & Haynes (2006) collected over 500 surveys of 
English drivers who were ticketed for speeding through an area with an automated 
speed camera. One line of questioning concerned reasons for speeding. Frequent 
answers were that speeding was not dangerous and that "everybody else speeds." 
Similarly, self report data collected by Fleiter and Watson (2006) indicate that Australian 
drivers view speeding as acceptable. They asked drivers to indicate the extent to which 
they speed on urban and "open" roads with respective speed limits of 60 and 100 
kilometers per hour. A third of the sample indicated that they speed on the slower road, 
whereas more than half indicated that they choose to speed on the faster road. Fleiter 
and Watson (2006) also asked drivers to indicate what speed should be permissible at 
both limits. The drivers overwhelmingly selected speeds that were greater than the 
posted limit. Similar findings are reported by Shinar (2001), who asked drivers to 
indicate what speed they typically drove on roads with different speed limits. Based on 
the hypothesis that different conditions affect speed choice, Shinar asked drivers to 
indicate the speed they would choose to drive when they were driving in situations such 
as driving alone, driving with family, or driving for fun. Drivers consistently indicated 
that the speed they drive when alone was higher than posted limits, and the "fun" 
speed was generally greater than the typical speed. 
These findings were based primarily on self-report data, and the validity of 
subjective results is always a concern. However, the work of Haglund and Aberg (2000) 
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indicates that there is value to self report data. These researchers tested the 
relationship between observed speed and drivers' self reports by using a hidden speed 
camera and an interview that occurred down road from the camera. Researchers asked 
the drivers, who were unaware that speed was recorded, to indicate how fast they were 
driving before they were stopped and how fast they would normally drive on the road. 
The correlations between observed and reported speed and observed and normal speed 
were .58 and .5, respectively. These data indicate that drivers' estimates were in general 
agreement with observed speeds. However, other researchers report more moderate 
relationships between observed and reported speed (see Corbett, 2001). 
In contrast to debate about the relationship between observed and reported 
speed, there is little doubt that drivers choose to speed in free flow traffic, particularly 
where the roads are in good repair and enforcement is absent. For example, Freedman, 
De Leonardis, Poison, Levi, and Burkhardt (2007) completed an evaluation that 
measured the effect of rational speed limits. The notion behind rational speed limits is 
that the overwhelming majority of drivers rationally select safe speeds based in part on 
road design, and therefore, speed limits should correspond to these selected speeds. 
Typically, the rational speed is defined as the speed at which 85% of the traffic selects 
during free flow conditions. Freedman et al. divided several roadways into 7 mile 
sections that contained multiple speed limit changes, and then measured the speeds 
that drivers selected in free flow traffic, defined as flow conditions in which five seconds 
separated the own vehicle from a lead vehicle. When driving in free flow, the authors 
found that 50 to 90% of drivers exceeded the speed limits before speed limits were 
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changed to the rational speed. After implementing the rational speed limit program, as 
many as 50% of drivers still violated the speed limit. In addition, the average speed did 
not change — drivers were traveling as fast after the limits increased as they were 
before they were changed. They simply were not violating the speed limit as frequently 
because the limit increased. In sum, an abundance of self report data indicates that 
speeding is commonplace, and high correlations between observed and reported speed 
suggest that self report data are indicative of drivers' true speed. Finally, the Freedman 
et al. study indicates that exceeding the speed limit may be the norm in certain 
locations. Several questions follow from these findings about the prevalence of 
speeding: 1) Who is speeding? 2) Why are they speeding? 3) Is speeding truly 
dangerous? and 3) If it is dangerous, why? 
Who is speeding? From a demographic perspective, there are several driver 
characteristics that covary with speeding. Many authors report that younger drivers are 
more likely to speed than older drivers (Quimby, Maycock, Palmer, & Buttress, 1999; 
Wasielewski, 1984), as suggested by fatality statistics (NHTSA, 2007.) Other individual 
difference variables include income level, with wealthier drivers speeding more 
frequently than their less wealthy counterparts; sex, with males driving faster than 
females; and vehicle size, with drivers of large vehicles driving faster than those with 
smaller vehicles (Shinar, 2007.) 
Why are drivers speeding? Explaining why individuals speed is vexing because 
drivers speed for different reasons, and there is considerable within group variance. An 
individual may speed in a certain condition on one day (being late for work) but choose 
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not to speed the next time the condition is present. Drivers may be rushing to work, 
speeding because they are within a group of drivers who are exceeding the limit, or 
speeding for emotional reasons (thrill or anger) (McKenna, 2005). McKenna describes 
these willful acts of speed as "rebellious" or "pragmatic" speeding. In addition to willful 
speeding, drivers may not be aware that they are speeding. That is, they may have a 
lapse of attention during which their speed may increase without their knowledge. A 
second cause of unintended speeding may be perceptual speed adaptation. Unintended 
speeding may also result from a failure to see a speed limit sign. When trying to explain 
these reasons more completely, researchers have applied theories from social 
psychology, sensation and perception, and information processing. 
From an information processing approach, speeding increases risk because of 
time pressure. Researchers quantified the time needed to sense, perceive, decide, and 
act to various stimuli using methods such as the additive method (Sternberg, 1969). In 
fact, researchers succeeded in parsing out the processing time associated with certain 
stages and factors that affect processing in laboratory settings. When movement 
through space becomes a factor, the equation Distance = Rate * Time dictates that an 
individual driving at a faster speed has less time to react to a given stimulus than an 
individual driving at a slower speed who encounters the same stimulus. In addition to 
the distance equation, stopping distance increases exponentially with speed. Finally, 
environmental factors such as darkness, weather, and roadway characteristics can add 
further constraints on the amount of time that drivers have to process and react. 
However, humans do not make decisions based on the computation of complex 
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formulas, and it is reasonable to assume part of the speeding problem is a result of 
naivety about the true risks. This situation may be further compounded by perceptual 
speed adaptation. 
Perceptual Effects on Speed - Speed Adaptation. This theoretical perspective is 
helpful for understanding why some violations are committed unknowingly. The 
vestibular system is attuned to sudden changes in movement; however, humans quickly 
adapt to steady movement. When angular or rotational acceleration occurs, fluid shifts 
in the vestibular canals, and the moving individual experiences the sensation of 
acceleration. When movement through space is at a constant velocity, the vestibular 
fluid will not shift, and individuals adapt to the speed at which they are moving. 
When individuals adapt to a set speed, e.g., 45 mph, and suddenly change to a 
new constant velocity, e.g., 25 or 65 mph, what they experience differs from what they 
would have perceived had they not adapted to 45 mph velocity. However, individuals 
experience significantly different perceptions depending on whether the new constant 
velocity is greater or less than the adapted speed. When individuals experience an 
increase in true velocity, the perceived change in velocity is greater than the true 
change, i.e., they feel that they are going faster. In contrast, and of particular interest to 
the current study, when there is a reduction from a high speed to a lower speed, 
individuals perceive that the reduction in speed is significantly slower than the true 
reduction. Psychophysical studies completed several decades ago support this 
perceptual phenomenon (Denton, 1966; Matthews, 1978; Schmidt & Tiffin, 1969). For 
example, Schmidt and Tiffin had participants make several estimates when a vehicle 
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they were driving reached 40mph. When participants accelerated from 0 to 40, the 
average speed that they estimated was 41mph. However, when the individuals 
maintained a speed of 70mph for a period of 20 minutes and then slowed to what they 
perceived to be 40mph, the perceived 40mph was 50mph. Schmidt and Tiffin (1969) 
showed that this underestimation of perceived speed increased as a linear function of 
time spent at the higher constant velocity. Denton (1966) completed a similar 
investigation. In addition to showing that drivers underestimate reductions from a 
higher to a lower speed, he also showed that participants overestimated increases from 
lower to higher speeds. Finally, Matthews (1978) recorded radar readings of vehicles 
traveling on a roadway that had the same speed limit in both directions. However, in 
one direction vehicles traveled on a road that was 15mph higher than the test road, 
whereas vehicles traveling in the opposite direction had previously driven on a lower 
speed road. Matthews (1978) reported that drivers who traveled on the higher speed 
road had significantly greater travel speeds than those traveling in the opposite 
direction. These studies provide empirical support to the frequent anecdotal reports of 
perceptual speed adaptation. 
Thus, the speed adaptation phenomenon may contribute to the prevalence of 
and dangers associated with speeding. An individual who adapts to a high speed of 70 
mph and does not slow sufficiently due to faulty perception may underestimate the 
time available to safely respond to a hazardous event. Unfortunately, required 
information processing time does not change because drivers choose a higher speed. 
Further, individuals generally make decisions based on heuristics and past experience 
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rather than the computations needed to determine decision time relative to stopping 
distance; therefore, it seems likely that drivers may underestimate the increased risks of 
speeding. 
Decision Making: Heuristics and Prospect Theory. The classical approach to 
decision making would suggest that when choosing to speed or comply with the limit, 
drivers weigh the probabilities of costs and benefits. These costs might include lost time, 
lost money associated with a speeding citation, and losses associated with a crash. 
Drivers may use confirmation bias and the availability heuristic when determining the 
probabilities associated with the possible outcomes. For example, drivers may discount 
speed related crashes and recall only those related to impaired driving. Drivers who see 
a driver adhering to the speed limit may look to confirm that the driver is "old" and 
dismiss information that disconfirms an assumption that only certain populations drive 
the speed limit. Speeders may recall that they always drive over the limit and never get 
stopped. Drivers may further downplay the threat of sanction if a judge dismissed or 
reduced a ticket when they went to court. Given the low perceived probabilities of costs 
associated with sanctions and crashes, classical decision making theory would predict 
that drivers weigh the potential losses accordingly when they select speed. 
The one cost that drivers might perceive as probable if they comply with the 
limit is the loss of time. Prospect theory explains an interesting phenomenon associated 
with the differences between subjective ratings of losses and gains (Kahneman, Slovik, & 
Tversky, 1982.) Kahneman et al. report a body of work that indicates individuals 
perceive a loss of a certain amount as more important than a gain of the same amount. 
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Prospect theory would predict that individuals who speed because they are rushing do 
so because they feel they are losing time rather gaining time. Prospect theory would 
provide an explanation for why drivers who speed for pragmatic reasons account for a 
significant portion of speeders, particularly given findings that indicate faster speeds do 
not ensure faster commutes (Regan et al., 2006). 
Theory of Planned Behavior. In contrast to information processing and 
perceptual perspectives associated with speed, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
offers an explanation as to why individuals purposefully speed. TPB is rooted in social 
psychology and is a frequently cited theory used to explain various behavioral 
phenomena. This theory was proposed by Ajzen and reviewed by De Pelsmacker and 
Janssens (2007). The central features of the theory include "norms", "attitudes", and 
"intentions." Norms refer to the rules and beliefs that an individual has about a certain 
behavior. These norms can be personal, normative, descriptive, or subjective. There is a 
"moral" component to personal norms; this component captures the extent to which 
the individual thinks the behavior is "right" or "wrong." A second component of 
personal norms described by De Pelsmacker and Janssens (2007) refers to the regret an 
individual would experience if the behavior were or were not manifested. Norms may 
also be relative or normative. Normative norms are those that describe what the 
individual thinks others believe about the behavior. These norms include "everyone else 
is doing it" reasoning for engaging in a behavior. Subjective norms refer to the extent to 
which the individual feels pressure from valued individuals, e.g., friends, family, peer 
groups, to engage in the behavior. 
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According to TPB, these four norm types directly affect attitudes about the 
behavior. Attitudes are comprised of affective and cognitive components. The affective 
aspect of attitudes capture the emotion associated with the behavior: "I am anxious to 
get home and see my family." The cognitive component describes the logic associated 
with the attitude: "I know that speeding is technically illegal but the police allow 10 mph 
over the limit." Researchers who refer to TPB suggest that attitudes directly affect 
intentions to engage in the behavior. Two additional important factors in this theory are 
"perceived behavioral control (PBC)" and "habits." PBC and habits moderate intention 
such that in situations when individuals believe they have behavioral control, they are 
more likely to realize their intention. Similarly, Azjen suggests that the intention to 
engage in a behavior is stronger when the behavior is relatively more habitual. 
TPB may explain a variety of behaviors. With regard to speeding, De Pelsmacker 
and Janssens (2007) completed a study that used structural equation modeling to test a 
model based on the factors contained in the theory. The authors devised Likert-type 
survey items that were written to reflect the latent factors described above, i.e., norms, 
attitudes, intentions, habits, and perceived behavioral control. In addition, they asked 
participants to estimate how often they speed. The results of the factor analysis 
indicated that there were significant loadings for items associated with each latent 
construct. The constructs with the strongest effect size were habits, intentions, and 
personal norms. 
TPB is reviewed here because it has received significant attention from traffic 
safety researchers. However, hypotheses based on the theory will not be included in the 
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current field experiment because there seems to be little explanatory power beyond 
what could be gained by asking individuals about their intentions and habits. Intuitively, 
to the extent individuals have opportunities to manifest a behavior and intend to do so, 
the behavior will be realized. This is particularly so if the behavior is habitual. The 
results of the factor analytic study reported by De Pelsmacker and Janssens (2007) 
suggest that asking drivers about their intentions and habits alone would yield nearly 
the same power for predicting self reported speeding behavior as using the full 
theoretical model. A final problem with the model used by De Pelsmacker and Janssens 
is the failure to consider the possibility that habits influence attitudes. Clearly, attitudes 
toward a behavior become more favorable as the behavior becomes more habitual. 
In sum, TPB describes some components involved in purposeful speeding but 
does not appear to sufficiently explain how or why norms are formed. The concept of 
habit, admittedly a strong component in an individual's decision to engage in a 
behavior, appears to be introduced as an afterthought. Further work may improve the 
explanatory power of TPB, and researchers would welcome a theory that facilitates the 
understanding of why drivers speed. Although some individuals indicate that speeding is 
not dangerous, evidence suggests speed increases the frequency and severity of vehicle 
crashes. 
Does Speeding Affect Traffic Safety? 
NHTSA publishes an annual report entitled Traffic Safety Facts. The document 
provides a wealth of data about crash related variables. The most recently published 
version of the document (2007) ranks a set of 16 variables by relative frequency of 
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"Related Factors for Drivers and Motorcycle Operators Involved in Fatal Crashes." The 
most frequent factors in the list of variables for fatalities occurring in 2005 were driving 
too fast for conditions, inattentiveness, driving recklessly, and failing to keep in the 
proper lane (NHTSA, 2007). "Driving too fast for conditions" is listed as a factor for 21% 
of traffic fatalities for 2005. This translates to nearly 12,000 deaths in one year. Further, 
36% of the total fatalities in 2005 were associated with unknown or unlisted factors. 
Some portion of this 36% was likely due to speed, which would increase the overall 
number of speed related fatalities. These recent data are supported by Treat, Tumbas, 
McDonald, Shinar, Hume, et al., (1977) who identified speed as a serious safety matter. 
Treat et al. completed in-depth analyses of approximately 2,000 fatal crashes. The 
authors used a strict definition of "causal:" a crash would not have occurred if the factor 
were absent. They determined speed was the causal factor in 8% of crashes and the 
probable cause of an additional 15% of the crashes. The Treat et al. data are dated, but, 
their conclusions support the fatality statistics reported by NHTSA (2006a) and recent 
work that captured driver behavior in naturalistic settings. 
The 100-car naturalistic driving study provides further underscores the need to 
establish effective speed countermeasures (Dingus et al., 2006; Klauer, Dingus, Neale, 
Sudweeks, & Ramsey, 2006; Klauer, Sudweeks, Hickman, & Neale, 2006b.) The 
naturalistic study was a significant endeavor. One hundred vehicles were instrumented 
with several video cameras and data loggers to capture images of the drivers, their 
vehicles, their environments, and several other parameters including acceleration, 
vehicle speed, yaw rate, and forward time to collision. The vehicles were tracked for one 
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year, yielding a vast amount of data that provide valuable insight about the nature of 
traffic crashes. To determine the extent to which events were associated with crashes, 
near crashes, or incidents, Klauer et al. (2006b) calculated odds ratios for behaviors 
operationalized as risky. The odds ratio for speeding was statistically significant: 
participants in the 100 car study were nearly 3 times more likely to be involved in a 
crash or near crash when driving at excessive speeds relative to periods when they were 
driving at acceptable speeds. 
Although the 100-car study and NHTSA statistics implicate driving too fast for 
conditions as a significant factor for collisions, several researchers found a significant 
positive relationship between changes in speed limit laws and crashes or fatalities. The 
easing and subsequent repeal of the United States' 55mph law has provided an ideal 
situation for examining the relationship between speed and crashes. Patterson, Frith, 
Povey, and Keall (2002) studied the changes in traffic fatalities associated with the 
easing of the national 55 mph law during the 1980s. Patterson et al. reported that states 
with increased limits had greater increases in traffic fatalities relative to states that kept 
the 55 mph speed limit. The work of Grabowski and Morrisey (2007) also suggests that 
increased highway speed limits increased crash risk. Those authors studied rural 
highways and examined the increase in fatalities that occurred when speed limits 
initially increased from 55 mph to 65 mph and when some limits increased from 65 to 
70 mph following the official repeal of the 55 mph law. Grabowski and Morrisey found 
that the increase from 55 to 65 mph was associated with a 15% surge in fatalities, and in 
locations where the limit went to 70 mph, fatalities were more than 30% greater. 
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Finally, Stuster, Coffman, and Warren (1998) reviewed studies of the effect of speed 
limit changes and reported that 75% of studies that assessed lowered limits found a 
concomitant lowering of traffic fatalities, whereas nearly 75% of the evaluations of 
increased speed indicated that fatalities increased. As with rational speed limits, 
changed speed limit laws permit faster driving, so drivers were not speeding as defined 
by law. However, these studies show the strong relationship between increased speeds 
and increased fatalities. 
A different approach to studying the same relationship is to select a specific 
section of road and investigate injury outcomes for crashes that occur at different 
speeds. Moore, Dolinis, and Woodward (1995) completed a case control study and 
found a strong relationship between speed and the occurrence of serious head injuries 
or fatalities for vehicles traveling, particularly in 60 km per hour zones. Moore et al. 
found that vehicles were approximately 8 times more likely to have a crash at speeds 
between 75 and 84 km per hour than vehicles traveling 55 to 64 mile per hour. Similarly, 
Kloeden, McLean, Moore, and Ponte (1997) reported that injury risk increased 
exponentially when drivers exceeded 45 kilometers per hour (approximately 30mph.) 
This finding might be expected given the relationship between speed and force at 
impact expressed in the formula for kinetic energy, E - l/lmv2, where E is energy, m is 
mass, and v is velocity (Shinar, 2007). This formula states that energy is a function of the 
square of velocity; thus an increase in of absolute speed of 10 mph will have a far more 
intense impact from 30 mph to 40 mph than from 20 mph to 30 mph. This physics 
equation is supported by the meta-analysis of Elvik, Cristensen, and Amundsen, (2004) 
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who concluded that speed was the most significant factor associated with traffic 
fatalities. 
Despite these studies that indicate speed is a causal factor in substantial portion 
of crashes, some researchers maintain that speeding in and of itself is not dangerous 
(see Shinar, 2007). Those who suggest that speeding alone does not elevate risk argue 
that drivers who travel at 65 mph in a 55 mph zone are speeding; however if they have 
adequate headway from a lead vehicle and refrain from weaving through traffic or 
making abrupt steering changes then these individuals are safe drivers. Proponents of 
this argument might suggest it is the presence of multiple factors that elevates risk. For 
example, individuals increase risk marginally when the only factor is increased speed but 
increase risk significantly when they drive impaired and speed (NHTSA, 2007). The 
position taken in the current project is in agreement with the multiple factor argument. 
However, physics clearly indicates that impact force increases exponentially with speed, 
so any given crash at a higher speed will elevate the risk of serious injury relative to the 
same crash that occurs at lower speeds. In sum, there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that lowering speeds will increase safety, and this is the focus of the current project. 
Additionally, the operational definition of speeding for this project is driving over the 
speed limit rather than driving too fast for conditions. 
From this focus, the goal of this project was to use driver monitoring technology 
to reduce speeding behavior by using a system that alerts drivers when they speed, that 
provides an incentive to promote speed limit compliance, or that combines an incentive 
and alert. Although speeding behavior was a central focus in the proposed study, the 
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experimenter gave significant attention to the possibility that drivers may adapt 
negatively to such a system. European field studies indicate drivers may habituate to 
warnings, may engage in unsafe driving behaviors such as short following distances, or 
may fail to monitor speed when the system is removed. These adaptations could 
attenuate or negate the benefits of reduced speeding realized by ISA. New systems such 
as ISA may supplement conventional speed countermeasures only if there are minimal 
adverse effects. 
What Countermeasures Exist for Addressing the Speeding Problem? 
The traditional methods to limit speeding fall into three categories: engineering, 
education, or enforcement. Engineering solutions typically involve changes to the 
roadway that force drivers to slow down. Examples of these include speed bumps and 
speed tables, roundabouts, road striping that narrows lanes, and increased road 
curvature. These "traffic calming" approaches successfully reduce speed but are 
expensive and limited to specific areas. Further, some drivers become frustrated upon 
encountering such engineering solutions, which could lead to aggressive driving (Litman, 
1999). 
A second speeding countermeasure is education, which is designed to inform 
drivers about the importance of driving slowly. An example of the educational approach 
is NHTSA's (2006b) pilot test of the "Heed the Speed" safety program, which was 
deployed to reduce the frequency and egregiousness of speeding in neighborhoods. The 
educational components of this project were street and yard signs, news stories about 
how vehicle speed affects pedestrian injuries, and brochures about the program for 
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residents of the target neighborhoods. Though such strategies are important, education 
has very limited success when not reliably linked to high visibility enforcement (NHTSA, 
2008). 
Enforcement is a final option for reducing speeding behavior. Anecdotally, many 
drivers will admit to checking their speedometers closely when they see a police cruiser 
or when they enter a location notorious for police "speed traps." However, this concern 
for obeying the speed limit is short lived. This phenomenon, reviewed by Shinar (2007) 
is referred to as the "halo effect." The effect describes the nearly reflexive reduction in 
speed that occurs from the point that a driver sees a police cruiser and remains for a 
certain period after passing the enforcement area. However, much like the resumption 
of speed by drivers who drive over a speed bump, drivers who travel past a police 
officer will eventually increase speed to levels that they drove prior to encountering the 
enforcement. A second issue that is problematic for enforcement is staffing; increasing 
the police force to allow for increased speed enforcement is not a feasible option. Speed 
cameras are effective, but there are considerable privacy concerns with this technology. 
The preceding literature review presented findings that indicate speeding is 
widespread and problematic. Drivers knowingly, willingly, and routinely violate the 
speed limit (Shinar et al., 1999; Taylor, Lynam, & Baruya, 2000). Speeding causes and 
contributes to crashes, increases crash risk, and increases the risk of serious injury or 
death (e.g., Elvik et al., 2004; NHTSA, 2007). Traditional approaches to curtail speeding 
have limited success (Shinar, 2007.) Based on these premises, different approaches to 
addressing the speed problem are warranted. Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA, a 
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technology that monitors driver speed, is a new approach that may help reduce 
speeding. 
Data Recording, Driver Monitoring, & ISA 
History of Data Recording in Transportation. ISA belongs to a class of technology 
based on operator monitoring, and its history dates to data recorders used in the 
aircraft industry. The aviation realm first used recorders in the late 1950s and referred 
to them as Flight Data Recorders (FDRs). FDRs recorded aircraft parameters such as 
speed and heading and were designed to survive a crash. As FDR technology matured 
during the latter part of the 20th century, additional recordings included conversations 
of the aircrew and sounds of the aircraft. FDRs have been instrumental for determining 
the causes and correlates of aviation crashes, but a by-product of the technology was 
that pilots decreased risky actions because they were aware of the performance 
monitoring. 
An automotive system analogous to FDRs is the motor vehicle event data 
recorder (EDRs), a device installed by original equipment manufacturers. EDRs were 
originally designed to trigger the deployment of air bags. When a monitored parameter 
such as speed, vertical and lateral acceleration, deceleration, and brake application 
exceeds limits, the EDR initiates air-bag deployment. However, shortly after EDRs were 
installed for air-bag deployment, their potential for facilitating crash investigation 
became evident. Since their deployment, the precision of the EDRs has improved. This 
improvement led to applications of EDRs to include fleet management and automatic 
crash notification (ACN) to emergency first responders. 
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This improved technology also generated interest about the use of EDRs to 
improve safe driving behavior in a manner analogous to FDRs. However, due to privacy 
concerns, the possibility of using the data and computing power of the EDRs installed by 
OEMs is unlikely to be realized. There are aftermarket devices that can be used in a 
manner analogous to FDRs. At times researchers mistakenly refer to the aftermarket 
devices as EDRs or "black boxes." The inappropriate use of the term "EDR" to refer to 
these monitoring systems has led to confusion. The federal government has a very clear 
definition of an EDR (Department of Transportation Final Rule, 2006), and the majority 
of the aftermarket systems are significantly different from the EDRs manufactured by 
automakers. For example, the driver monitoring system Drivecam records and saves 
video footage of the inside and outside of the vehicle when a driver exceeds a certain 
parameter, such as lateral acceleration. This capability is far beyond the US DOT 
requirements for an EDR, and the experimenter will avoid use of the term "EDR", as the 
focus is on aftermarket devices. Throughout this document the general class of systems 
designed to improve safe driving behaviors by monitoring vehicle or driver performance 
will be referred to as in-vehicle driver monitoring (IVDM.) In this classification scheme, 
ISA, is a type of IVDM. General IVDMs and ISA systems are relatively new and have 
undergone limited empirical evaluation. However, the evaluations that do exist suggest 
that the technology may reduce traffic injuries and fatalities. 
Use of In-Vehicle Driver Monitoring to Change Driver Behavior. The ability of 
technology to monitor real time measures has led researchers to assess the extent to 
which IVDMs might reduce unsafe driving. For example, Wouters and Bos (2000) 
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instrumented a fleet of vehicles and documented changes in accident involvement. The 
authors recorded several measures including delivery schedules, fuel consumption, 
sudden accelerations and decelerations, and average speed. The experimenters told 
drivers in the experimental group about the monitoring. Some drivers were given 
feedback by their managers, whereas a control group was naive to the presence of the 
equipment. Wouter and Bos reported an accident rate that was 20% lower for the 
treatment relative to the control group. The researchers emphasized that neither 
feedback nor consequences were central to the study. Thus, it is conceivable that 
managers' interactions with drivers ranged from positive feedback to job termination. 
Despite this limitation, the findings of Wouters and Bos indicate that monitoring 
technology can positively affect safe driving. 
In a manner similar to Wouter and Bos (2000), Toledo and Lotan (2006) recruited 
participants from a private vehicle fleet to conduct a field study with an IVDM system. 
However, these authors examined the role of feedback to a greater extent than Wouter 
and Bos. The system used by Toledo and Lotan recorded GPS location, acceleration, 
speed, and sudden braking. The authors then used these measures and created an 
algorithm that produced a single risk indicator, which ranged from cautious to risky, for 
each driver. Toledo & Lotan validated this index by showing a significant correlation 
between drivers' previous crash history and the risk score. 
Toledo and Lotan (2006) then implemented their treatment, which included an 
explanation of the system and feedback about driving performance. The researchers 
defined feedback as the number of log-ins to a web-based system that provided 
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information for each driver. Specifically, the authors rated every trip made by a driver as 
"cautious, moderate, or risky," and each driver was able to see how his or her 
performance compared to the whole fleet. Toledo and Lotan indicated that the 
feedback successfully for reduced the risk index but only for individuals who had 
relatively low risk initially. In addition, the results indicated that log-ins decreased 
linearly such that by the fifth month the log-in rate was reduced 6-fold. Finally, the 
results indicated that the risk index for whole treatment group showed a U-shaped 
function: the average risk index decreased initially but by the end of the feedback 
period, the index was slightly higher than at the onset of the study. 
Given the designs used by Toledo and Lotan (2006) and Wouters and Bos (2000) 
it is impossible to determine whether the reported effects were a function of the 
drivers' awareness of the systems, the feedback provided, or the combined effects of 
awareness and feedback. Both research teams found that awareness of monitoring may 
affect behavior, and Toledo and Lotan reported that feedback may reduce risky driving. 
Wouter and Bos were rather cavalier in their discussion of feedback, merely stating that 
fleet owners may have used it, but it was not the focus of the study. In contrast, Toledo 
and Lotan's operational definition of feedback was concise but poorly controlled by the 
experimenter. In sum, the two studies tested the effects of IVDMs on risky driving in 
general, and both research teams obtained results that indicated potential benefits 
from the use of such systems. The following section documents the efforts made to test 
a specific type of IVDM: intelligent speed adaptation or ISA. 
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History of ISA Systems. Whereas general IVDMs target several unsafe behaviors, 
the focus of ISA systems is on speed. As mentioned previously, ISA systems require a 
linkage between vehicle speed, vehicle location, and speed limit information. 
Researchers in Europe and Australia have used two methods to meet these 
requirements. As reviewed by Jamson, Carsten, Chorlton, and Fowlkes (2006), the 
precursors to modern ISA systems were essentially a cross between speed governors 
and cruise control: either the system prevented the driver from speeding by setting a 
predetermined speed regardless of the speed limit, or the driver or passenger activated 
a speed limiter manually upon encountering a speed limit change. The first researchers 
to study true ISA used transponders affixed to speed limit signs, which sent microwave 
signals about the speed limit to the ISA system in the vehicle. A processor then 
compared the speed limit to the vehicles' travel speeds, and a user interface provided 
feedback to the driver (Almquist & Nygard, 1997; Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999.) 
Brookhuis and de Waard used this transponder system and had drivers complete 
baseline and ISA drives on a route that had five speed limits and took 35 minutes to 
drive. An in-vehicle system provided visual and vocal feedback to the driver when they 
exceeded the limit. The visual feedback was graded: green indicated adherence to the 
speed, yellow an intermediate violation, and red a violation greater than 10 kilometers 
per hour. The vocal feedback coincided with the red visual display. Using this system, 
the researchers were able to show a significant reduction in the amount of time that 
drivers were 10% over the limit when driving with the ISA system. 
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The work completed by Almqvist and Nygard (1997) also used a transponder 
based system. However, the system deployed in the vehicle exerted a higher level of 
control over vehicle speed than that of Brookhuis and de Waard. Specifically, when 
Almqvist and Nygard's participants entered the zone defined by the installed 
transponders, the fuel distributor prevented acceleration over 50kmh. As one would 
expect with this level of automation, the system was 100% effective in terms of 
compliance with the speed limit. Surprisingly, nearly two-thirds of the participants 
provided positive ratings about the system's usefulness in maintaining the speed, 
although drivers also felt that they were delaying other drivers. 
A third early ISA study used an intermediate level of automation with a device 
referred to as the active accelerator pedal or AAP (Varheiyi & Makinen, 2001.) The AAP 
provides a force to the accelerator when the driver violates the speed limit, but unlike 
the system tested by Almquist and Nygard (1997), drivers could override the system by 
pressing harder on the accelerator. The premise for such a system is that drivers at 
times may need to exceed the speed limit, e.g., to overtake a vehicle in some 
emergency. Schulman (2005) first tested a similar accelerator technology in 1985. 
Varheiyi and Makinen tested the effect of the AAP ISA among three different European 
populations: Dutch, Swedish, and Spanish, using methods similar to those previously 
discussed. The authors reported significantly reduced speeds in each country, but the 
effect was strongest in Spain. The authors attributed this difference to less road 
congestion in Spain, which allowed drivers greater choice in setting their speed. 
Subjectively, there was a general acceptance of ISA. The majority of the sample 
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indicated that they partially or entirely supported the use of such a system for situations 
such as dangerous road conditions. 
In contrast to the speed measures that showed a positive effect on behavior, 
Varheiyi and Makinen (2001) reported negative subjective workload ratings. Summing 
across the full sample, the authors found increases in frustration and time pressure. 
Moreover, the authors reported closer following distances during the ISA drives relative 
to baseline drives. There were also important differences among the countries. For 
example, the increase in frustration between the ISA drive and the baseline drive was 
significantly greater in the Netherlands, relative to Spain and Sweden, and there were 
no changes in the six workload dimensions (frustration, time pressure, performance, 
effort, physical demand, and mental demand) among the Swedish participants. These 
differences indicate that cultures may differ regarding attitudes toward ISA and 
underscore the need to test ISA in any region prior to wide scale adoption of the 
automation. 
At approximately the same time that Varheiyi and Makinen (2001) found 
potential negative behavioral adaptations, Comte (2000), used a simulator to test the 
effects of ISA in a more controlled setting. The researcher recorded gap acceptance, i.e., 
the distance between two oncoming vehicles at which participants would initiate a left 
turn; following distance between the participant and lead vehicles; reaction time to a 
sudden braking event; passing; and moving violations. Comte reported two significant 
behavioral adaptations. Relative to a control drive, drivers accepted shorter gaps when 
initiating left turns and following distances were shorter. Similar to Varheiyi and 
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Makinen, Comte reported that subjective workload ratings of time pressure and 
frustration were significantly greater when driving with ISA relative to driving without it. 
The failure of Comte (2000) to show a difference in reaction time when 
responding to the sudden event is of particular interest, because of the concern that ISA 
systems, particularly those that completely control speed, may take the driver out of the 
loop, which could result in automation induced complacency (Sarter & Woods, 1995). 
Comte's (2000) results cannot support nor refute the potential for such complacency. A 
second finding of interest was that this simulator experiment showed no mean 
difference in speed when driving with the system, relative to control drives. This finding 
is in direct contrast with earlier field studies showing significant reductions in speed 
when using ISA (i.e., Brookhuis & De Waard, 1999; Varheiyi & Makinen, 2001). Two 
possible explanations for this result are that speeding in the virtual world and the real 
world are sufficiently dissimilar behaviors or that Comte's dependent variable, mean 
speed, was not sufficiently sensitive to detect an effect. This latter explanation has some 
support based on findings that show that the proportion of time over the speed limit 
may be a more sensitive measure than mean speed (Warner & Aberg, 2008). 
These early "proof of concept" studies demonstrated that ISA systems were a 
feasible countermeasure for speeding. As reviewed by Carsten and Tate (2005), 
transponder based ISA systems such as those used by Almqvist and Nygard (1997) and 
Brookhuis and de Waard (1998) were deemed unreliable relative to GPS-based systems 
because of potential transmission or reception problems. Therefore, systems that rely 
on GPS capabilities are currently the preferred method of deploying ISA (for example, 
Adell & Varheiyi, 2008; Harms et al. 2007). GPS provides accurate latitude and longitude 
location and accurate travel speed. In such advanced ISA systems, a database links the 
GPS coordinates of speed limit signs and the speed limit indicated on each sign. The fina 
component of a GPS based ISA system is an interface between an on-board GPS system 
and the speed limit GPS database. These systems react in real-time to speeding. As 
alluded to in review of earlier ISA work, these reactions vary with regard to the level of 
speed limit control experienced by the driver. 
Level of ISA Automation. The types of ISA systems developed and tested can be 
conveniently classified by level of automation. Levels range from those that simply 
provide a visual, auditory or haptic signal to the drivers when they speed (e.g., the 
system tested by Brookhuis & De Waard, 1998), to those that exert some level of 
control over the vehicle that can be overridden by the driver (e.g., the AAP system used 
by Varheiyi & Makinen, 2001), to those that prevent driving the vehicle above the speed 
limit (e.g., the system used by Almqvist & Nygard, 1997.) Carsten and Tate (2005) 
defined these levels of ISA automation as advisory, interactive, and mandatory. 
The three levels of automation defined by Carsten & Tate (2005) fit well with 
Sheridan's (1980) framework for classifying levels of automation. Sheridan's (1980) 
discussion of automation provides a means of categorizing automation as a function of 
which entity in the human-system relationship decides upon action. The author lists 10 
levels of automation that range from complete human control of decision making 
determined by automation with zero input from the operator. Advisory ISA parallels the 
Sheridan's second level, one at which the system offers alternatives that operators may 
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act upon if they desire. The interactive ISA would fall at some point near Sheridan's sixth 
level, a point at which the system decides but the user can override the automation. 
Mandatory ISA would fit with Sheridan's final two levels, points where the operator has 
no control over the decision to exceed speed limits. 
Researchers in Europe and Australia tested each of these levels of ISA 
automation. Mandatory systems engineered to prevent exceeding the speed limit 
provide a consistent change in speeding behavior, as drivers are forced into compliance 
with the speed limit (Almqvist & Nygard, 1997; Duynstee, Katteler, & Martens, 2001.) As 
mentioned previously, Almqvist and Nygard were able to show the effect during a 
relatively short period, whereas Duynstee et al. tested a relatively large sample of 
drivers (480) over a test period of 8 weeks (2 week baseline period and 6 week ISA 
period) and showed that a mandatory ISA system was completely effective for 
preventing violations of the speed limit. These authors report that a majority of drivers 
(64%) rated this mandatory ISA system as positive. However, Duynstee et al. did not test 
other levels of ISA automation, so it is difficult to know how the mandatory ISA 
compared to advisory or interactive systems. As reported below, field studies of 
advisory and interactive ISA also obtained significant reductions in speeding and 
relatively higher acceptance ratings than more controlling systems (Biding & Lind, 2002). 
The continuum of automation described by Carsten and Tate (2005) presents a 
dilemma. Based on the literature that indicates speed significantly increases crash 
severity (e.g., Elvik et al. 2004; Grabowski & Morrisey, 2007), the notion of a mandatory 
system that reliably prevented speeding as such automation would eliminate speeding. 
Yet intuitively, such a system would lead many to react unfavorably, and perhaps even 
override the system. Findings indicate that commercial drivers found an interactive ISA 
system adverse relative to an advisory system (Biding & Lind, 2002), and drivers were 
reported as having sabotaged other vehicle safety systems (Van Houten & Malenfant, 
2006). Moreover, Harms et al. (2007) report that younger drivers aged 18-28 rated 
mandatory and interactive systems less desirably than advisory ISA. As this age group 
speeds more often than older drivers, stakeholders may benefit from considering the 
preferences of this demographic. However, proponents who more staunchly support ISA 
may argue that the benefits of limiting speeding outweighs driver acceptance. A cost-
benefit analysis completed by Carsten and Tate (2005) led the authors to conclude that 
mandatory ISA offered the largest benefit, although there were significant but smaller 
benefits for the advisory and interactive systems. Further support for mandatory ISA is 
found from subjective results. Almqvist and Nygard (1997) and Duynstee et al. (2001) 
reported that a majority of their participants reacted positively toward the mandatory 
ISA systems. Given any ratings that suggest mandatory ISA is acceptable, proponents of 
mandatory ISA might argue that drivers would eventually accept such technology. 
Thus there is debate about the appropriate level of control, with supporting 
evidence on both sides. Moreover, there are factors that indicate that the optimal level 
of ISA automation is still undecided, and these factors are of particular relevance to the 
current project. ISA researchers have studied only drivers and geographic regions 
outside of the United States. The findings of Varheiyi and Makinen (2001) indicate 
substantial cultural differences with regard to ISA acceptance. Second, individuals who 
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rated the more controlling systems positively were biased toward wanting such a 
system. Some participants were told the nature of the system prior to signing up for the 
study, i.e, they actively sought to participate in a study designed to reduce speeding (see 
Almqvist & Nygard, 1997 and Duynstee et al., 2001). Finally, results suggest more 
automated ISA systems have potential negative behavioral adaptations (Hjalmdahl & 
Varheiyi, 2004). 
In sum, the ultimate goal of reducing speeding behavior would surely be met by 
a mandatory system. However, whether drivers, particularly United States drivers who 
have yet to be exposed to ISA, would accept such a system or whether there may be 
negative behavioral adaptations is not yet determined. With the intention of maximizing 
acceptance of ISA and with the goal of maintaining a fully crossed experimental design, 
the current project will test an advisory ISA system. Although advisory and interactive 
systems are a focus, systems using a higher level of automation are a significant part of 
a discussion about potential behavioral adaptations to ISA. 
Sweden's ISA Field Study. To date, the most comprehensive ISA effort occurred in 
Sweden between 1999 and 2002 (Biding & Lind, 2002), with several field studies and 
post-hoc analyses following the original large scale evaluation (e.g., Adell & Varheiyi, 
2008; Hjalmdahl & Varheiyi, 2004; Hultkrantz & Lindberg, 2003). The following summary 
of the Swedish National Road Administration's (SNRA) effort comes largely from the 
report authored by Biding and Lind. The SNRA tested four systems in four urban areas 
over a 2 year period. Two systems were advisory (used in the city of Umea and 
Borlange). A major goal for the Umea location was a wide scale deployment of the 
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system, and because the cost of GPS based ISA was prohibitively expensive for the 4000 
vehicles that took part in the study at Umea, this test area used transponder 
technology. The Borlange site (400 vehicles) and the remaining two sites used the GPS 
based ISA. These remaining two field test sites were the cities of Lund (290 vehicles) and 
Lidkoping (280 vehicles). Participants in Lund drove vehicles with interactive systems 
that used a variation of the AAP described above. Participants in the Lidkoping either 
drove vehicles with an advisory system or AAP plus an advisory system. 
Although different variations of ISA systems were tested at the four sites, the 
experimental design was essentially the same at each location. Experimenters recorded 
baseline driving measures and subjective ratings during the first month of the trial. After 
recording baseline measures, the ISA systems became active and the same measures 
were recorded. The analyses compared the pre-ISA activation period with two post-ISA 
periods of one month each. The first post-period occurred immediately following system 
activation, and the second post-test period was approximately a year later. The ISA 
system was active during both post-periods. Across the four sites, there were significant 
reductions in the percentage of speed violations during the first post-activation period 
relative to the baseline period. For example on 70 km/hour roads, speed limit violations 
reduced 18 percentage points in Lund on 70 km/hour roads and 13 percentage points in 
Borlange. Overall, the reductions ranged from 10 to 20 percentage points across sites 
and speed limits. Effects on speed were similar for the interactive system that provided 
accelerator pedal feedback and the advisory system. During the second baseline period, 
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speed violations were significantly lower than the baseline period, although the effect 
was attenuated. This attenuation suggests that drivers may habituate to the system. 
In contrast to objective measures of speed, which indicated similar effects 
between the interactive and advisory systems, the ISA systems received different ratings 
of general acceptance. For example, prior to the onset of the field trial, participants 
were asked whether having an ISA system would be "good." The respondents provided 
ratings for each type of ISA system used in the study. There were differences between 
the individuals who expressed interest about participating and those who did not, with 
those uninterested in participation feeling less positive toward all ISA automation levels. 
The range of positive ratings for those not interested in participating in the ISA study 
was approximately 15% to 45%, whereas the range of positive ratings for those who 
were interested in participating was 20% to 80%. Prior to and after driving with the 
systems, participants rated the advisory systems more favorably than the interactive 
systems. Participants disliked the psychophysical parameters of the auditory warning. 
Twenty percent of the individuals who used the system admitted to trying to deactivate 
the auditory warning, and many indicated that a "softer" tone would be more 
acceptable. Drivers who experienced the advisory systems stated that a variable alarm 
pulse rate that increased as the speed violation increased would be desirable. Many of 
the negative ratings associated with the interactive systems were due to mechanical 
problems, and Biding and Lind (2002) suggested that ratings would likely have been 
more positive had the functional issues not surfaced. The participants also provided 
acceptance ratings by indicating whether or not they would keep the system. 
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Approximately 66% of the participants indicated that they would keep the system if 
given the opportunity. However, only 33% of the participants indicated that they would 
pay to keep the system. 
The results reported by Biding and Lind (2002) also included ratings of perceived 
mental workload. The workload scale was similar to the NASA TLX (Hart & Staveland, 
1988.) Specifically, the individuals rated the extent to which ISA affected perceived 
temporal demand, attentional demand and time stress. As mentioned by Comte (2000) 
there is concern that ISA may affect attentional resources negatively by removing the 
operator from the loop, increasing frustration associated with the interface, or 
potentially reducing workload associated by eliminating the task load associated with 
monitoring speed. Biding and Lind's participants rated the advisory systems as having 
more attentional demand than driving without the system. In contrast, participants 
rated the interactive systems as having less attentional demand. 
In sum, the Swedish large-scale ISA field test demonstrated that ISA was 
effective in reducing speed, although the effect decreased in magnitude at the second 
post-test period relative to the first post-test period. The majority of drivers who 
participated in the study indicated that they would continue to use the system -
provided they did not have to pay for its use. Despite the negative ratings related to 
frustration and feelings of being a hindrance to other drivers, which could arguably be 
attributed other vehicles on the road traveling faster, the participants overwhelmingly 
(a range of 70% to 90%) admitted that ISA was useful for maintaining speed. A final sign 
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of ISA acceptance were participant ratings that indicated ISA should be available for 
certain groups, such as teen drivers, and locations, such as hospitals. 
Thus, the Swedish trial was successful and suggests that ISA has promise. 
However, the study had limitations. For example, the participants were not 
representative of at-risk drivers. Across the four test sites, participants averaged 
approximately 50 years of age, an age at which speeding is less of a problem (Quimby et 
al., 2007), relative to younger age groups. Younger drivers may particularly benefit from 
ISA, but this age group may have a significantly different experience than participants in 
the Swedish field test. For example, 20% of Biding and Lind's participants admitted to 
trying to deactivate the advisory system; if younger drivers are less accepting this 
percentage could be greater. Another limitation of the sample relates to participant 
recruitment. Participants were fully aware of the study's purpose and goals and were 
willing to have their cars instrumented and driving performance recorded for the full 
test period. The self report data concerning ISA acceptance reported by Biding and Lind 
(2002) that revealed differences between field test participants and non-participants 
supports the notion that participants were biased toward having a positive view of ISA. 
Therefore, the findings may only generalize to older individuals with favorable attitudes 
toward automation. 
Two final limitations of the study were related to the experimental design. The 
experimenters did not use a control group and therefore cannot rule out that 
differences were due to historical events. In fact, the authors mention that there were 
significant traffic calming and enforcement efforts during the study period. A second 
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limitation was the absence of a post-ISA measurement period to measure driving 
performance after removal of the system. Therefore, it is not possible to answer 
whether or not permanent behavior change occurred in association with exposure to 
the system. Would drivers be more mindful of speed limits, or could there be some 
negative behavioral adaptation such as failing to monitor the speed limit because of an 
expectation that the system would do so? Subsequent ISA research attempted to 
address some of these and additional questions about how various ISA systems might 
affect driving behavior. 
Follow-up Studies to the Sweden's Large Scale Field Test. 
Removal of ISA after Long Term Use. Hjalmdahl and Varheiyi (2004) tested for 
the effect of ISA removal after drivers drove with the system for several months. A 
subsample of participants from the Lund site drove a preplanned 30km route at two 
different periods. The first period occurred prior to the activation of ISA, and the second 
period occurred after the participants had driven with ISA for six months. Half of the 
30km route occurred within the digitally mapped area, and the remaining portion 
occurred outside of the mapped area. Thus, it was possible to compare the interaction 
between test period, (pre-ISA activation versus post-ISA activation), and drive segment 
(ISA controlled versus non-ISA controlled). Hjalmdahl and Varheiyi (2004) indicated that 
upon entering the non-ISA controlled route segment during the post-activation drive, 
several drivers failed to notice speed limit changes that occurred outside of this range. 
In contrast, the same drivers rarely failed to adjust their speed when they entered this 
region during the pre-activation drive. These results strongly suggest that drivers had a 
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behavioral adaptation; they appeared to delegate to the vehicle the task of monitoring 
for and reacting to speed limit changes, whereas the drivers had sole responsibility of 
speed monitoring during the pre-activation phase. 
This finding is compelling for theories about the effects of automation on 
operator performance. Specifically, Parasuraman and Riley (1997) suggest that there are 
several potential reactions to automation. One potential effect described by these 
authors is overreliance on the system. The authors site empirical work that suggests the 
probability for overreliance increases as a system's reliability increases. As the ISA 
system was reported to be reliable within the mapped area, and given that drivers failed 
to detect the speed limit changes, it is possible that these individuals were over relying 
on the system as suggested by Parasuraman and Riley. However, Hjalmdahl and 
Varhelyi's (2004) study looked only at a single 30km post-activation drive, and during 
half of this drive the participants experienced the interactive ISA. Given the authors' 
design, it was not possible to test if drivers would reallocate the task to themselves after 
realizing that the system was no longer active or how long a period of time it might take 
if the reallocation did occur. For example, scenarios in which drivers drive for extended 
periods of time with and extended periods without ISA might show allocation of speed 
monitoring to the vehicle during the ISA period and then a gradual reallocation to the 
driver during the post-ISA period. An objective of the current project is to further 
examine the potential for automation misuse as described by Parasuraman & Riley. To 
accomplish this objective, the current study tested the effects of a one week post-ISA 
period. 
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The Effect of ISA on Tertiary Measures. Post-hoc analyses of the large scale 
Swedish field study assessed hypothesized effects on measures that were tangentially 
related to speeding or speeding violations. Varheiyi, Hjalmdahl, Hyde, and Draskoczy 
(2004) completed several in-depth analyses from the field test site in Lund, which used 
the active accelerator pedal, and reported that individuals with the ISA drove with less 
speed variance after the ISA activated. This finding of reduced speed variance is 
important; as reviewed by Shinar (2007), minimizing differences in speed between 
vehicles on the same road reduces potential confrontations that should lead to reduced 
crashes. In addition to reduced speed variance, Varheiyi et al. also reported a significant 
reduction in emissions at approximately 40% of sample sites. Given concerns about 
global warming among the general public, such findings could provide another line of 
support for the use of ISA. Of course this assumes that the effect of ISA is permanent. 
Habituation to ISA warning. The advisory ISA system that was studied at 2 of the 
4 sites in the Sweden large scale study showed initial large effects on speeding, but a 
follow-up analysis reported by Warner and Aberg (2008) indicates that initial effects 
may decrease over time. Specifically, the authors examined a subsample at the Borlange 
site and compared speeding performance at 4 time periods from 2 to 4 weeks prior to 
activation to 3 years after activation. The effect of ISA on speeding reduced significantly 
as time progressed. At one speed limit level (i.e., 45 km/hour), speed during the final 
measurement period was no different than during the pre-test. However, reductions in 
speed were significant at the other speed limit levels during the final measurement 
period, albeit a smaller effect than during the initial post-ISA period. 
Additional ISA Studies. The effort of the SNRA was admirable and offshoot 
reports will surely continue from the field trial. It is likely that Sweden's endeavor also 
provided motivation for researchers in other countries. For example, in Belguim 
Vlassenroot et al. (2007) reported mixed results of an interactive ISA. On high speed 
roads, participants sped a smaller portion of the time, but this effect was not found for 
lower speed roads. However, the study had several flaws. In particular, the authors' 
intention of recording pre-ISA speed behavior was not met because of equipment 
failure. 
Using a more rigorous experimental design, Regan et al. (2006) evaluated the 
effects of an ISA system on speed of a sample of Australian drivers. The system paired 
advisory information with an active accelerator pedal. The design used by Regan et al. 
was novel relative to other ISA studies because the researchers repeatedly introduced 
and removed the ISA system and observed the resulting effects. Specifically, participants 
began with a baseline period of 1,500 kilometers, and then drove 3 experimental 
phases. A phase comprised a 1,500 kilometer drive with ISA and a 1,500 kilometer drive 
without the system. The authors reported that the system reduced speed violations, 
defined as time spent more than 10 km/hour over the limit. The authors also reported 
that speed variance decreased during ISA phases. Interestingly, Regan et al. reported 
that there was no difference between travel times as a function of the ISA. A potential 
negative result reported by Regan et al. (2006) was that speeds increased significantly 
when the ISA system was removed, which suggests that ISA did not affect permanent 
change. 
A major effort was recently completed in the United Kingdom (Personal 
communication, Carsten, March 2008; Carsten & Tate, 2005; Jamson et al. 2006.) Part of 
the UK's effort involved the examination of economic, legal, and macro system issues. If 
Carsten and Tate's (2005) estimate of a 37% reduction in fatal crashes were valid in the 
US, approximately 15,000 lives would be saved - annually. In addition to the UK, other 
countries have ongoing or recently completed but not published field tests. These 
countries include Canada (personal communication with Paul Boase, April 29, 2008.), 
China, France, and Belgium (Jamson et al. 2006). One ISA research endeavor with 
potential is to pair ISA technology with monetary incentives, e.g., insurance premium 
discounts, to determine the extent to which external motivation might reduce speeding. 
Studies that Used Incentives. The goal of the current project was to test the 
effect of an advisory ISA similar to the system used by Warner and Aberg (2008) on 
driver speed and acceptance. In addition, the current study tested whether an external 
motivator, a cash bonus for observing the speed limit, by itself or paired with an ISA 
system affected speeding. There are insurance companies that provide discounts to 
drivers who document that they avoid situations that increase crash risk. From a 
behavioral perspective, this might be viewed as negative reinforcement. As speeding is 
one of these risk factors, ISA could be paired with the insurance policies. To date, it 
appears that two research efforts measured how incentives interacted with ISA. 
Hultkrantz and Linberg (2003) completed a project using vehicles from the Swedish field 
trial. The authors included 4 groups of drivers: 2 "bonus" groups (high versus low bonus 
amount) were crossed with 2 penalty groups (high versus low penalty). The "bonus" 
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variable refers to the amount of money drivers could receive if they heeded speed 
limits. The high bonus group could earn approximately $100 per month; the low bonus 
group could earn $50 per month. The "penalty" variable referred to how much the 
money the drivers lost for each violation of the limit. Drivers were penalized based on 
the magnitude of violation; the penalty for speeds 20% over the speed limit was 10 
times greater than violations that were 1 to 10% over the speed limit. Hultkrantz and 
Linberg (2003) also included 2 "control" groups that received high and low bonus 
amounts but were not penalized for speed violations. Drivers received a monthly report 
that documented how frequently they violated the speed limit and how much of a 
reward they would receive. 
Hultkrantz and Lindberg (2003) focused on three ranges of speed violations 0 to 
10% over the speed limit; 11 to 20% over the limit; and more than 21% over the limit. 
The authors reported a reduction in speed violations for all six participant groups during 
the first month; during this initial period there was a tendency for the drivers who were 
penalized for speeding to have fewer speed violations than the drivers who were not 
penalized, but the trend was not statistically significant. However, when the authors 
compared the violations of the "penalty" groups to the "no penalty" groups, a large 
difference was found, with the "penalty" drivers reducing their speed violations 
significantly more than the "no penalty" group. Hultkrantz and Lindberg (2003) also 
noted that participants who were assigned to the lower bonus group had greater 
reductions in violations than drivers who were assigned to higher bonus group. Few 
differences were noted between the drivers who were in the high penalty group relative 
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to the low penalty group. These findings suggest that the potential to earn money is a 
viable external motivator for encouraging speed limit compliance, but also indicate that 
the contingency structure requires careful consideration. 
A more recent project completed in Denmark also measured the effect of 
monetary incentive and an advisory ISA system on speeding behavior (Harms et al. 
2007.) The authors described the advisory system as having visual and auditory displays, 
and the monetary incentive was the potential to receive a 30% discount on vehicle 
insurance premiums. The negative reinforcement schedule worked in a manner such 
that participants received an audible verbal warning when their speed was greater than 
5 km/hour over the speed limit for six seconds. If the driver continued to speed the 
warning would repeat at 12 and 18 seconds. At 18 seconds, penalty points, which were 
defined as a reduction of the 30% insurance discount, would accrue. Harms et al. had 
four treatment groups: ISA only, ISA and penalty, penalty only, and neither ISA nor 
penalty points. The field study lasted for 6 months, with an initial 6 week baseline 
period. The authors divided the post-ISA period into 2 periods and showed that the 
participants in the three treatment groups effectively reduced their speeds, whereas the 
control participants did not change their speeding behavior during the study period. 
Harms et al. reported an interaction between the information group (ISA only), 
combination group (ISA + penalty points), and incentive group on the extent to which 
participants drove at speeds greater than 5kph. The two groups that had ISA reduced 
their speeds significantly more than the incentive and control groups during the first and 
second ISA periods. The authors reported that all groups but the control group 
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increased the proportion of time spent driving at speeds that ranged from -5 to +5 km 
per hour within the speed limit. 
In sum, Hultkrantz and Lindberg (2003) and Harms et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that ISA paired with the external motivation of money resulted in reduced speed 
violations. The first study used a form of positive reinforcement, with the magnitude of 
the reward contingent on the level of speed limit compliance, whereas Harms et al. used 
negative reinforcement, the reduction of insurance premiums. However, their studies 
leave several questions unanswered. For example, neither study monitored speeding 
violation after removing the ISA or the incentive. Some work suggests that no lasting 
behavioral change occurs after exposure to ISA (i.e., Regan et al. 2006), but Regan et al. 
did not use an incentive, which limits comparability with studies that did. Moreover, the 
samples using incentives were biased, particularly the Hultkrantz and Lindberg study, 
which used participants from the original Swedish field trial. Thus, the limitations of 
Biding and Lind (2002) apply here. Although Harms et al. used a sample of younger 
drivers, i.e., aged 18 to 28, their participants were significantly more agreeable toward 
automation than individuals who declined to participate. 
The current study differed from the two monetary incentive studies with regard 
to the interface for individuals in the incentive conditions. Hultkrantz and Lindberg 
(2003) provided a monthly report to their participants that informed them about their 
bonus amounts and speeding behavior, and Harms et al's (2007) participants could view 
their insurance bonus "overnight" but did not indicate how this occurred. In the current 
study, the incentive amount was displayed on the dashboard when drivers started and 
turned off their vehicles. 
Summary of Existing ISA Research. 
In sum, intelligent speed adaptation is a relatively new technology, so there are 
several research questions yet to be answered. However, there have been a number of 
evaluations that allow some conclusions to be drawn about the potential positive and 
negative effects that may result with deployment of the system. As suggested by 
Carsten and Tate (2005) the research reviewed in this document suggests that the net 
effect of ISA seems positive, yet because of the limited history of ISA and some negative 
findings it would be premature to recommend wide scale adoption, particularly in the 
US where it is untested. 
Benefits of ISA. The main benefit of ISA seems to be reduced propensity to 
speed, which should lead to a reduction in crashes. Nearly all work cited above indicates 
this positive effect of the system, regardless of the level of automation. Some authors 
found the effect to be consistent across roads with various speeds (e.g., Regan et al. 
2006; Varheiyi & Makinen, 2001); whereas others found that certain speed limits were 
associated with attenuated effects (Warner & Aberg, 2008.) In addition to reducing the 
proportion of time that drivers violated the speed limit, some researchers reported 
reduced speed variance (Regan et al., 2006; Varheiyi et al., 2004), which is also 
suggested to lower crash risk (Shinar, 2007). A third objective measure shown to be 
positively affected by ISA was vehicle emissions (Varheiyi et al. 2004.) 
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These effects would combine to provide a significant economic benefit to 
countries that had wide scale deployment of ISA (Carsten & Tate, 2005.) The costs of 
crashes associated with speeding are estimated at 40 billion dollars per annum (NHTSA, 
2007). If Carsten and Tates' estimates of ISA savings were accurate, ISA could lower this 
annual cost by 10 to 15 billion dollars. Finally, lowered vehicle emissions offer a 
significant societal benefit that may be more appropriately measured by a change in air 
quality. Cleaner air may in turn affect the prevalence of health issues such as respiratory 
function, although such a long term impact would be difficult to quantify. 
Subjective results indicate ISA may also lower some aspects of mental workload, 
although these results were less conclusive than the objective results. Biding and Lind 
(2002) indicated that the level of automation affected various dimensions of workload 
ratings differently. For example, their interactive system was associated with lowered 
stress in high traffic situations; evidently removing speed monitoring from the drivers' 
task load reduced this component of mental workload. 
A final subjective benefit of ISA is to the attitudes of the drivers who experience 
ISA. Participants in Europe, in general, had positive attitudes toward ISA. For example, 
Adell and Varheiyi (2008) reported that drivers felt that ISA made them safer drivers, 
and drivers also acknowledged that it reduced their chances of receiving tickets. 
Moreover, Carsten (2002) reviews work that suggests the attitude toward ISA continues 
to improve. Originally thought of as ludicrous for mechanical and privacy reasons, the 
idea of ISA being widely deployed is gaining more acceptance. However, as Carsten 
cautions, this favorable attitude may be in conflict with objectivity. In fact a bias to 
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promoting ISA could lead to "automation abuse", i.e., the implementation of 
automation without fully considering potential outcomes (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Given the following summary of negative effects, it is clear that continued, objective 
evaluation of the effects of ISA is necessary to avoid such automation abuse. 
Costs of ISA. In contrast to some findings that suggested ISA might lower stress 
levels as a result of lowering task load, there were consistent findings that suggested 
drivers experienced elevated levels of stress, frustration, and temporal demand (Biding 
& Lind, 2002; Comte, 2000; Varheiyi & Makinen, 2001.) These ratings were found to be 
similar for advisory, interactive, and mandatory ISA systems. Regarding the lowest level 
of automation, advisory ISA, the results were somewhat mixed. For example, Harms et 
al. (2007) reported that drivers preferred this level relative to interactive and mandatory 
ISA, whereas Biding and Lind and Brookhuis and De Waard (1999) indicate that the 
auditory displays were particularly annoying features of the advisory system. In addition 
to annoyance, long term use of advisory ISA may result with habituation to the warning 
and a return to pre-ISA speeding behaviors (Warner & Aberg, 2008). 
Staunch proponents of mandatory ISA may argue that minimizing annoyance is 
of little concern because drivers would have no choice but to adapt to a government-
mandated system. However, there are findings that suggest drivers who use mandatory 
or interactive ISA may change other safety related behaviors as a result of exposure to 
the system. These changes include shorter gap distances when turning, closer following 
distances, and poorer reallocation of the speed monitoring task (Comte, 2000; 
Hjalmdahl & Varheiyi, 2004). This failure of proper reallocation may be an example of 
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mode error that resulted from overreliance on the system (Sarter & Woods, 1995). 
Comte also cautions that for the higher level of ISA, automation complacency may result 
in cognitive underload, which could slow reaction times. This last concern seems 
possible, but the claim was not supported in the ISA literature. In sum, the potential for 
overreliance, mode error, and induced complacency seem to suggest that advisory may 
be the optimal choice. However, results suggest that drivers may eventually habituate 
to the auditory warning or may deactivate it if they find the alert annoying. 
In sum there are clear benefits to ISA yet there may be unintended 
consequences associated with all ISA levels that would reduce the safety benefits of the 
systems. The more severe behavioral adaptations, e.g., closer following distances, 
shorter gap acceptance, are associated with ISA systems that have a higher level of 
control. The minimization of these more severe behavioral adaptations is one basis for 
the use of an advisory system in the current project. In addition, this level of automation 
has the highest amount of driver acceptance (with the exception of annoyance level), 
which may result in less tampering. Ultimately, the proposed ISA system was selected 
based on the logic that all levels of ISA have shown reductions in speed, and the general 
population of drivers within the US should first be exposed to the most innocuous level 
of ISA automation and shown its benefits before testing the higher levels of automation. 
Careful design of the auditory interface may maximize speed reduction and driver 
acceptance of the system. 
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Features of the Tested ISA System: Automated Feedback & Monetary Incentive 
Temporally linking feedback to a target behavior is frequently shown to shape 
behavior (Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1986) and may increase the effects of ISA 
systems, particularly for drivers who are unintentionally speeding. Blincoe et al. (2006) 
surveyed drivers who were ticketed for speeding and found support for classifying the 
drivers into four groups based on participants' responses to questions about speeding. A 
significant proportion of two groups, 50% of "conformers" and 30% of "deterred 
drivers", indicated that inadequate signage was the main factor that caused their 
violation. These types of drivers may particularly benefit from and even appreciate 
immediate feedback when they violate the speed limit. 
In contrast to drivers who unintentionally violate the speed limit, drivers who 
intend to speed may ignore or disable advisories. Such drivers may need a more 
compelling reason to refrain from speeding. The principles of instrumental conditioning 
established over a century ago, applied in conjunction with ISA, might result in improved 
driving behavior. Specifically, drivers who are exposed to extrinsic motivation may 
reduce their driving speed relative to drivers who only receive advisories. Thus, a second 
variable manipulated tested in this study was a monetary incentive; drivers who 
complied with the speed limit received a bonus. The bonus diminished progressively for 
drivers who chose to speed. Therefore, the proposed behavioral contingency was a 
delayed incentive combined with an immediate disincentive. This section of the 
literature review first reviews work related to the auditory interface, followed by a 
discussion of using tangible rewards to alter behavior. 
49 
Designing Appropriate Auditory Messages. The auditory display was designed to 
alert drivers when their speed exceeded the limit. The clear purpose in providing the 
alert was to have drivers slow down; however, the alert does not force drivers to slow 
down. In fact, drivers who are purposefully speeding may want to ignore the signal. 
Given this situation, a goal of the project was to create an advisory message that is 
clearly salient yet introduces minimal annoyance to the driver. 
Marshall, Lee, and Austria (2007) provide a succinct summary of the 
relationships between annoyance, appropriateness, and perceived urgency of a sound. 
Alerts with a high level of perceived urgency are rated as annoying when the individual 
deems the alert to be inappropriate. Signals are judged to be appropriate when the level 
of perceived urgency of the warning matches the situational urgency, i.e., the true 
danger at the moment (Edworthy, Loxley, & Dennis, 1991). Marshall et al. completed a 
study in which participants rated several warnings in three contexts, i.e., warnings for a 
collision avoidance system, a navigation system, and an email system. The authors 
reported high positive correlations between ratings of appropriateness and perceived 
urgency when experimenters presented urgent signals in the collision avoidance 
context; weak correlations were reported between annoyance and urgency. In contrast, 
when Marshall et al. presented a less annoying warning with the low urgency situation, 
they found a strong relationship between annoyance and perceived appropriateness; in 
this situation, perceived urgency and appropriateness were uncorrelated. These findings 
suggest that in dire situations the user may benefit from what would be considered a 
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noxious stimulus in less urgent contexts. Conversely, less urgent sounds should be 
paired with lower priority matters to improve the appropriateness of the advisory. 
Edworthy et al. (1991) and Marshall et al. (2007) provide further insight 
regarding the relationship between urgency and annoyance and the parameters of the 
signal. As reviewed by Edworthy et al. designers typically follow four steps when 
creating the actual sound presented to the user. First, the designer must determine the 
appropriate decibel level of the sound, which can be a challenge in acoustically dynamic 
environments. The remaining three steps concern design of the pulse, the burst, and the 
time between bursts. When creating the pulse, e.g., a single beep or tone, the designer 
must specify its temporal and acoustical components. The duration of pulses tend to 
vary between 100-300 milliseconds (ms). In addition to duration the designer also 
determines the envelope, a term that describes how quickly the burst reaches peak 
amplitude and the characteristics of signal offsets. With regard to acoustical properties 
of the pulse, the designer must determine features such as speech versus non-speech 
and.the fundamental frequency of the signal. The designer also determines the qualities 
of the burst, or a unitized group of pulses, which include specifying the pulses to include 
in one burst, the interval between pulses, and the harmonic properties of the burst. 
Finally, the designer determines the time period between each burst. 
Research clearly indicates that manipulation of acoustical and temporal 
parameters affect the perceived urgency and annoyance of the sound. Researchers 
found the following conditions to increase perceived urgency: fast onset and offset of 
the signal, long pulse durations, short inter-pulse intervals, multiple pulse repetitions 
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per burst, loud signals, high fundamental frequencies, irregular harmonics, large pitch 
ranges, and atonal pitch ranges (Edworthy et al. 1991; Marshall et al. 2007; Spain & 
Bliss, accepted; Tan & Lerner, 1995.) In fact, Edworthy et al. created a series of 16 
different warnings and predicted with a high level of accuracy the order that 
participants would rank each signal with regard to perceived urgency. However, the 
Marshall et al. (2008) study discussed above indicates some parameters, e.g., burst 
offset, can be manipulated such that for a given level of perceived urgency, annoyance 
is minimized. 
Increasing perceived urgency while limiting annoyance was a goal of the current 
study because speed warnings were given to an action that has a low situational 
urgency, particularly for those drivers who are intentionally speeding. Given the lower 
level of situational urgency, an objective for the warning design was to create a signal 
perceived as, at least initially, more urgent than annoying. However, a second design 
feature of the speed advisory was the gradation to differentiate egregious speeding 
from moderate speed limit violations. The proposed study will pilot test several 
potential warning sounds such as synthesized complex waveforms designed to be 
perceived as melodious. 
Several additional factors associated with the presentation of the warning 
required pilot testing. For example, extensive pilot testing ensured that the system was 
functionally reliable, as the effect of trust on reliability is clear. If a warning is unreliable 
the user will have little reason for heeding the signal (Bliss & Fallon, 2006; Lee & See, 
2004; Lee & Moray, 1991; Spain & Bliss, accepted). Another factor that required 
52 
specification was the temporal tolerance of the signal; given that other drivers on the 
road will likely be speeding, it may be necessary to provide a period of time that allows 
drivers to adjust their speeds before the warning triggers. A final design consideration 
was the use of verbal versus non-verbal warnings; the current project considered only 
the latter. Although current technology allows the creation of realistic spoken warnings, 
the proposed study will use non-speech signals based on the recommendation of Lee 
and See (2004), who suggest that trust in automation may be compromised when using 
speech (but see Bliss & Kirkpatrick, 2000). In sum, the goal of the advisory ISA system 
was to alert drivers about their speed without annoying them to the extent that they 
tampered with the system. The alert informed those who are unaware of their speed, 
whereas an extrinsic motivator is to reduce intentional speeding. 
Using extrinsic motivation to reduce speeding. One expectation for this study 
was a significant effect of the advisory ISA system on unintentional speeding. In 
contrast, a delayed incentive - immediate disincentive contingency was expected to 
reduce intentional speeding, particularly when coupled with the advisory system. 
Incidents of unintentional speeding may be situations in which the advisory signal 
provides useful information to the driver. However, drivers frequently choose to speed; 
as reviewed above, they perceive compliance with the speed limit as having little 
benefit. Thus, the current study includes an economic incentive, an extrinsic motivator, 
as a means of increasing the perceived benefit of speed limit compliance. As succinctly 
stated by Eisenberger and Cameron (1996, p. 1164), "any leamable category of 
performance, including original thinking, can be effectively strengthened by reward." 
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There is debate about the effect of extrinsic motivators such as money on 
behavior (Benabou &Tirole, 2003; Deci, 1975; Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 1999; 
Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Kohn, 1993.) Some findings suggest extrinsic motivation 
may actually result in poorer performance than conditions in which no extrinsic 
motivation exists, and authors of this research argue that this negative effect is due to 
reductions in intrinsic task interest (see Deci, 1975). Participants in Deci's studies were 
or were not paid for working to solve puzzles. Experimenters using Deci's approach 
would observe how removal of reward affected participants' interaction with puzzle 
solving. Deci found that individuals who were in the reward condition stopped solving 
earlier and solved fewer puzzles than individuals who received no payment. 
Researchers also report that when there is a positive effect of tangible rewards, 
the effect tends to decrease over long term exposure to the extrinsic motivation 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2003.) A key to the argument that extrinsic motivation decreases 
intrinsic task interest is the nature of the task itself. Researchers who argue strongly 
about these negative effects of tangible rewards (e.g., Kohn, 1993; Deci et al., 1999) 
frequently discuss the rewards' effects on tasks with clear intrinsic interest. It is with 
such tasks that the authors report a negative relationship between task interest and 
tangible reward. 
The apparent lack of and sometimes negative effect of extrinsic motivation on 
tasks that have intrinsic interest has support, and many leaders in education research 
argue against their use because of this evidence. For example, Deci et al. (1999) 
completed an extensive meta-analysis that tested the effect of such motivation on tasks 
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with inherent interest. The studies included in the analysis compared the effects of 
various types of reinforcement schedules, e.g., completion dependent, performance 
dependent, and positive feedback on intrinsic motivation. Deci et al. reported that 
extrinsic rewards, except for positive verbal feedback, consistently lowered intrinsic 
motivation. The authors conceded that concrete incentives were successful, but they 
referred to them as "controllers." Such incentives consistently changed behavior, but 
the individuals who received controllers also perceived the task as less interesting than 
individuals who received well-constructed verbal feedback or no feedback. Such 
controllers are assumed to undermine feelings of competence and self-determination, 
which are the central causal constructs associated with cognitive evaluation theory (see 
Deci, 1975.) These findings from psychological research fuel the debate about the 
effectiveness of bonuses in the workplace (see Kohn, 1993). 
In contrast to Deci (1975) and Kohn (1993), Lazear (2000) indicates that pay 
based incentives significantly improve output. Lazear had the opportunity to evaluate a 
"natural experiment." Safelite, a windshield replacement service company, changed 
ownership in the 1990s. The new owners offered their employees the chance to switch 
salary payment structure from an hourly rate to a quantity based performance pay 
structure. Individuals who switched to the performance based system had the 
opportunity to earn more money and were guaranteed a minimum amount, which was 
close to their previous hourly wage. Workers were free to choose whether they wanted 
to continue being paid the hourly rate or switch to a new structure. Lazear was able to 
show that output increased by 44% relative to the output with hourly wages. The author 
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emphasized that output continued to increase with the time on the program; this 
suggests that the results are unlikely due to the Hawthorne effect. Finally, Lazear (2000) 
emphasized that the experiment controlled for workers who sacrificed quality for 
quantity; workers had to pay for and install a new windshield before more work would 
be given. 
Although the work of Lazear clearly supports the concept of performance pay, 
and Deci (1975) argues against it, other research indicates mixed results. Pokorny (2006) 
reports the results of a study that found a u-shaped function between incentive amount 
and performance on IQtests. Participants who received no incentive performed 
significantly worse than individuals who received a small bonuses. However, the 
solution rate of the no-incentive group was similar to a group of participants who 
received high bonuses. In addition to incentive amount, Heyman and Ariely (2004) 
provided evidence to suggest the market relationship affects intrinsic task interest. The 
authors' work indicates that intrinsic motivation appears to be more crucial in social 
markets, where monetary rewards are not available. Social markets contrast with 
money markets. Heyman and Ariely results indicate that the potential cash incentive 
clearly affects individuals' willingness to engage in the hypothetical task of helping move 
furniture. Specifically, individuals offered a high reward were more willing to help than 
individuals offered a lesser reward. However, individuals who were assigned to the 
social markets were more willing to help than individuals assigned to the low reward 
group. 
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An added level to the debate about rewards is that the type of contingency is a 
significant determinant of effectiveness (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). Specifically, the 
authors reviewed three types of tangible rewards. Performance independent rewards 
are those given simply for engaging in an activity. The activity need not be completed 
much less completed well; the individual simply must engage in the task to receive the 
reward, e.g., shows up to move furniture. Completion dependent rewards are those 
given when individuals accomplish a predetermined task. Quality dependent rewards 
describe rewards dependent upon a predetermined standard. Proponents of cognitive 
evaluation theory such as Deci et al. (1999) argue that extrinsic rewards lower self 
determination and competence. Eisenberger and Cameron's (1996) review suggests that 
cognitive evaluation theory has difficulty with predictions about the effects of quality 
dependent rewards. These rewards should increase feelings of competence because the 
individual receives the bonus only if they perform well. Further, cognitive evaluation 
theory cannot accurately predict whether competence or self determination plays a 
larger role in the effect of rewards. A second argument presented by Eisenberger and 
Cameron suggests that Deci's paradigm is flawed. The common paradigm is to introduce 
a task with reward, and then measure engagement in the task after removing the 
reward. When individuals engage more in the task after removal of reward, researchers 
conclude that the reward lowered intrinsic motivation. However, it would be more 
appropriate to conclude in these situations that the removal of the reward affected 
behavior, not the reward itself. After presenting these arguments that counter cognitive 
evaluation theory, Eisenberger and Cameron presented the results of a meta-analysis. 
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When the authors controlled for the type of reinforcement, only expected, performance 
independent rewards adversely affected intrinsic task interest. Further, the authors 
suggested that learned helplessness could easily explain the results associated with such 
performance independent rewards. Unlike cognitive evaluation theory, this explanation 
faces no ambiguity predicting the effect of quality dependent rewards. 
In sum, there appear to be mixed effects of incentives on behavior. In conditions 
where the task has little intrinsic motivation, incentives may be effective (Benabou & 
Tirole, 2003). However, in such unappealing situations described by Benabou and Tirole, 
the effectiveness of an incentive is frequently short lived. Researchers who use extrinsic 
motivators must also consider that behavioral contingencies such as punishment may be 
more effective than incentives when individuals know they are monitored. In addition, 
Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) reported that a quality dependent reward structure, 
which was the structure used in the proposed study, does not adversely affect behavior. 
Finally, the work of Lazear (2000) provides ecological validity to the notion that 
economic incentives can effectively increase desired performance. 
Much of this section presented literature that focused on the effects of extrinsic 
reward on intrinsic task interest. However, the current study used an incentive to shape 
behavior for a task which is not intrinsically motivating. It is the converse of the target 
behavior, speeding, that has intrinsic appeal for many. In fact, a premise of the current 
project is that little intrinsic motivation exists with strict compliance to speed limits. The 
exception may be for individuals who perceive safety to be sufficiently threatened by 
speeding or for drivers who perceive the probability of a sanction to be substantially 
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high. In other words, speed limit compliance is likely only intrinsically rewarding to 
individuals who do not speed. However, the literature (i.e., Freedman et al. 2007; Shinar 
et al. 1999; Shinar, 2007) suggests that these individuals would be statistical outliers. 
Based on the assumptions that the target behavior in the current study is 
unappealing and that tangible incentives are successful motivators with such behaviors, 
adverse effects of monetary incentive on speeding were unexpected. Further, based on 
prospect theory (Kahneman et al. 1982), an incentive framed as a potential loss can 
affect decision making. The incentive structure was designed such that drivers assigned 
to the incentive condition began with a full bonus and lost portions of the incentive 
based on speeding. Thus, these drivers faced a loss, and based on prospect theory this 
outcome was expected to lead to decisions to minimize the loss. In addition to this 
relationship between losses and gains, a monetary incentive may close the gap between 
the perceived benefits associated with speeding versus not speeding. 
In addition to emphasizing the potential loss of the cash bonus, the type of 
reward contingency was expected to affect compliance. According to Eisenberger and 
Cameron (1996), quality dependent rewards serve to guide behavior in the desired 
direction. The proposed incentive is such a reward; drivers receive the full award only if 
they adhere to the speed tolerance. In addition to the reward structure itself, some 
researchers might frame the subtraction of the bonus for speeding as a punishment. As 
indicated by Benabou and Tirole (2003), punishment is effective when the individual 
knows that their behavior is monitored, as will be the case in the proposed study. These 
same authors suggest that when the activity associated with reward is unappealing, i.e., 
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reducing speed, monetary rewards are effective. In sum, decision making research 
suggests that the incentive will lead to reduced speeding as does the literature from 
behavior theory (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996) and economics (Lazear, 2000). 
Feedback Coupled with Monetary Incentive. One treatment group in the current 
study received exposure to the monetary incentive (Ml) and the automated feedback 
(AF). Anecdotal evidence led to the expectations that these individuals would change 
their speeding behavior to a greater extent than either Ml or AF groups alone. For 
example, the recent soaring of fuel prices drew attention to the Toyota Prius hybrid, 
which provides feedback about miles per gallon in real time. The Washington Post 
(Rosenwald, 2008) featured a story about Prius owners who compete to get the best 
MPG. These "hypermilers" are using the instantaneous feedback provided by the 
vehicle's display to help them save gas, the monetary incentive. This anecdotal evidence 
is supported by Balcazar et al. (1986) who analyzed over 100 studies that assessed the 
effects of feedback on employee performance. Consistent, robust improvements 
resulted from the pairing of tangible consequences and feedback. The authors argue 
that these particular feedback structures achieve success because the feedback 
becomes a conditioned reinforcer. This theoretical principle was key to the central 
hypothesis of this study. A summary table of the literature review precedes the 
proposed hypotheses. 
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TABLE 1: Literature Review Summary Table 
Driving too fast for conditions is listed as causal factor for 
approximately 12,000 deaths per year . 
1. NHTSA (2007) 
Speeding is widespread ; drivers speed for many reasons 
(pragmatism, emotion, habit)3; drivers rate speeding as a 
relatively low safety risk 
2. Blincoe etal. (2006) 
3. McKenna (2005) 
4. Shinar etal. (1999) 
Speed increases the probability and severity of crashes. Impact 
forces increase exponentially as speed increases. 
Speeding places time pressure on information processing. 
Decision making theorists would suggest that drivers use 
heuristics when choosing to speed and conclude that probable 
gains (saved time, increased enjoyment) outweigh probable 
costs (lost time, ticket, crash). 
5. Moore et al. (1995) 
6. Shinar (2007) 
7. Sternberg (1969) 
8. Kahneman etal. (1982) 
Reasons for Unintended speeding: human perceptual system 
adapts to constant velocity9 or attentional overload or failure1 . 
9. Schmidt & Tiffin (1969) 
10. Blincoe et al. (2006) 
ISA is a relatively new technology that shows promise as a 
speeding countermeasure. ISA not evaluated in US. ISA links 
GPS, speed limits, and speed of vehicle. User interface can 
provide information to driver about speed or limit speeding. 
11. Jamson etal. (2006) 
Three levels of ISA automation - advisory, interactive, and 
mandatory. Research has shown each level reduced frequency 
of speeding.1'14 Other benefits of ISA include fuel savings, 
reduced emissions, and lower workload associated with 
offloading speed monitoring task from driver to system. 
12. Carsten & Tate (2005) 
13. Biding & Lind (2002) 
14. Duynstee et al. (2001) 
15. Biding & Lind (2002) 
Potential costs of ISA include behavioral adaptations (decreased 
following distance, decreased gap acceptance) and increased 
mental workload associated with temporal demand and 
frustration. ' 
16. Comte (2000) 
17. Varheiyi & Makinen (2001) 
One application of advisory ISA is to combine the advisory 
system with a behavioral contingency that uses extrinsic 
motivation. Two European studies showed these interventions 
to be effective. ' 
18. Hultkrantz & Lindberg (2003) 
19. Harms etal. (2007) 
There is a debate about the effectiveness of extrinsic 
motivators such as money. Some researchers argue that such 
reinforcement is ineffective and that it lowers intrinsic 
motivation. Other researcher indicates that quality dependent 
rewards effectively change behavior.21 Linking feedback with 
extrinsic rewards consistently changes behavior. 
20. Deci etal. (1999) 
21. Eisneberger & Cameron (1995) 
22. Balcazar etal. (1986) 
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HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses Associated with Speed. 
Hypothesis la. There was an interaction predicted between monetary incentive 
(Ml) and automated feedback (AF). The combination of Ml + AF was predicted to result 
in significantly lower speeds than the Ml-only, AF-only conditions, and the baseline and 
control conditions (Balcazar et al., 1986; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Harms et al., 
2007; Hultkrantz & Linberg, 2003). The Ml condition was predicted to result in 
significantly lower speeds than the control and baseline conditions (Lazear, 2002). 
Similarly, the AF treatment condition was predicted to result in lower speeds than the 
control and baseline conditions (Blincoe et al., 2006; Balcazar et al., 1986). The AF and 
Ml treatment conditions occurred during Weeks 2 and 3 of experimental trials. The 
baseline conditions (no-AF and no-MI) occurred during Weeks 1 and 4. A control group 
of drivers drove their full trial without Ml or AF. 
Hypothesis lb. Percentage of time speeding was predicted to be significantly 
lower for individuals who were assigned to the Ml + AF treatment condition relative to 
the baseline period, the control group, and the three other MI/AF treatment conditions. 
The speed variance of the AF-only and Ml-only groups was predicted to be significantly 
lower than the No-MI/No-AF conditions. Predictions follow from the work of Regan et 
al. (2005) and Varheiyi et al. (2004). 
Hypothesis lc. This hypothesis concerned the correlation between self report 
beliefs and behaviors about speeding before experiencing the incentive or the advisory 
and observed speed measures during the experimental trials. Individuals who on the self 
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report measures indicated a proclivity for speeding were predicted to have higher speed 
measures than participants who had lower scores on these measures (Haglund & Aberg, 
2000). 
Hypotheses Associated with Subjective Mental Workload 
Hypothesis 2a. This hypothesis pertained to testing perceived mental workload 
as measured by the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988.) Individuals assigned to the AF 
and Ml treatment groups were predicted to have significantly higher ratings of 
perceived workload relative to control participants. The difference between the 
experimental and control group will be largely explained by the differences predicted in 
hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 2b. This hypothesis was for the testing of the "frustration" and 
"temporal demand" dimensions of the NASA-TLX. Based on previous ISA work (e.g., 
Biding & Lind, 2002; Comte, 2000; and Varheiyi & Makinen, 2002), individuals assigned 
to the AF-only condition were predicted to rate "frustration" and "temporal demand" 
significantly higher than individuals in the remaining experimental and control groups. 
Similarly, individuals in the AF+MI condition were expected to give significantly higher 
ratings than the Ml-only condition and control participants. However, ratings provided 
by individuals in the AF+MI condition would be significantly lower for these two 
dimensions than the participants in the AF-only group. 
Hypothesis 2c. This hypothesis was for testing the effect of ISA on the mental 
workload dimensions of effort and mental demand. Because individuals assigned to the 
Ml-only condition were provided quality based extrinsic motivation to reduce speed, 
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they were expected to be more vigilant with regard to their speed monitoring relative to 
individuals in the control group (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). Individuals who 
received AF were predicted to experience lower mental demand to the extent that 
these individuals offload the task of monitoring speed (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Given the extrinsic motivation to maintain speed and the increased prioritization to the 
task of speed monitoring, the Ml-only group was predicted to have higher ratings of 
effort and mental demand. 
Hypotheses Associated with ISA Acceptance. 
Hypothesis 3a. Hypotheses 3a-3c were based on Biding and Lind (2002). 
Significant correlations were expected between driver acceptance of the AF system and 
initial attitudes toward automation in general. Individuals who provided favorable 
attitudes towards automation in general will have higher acceptance of the AF system 
relative to participants who indicated that they have negative views about automation. 
Hypothesis 3b. Ratings of acceptance were expected to be significantly greater 
for individuals in the Ml + AF conditions relative to individuals assigned to the Ml-only or 
AF-only conditions. 
Hypothesis 3c. A significant negative correlation was expected between the 
driver acceptance of ISA and the frustration dimension of the NASA-TLX. Individuals who 
indicate positive attitudes toward ISA would express less frustration via the TLX. 
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TABLE 2: Summary Table for Experimental Hypotheses 
Measure Prediction 
Average speed l a . l . Combined Ml + AF would result in greatest reduction in speed. 
la.2. Ml would result in reduction in speed relative to controls. 
la.3. AF would result in reduction in speed relative to controls. 
Percentage of time speeding l b . l . Ml + AF would lead to greatest percentage of time not speeding. 
lb.2. Ml would lead to greater reduction in speeding than controls. 
lb.3. AF would lead to greater reduction in speeding than controls. 
Self-report & observed speed lc . l . There would be a significant positive correlation between 
observed and self report speeding. 
Mental Workload 2a.1. Mental workload will be higher for drivers in the AF, Ml, or 
AF+MI conditions relative to baseline period and control groups. 
2b.l. Temporal demand and frustration would be highest for the AF. 
2b.2. Temporal demand and frustration would be higher for MI+AF 
than Ml. 
2c.l. Mental demand and effort would be higher with Ml. 
2c.2. Effort and mental demand would decrease with AF. 
Trust and Acceptance 3a.1. There would a significant positive relationship between attitudes 
toward automation in general and acceptance of AF and Ml. 
3b. l . Acceptance of Ml would be greater in MI+AF than Ml-only. 
3b.2. Acceptance of AF would be greater by MI+AF than AF only. 
3 d . There would be a significant negative relationship between 




The basic research design was a split plot design with one between and one 
within subjects factor. Fifty drivers were randomly assigned to three independent 
groups and were measured at four one-week periods creating the 3 (Monetary 
Incentive) X 4 (Automated Feedback (AF) Week) mixed factorial design. Monetary 
Incentive (Ml) was the between subjects variable, with 20 participants scheduled to get 
Ml and 30 (20 who received AF plus 10 control drivers) who drove without receiving Ml. 
The Automated Feedback (AF) system activated for one week, either Week 2 or Week 3. 
The 20 participants assigned to receive Ml and the 20 participants assigned to the no-MI 
conditions experienced the AF system. The 10 participants in the control group did not 
receive AF, but they did provide data at the same four periods as the 40 participants 
who received AF. Weeks 1 and 4 served as baseline and reversal periods for the 40 
experimental participants, respectively. Table 2 shows how AF and Ml were crossed 
during the AF period. The AF condition was counterbalanced within each Ml group; half 
of the Ml and half of the no-MI group received the advisory during Week 2 and the 
other half of each group experienced it during Week 3. 
66 
TABLE 3: Experimental Design 
Incentive - yes 
Between Subjects 
(n=20) 









AF On or Off* 
Advisory On or Off 
Incentive Yes 




AF On or Off* 
Advisory On or Off 
Incentive Yes 







* Within the Ml and no-MI groups, the advisory was counterbalanced between Weeks 2 and 3. 
During Week 1, the instrumented vehicles monitored and recorded measures 
used to derive many of the dependent variables described below. During Week 2 and 3 
the individuals in the Ml group had the opportunity to earn a cash bonus and received 
AF during one of these weeks. In contrast, those in the no-MI group did not have the 
cash incentive but were exposed to AF during either Week 2 or 3. During the Week 4 
return to baseline period the AF and Ml systems were deactivated, but dependent 
measure recording continued. 
In addition to the primary analyses associated with the 3X4 design, there were 
opportunities to code several variables and conduct correlative analyses of relationships 
that were of secondary importance. For example, correlations were used to explore 




Dependent Variables Recorded by the Data Monitoring Device. The primary 
dependent variables were associated with speed. The streets within the geographic 
study region were grouped by speed limit. For each speed limit category, speed was 
recorded a minimum of once every six seconds or when monitored vehicle status 
changed. The criteria that would trigger data points included exceeding the speed limit 
or crossing speed thresholds associated with the two speed cushions, i.e., more than 4 
mph over the limit and more than 9 mph over the limit. From this raw data record, the 
analysis program computed weekly average speeds, miles driven per week, and the 
percentages of time spent traveling at or below the speed limit (Speed Bin 0), 1-4 mph 
(Speed Bin 1), 5-8 mph (Speed Bin 2), and 9 mph or more (Speed Bin 3) over the speed 
limit for each speed limit zone.. 
Subjective Dependent Variables. Participants provided subjective data related to 
several constructs. These data included self-report demographic items, and self-report 
attitudes about driving over the speed limit and the ability and frequency of doing so 
without being ticketed. Participants also responded to questions about sensation 
seeking, self-report attitudes about trust and acceptance of automation in general and 
with respect to the AF and Ml systems,, and self-report ratings of perceived workload. 
The acceptance and workload data elements were repeatedly collected during each 
experimental session. 
Participants provided the demographic information and information about 
attitudes toward speeding during Week 1. Trust and acceptance was measured by a self-
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report, eight-item scale. The scale was adapted from a previously validated instrument 
(Bustamante, Fallon, Bliss, Bailey, & Anderson, 2005; Fallon, Bustamante, Ely, & Bliss, 
2005). Participants completed iterations of this scale at the end of each week they 
experienced Ml or AF. The ratings, which were on a scale from 1 to 10, indicated the 
extent to which participants felt that the Ml or AF systems were reliable, predictable, 
trustworthy, acceptable, pleasing, annoying, accurate, and agreeable. Fallon et al. 
reported that the scale has high internal consistency reliability (Cronbach alpha = .93), 
and the scale was sensitive to conditions known to affect trust in automation, e.g., task 
load and reliability. Participants also provided ratings of perceived mental workload; at 
the end of each week of the study, participants completed the NASA-Task Load Index 
(TLX), created by Hart and Staveland (1988). At the end of the study, participants also 
provided ratings about perceived safety benefits of and willingness to keep the system. 
To view the self-report questions, please see Appendix B. 
Participants 
The participants were a convenience sample of 50 drivers (26 males and 24 
females) who live and work within the Kalamazoo, Michigan metro area. Drivers ranged 
in age from 23 to 39. Table 3 presents the number of males and females and average 
age for the incentive, no-incentive, and control groups. Participants had to possess a 
valid driver license and must have had a minimum of five years of driving experience. 
Drivers convicted of impaired or reckless driving or who had their license suspended 
were prevented from participating. For liability reasons, a third party verified potential 
participants' driver abstracts (Michigan's Department of Motor Vehicles records of 
driver history of licensure, violations, and crashes) and ensured they met these driving 
record requirements. To obtain participants who would provide adequate driving 
exposure, the initial recruitment effort also required that participants reported driving a 
minimum of 20 miles per day 5 times per week. 
TABLE 4: Number of Males and Females and Average Age by Experimental Group 
Group Males Females Average Age (SD) 
Control 5 5 27.7(4.22) 
Incentive 10 10 27.8(3.43) 
No-Incentive 11 9. 28.0 (4.90) 
Given the several eligibility requirements, the research team used a multi-stage 
recruitment process for the project. Potential participants learned of the experiment by 
class visits from the research assistant, e-mail from the Graduate Student Advisory 
Committee (GSAC) or from recruitment posters that were posted around the campus of 
Western Michigan University. The posters and presentations presented the 
participation criteria, including the need to provide driving records. Potential 
participants signed an initial informed consent document and provided self report 
information regarding driving exposure and their driver license numbers for the Driver 
Record Abstract check (Appendix C). If participants passed the abstract check and 
indicated that they met the exposure requirements, they were contacted to gauge 
interest in beginning the actual experiment. Individuals who expressed interest in 
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continuing signed a second informed consent document (Appendix C). This multiple 
informed consent procedure ensured that potential participants clearly understood the 
study. Participants were asked to sign a non-disclosure statement at the end of week 1 
and reiterated their non-disclosure contract at the end of week 4 to prevent participants 
from speaking to potential future participants and subsequently affecting their 
behavior. 
All drivers received compensation for their participation in the field study. The 
test vehicles received a full tank of gas upon Day 1 of the experimental session, and 
participants received $60 for completing the full 4 week trial, and $10 for each phone 
appointment (to complete the NASA-TLX and Trust and Acceptance scales) met during 
the session. Payments were made upon completion of the study. Participation was 
voluntary, and the participants were assured that their performance was confidential. 
Institutional review boards of Western Michigan University, Old Dominion University, 
and Westat, Inc. approved the project. 
Materials 
Vehicles. Project staff instrumented eight vehicles for use during the field study. 
NHTSA provided a 2002 Oldsmobile Intrigue, a 2001 Saturn L 200, a 1998 Chevrolet 
Malibu, a 2000 Ford Taurus, a 2005 Cadillac STS, a 1999 Toyota Camry, a 2003 Toyota 
Corolla, and a 2004 Toyota Sienna. The vehicles were four-door sedans, except for the 
Sienna, which was a mini-van. The Corolla had a manual transmission, and the 
remaining vehicles had automatic transmissions. The Saturn, Camry, and Corolla were 
four-cylinder vehicles; the Intrigue, Malibu, Taurus and Sienna had six cylinders; the 
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Cadillac had an eight-cylinder engine. During the third cohort, the Saturn was totaled 
when two vehicles, unassociated with the experiment, collided. The collision propelled 
one of the vehicles into the Saturn. The participant assigned to the Saturn, who just 
began his final week in the study, was not injured and wanted to finish the experiment. 
Thus, he finished his fourth week of data collection when the Malibu became available. 
Other than this driver, participants kept the vehicle to which they were assigned at the 
onset of their trial. Several participants traveled out of the area for holidays, 
conferences, and family emergencies; these individuals resumed their respective weeks 
of driving upon their return. Vehicle assignment was partially counterbalance between 
the control, Ml, and no-MI groups to control for the confound of vehicle type. The 
instrumentation in the Toyota Corolla began malfunctioning after four participants 
completed the study with the vehicle. The project budget prevented troubleshooting 
and replacing components, so the vehicle was removed from the vehicle fleet. 
Speed Map. To create the map a research assistant first obtained blueprints of 
the street networks for the Kalamazoo and Portage areas from the municipal 
governments and a separate data base that contained the speed limits of the streets in 
the road network. The assistant then color coded the streets on the blueprint by speed 
limit. Finally, three research assistants traveled roads on which speed limits changed. 
The team then noted the distance between a transition point and the nearest 
intersection, and then transposed this information to the color-coded map so that the 
transition point in the database was accurate within 50 feet of the speed limit sign. The 
areas outside of the speed mapped zone were coded to have a speed limit of "0." This 
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designation let the project's software engineer deactivate the advisory and incentive 
displays when the vehicles were outside the mapped zone. The research assistant then 
provided the color coded municipal map to Persentech, Inc., the company that 
integrated the speed limit information into an existing Automate™ GPS device. 
Appendix A contains a map of Michigan and a more detailed map of the speed mapped 
area. Figure 1 is an image of the GPS device. As shown in the figure, the devices were 
mounted in the rear window of the vehicles, except for the Toyota Sienna, where the 
installers placed the device on the front windshield above the display box. The angle of 
the Sienna's rear windshield degraded the GPS signal and prevented the mounting of 
the device in the rear. The project's software engineer then designed the 
microprocessor to receive GPS and speed limit information from the GPS device and 
vehicle speed information from the anti-lock brake sensors or vehicle speed sensors. 
Based on this input the microprocessor recorded driving data and activated the 
incentive and feedback systems. 
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Figure 1. GPS system used for project (dollar bill included for size scale). 
Monetary Incentive (Ml) System. As discussed in the Introduction section, the Ml 
condition was structured as a bonus system with a delayed incentive and an immediate 
disincentive. Individuals who were in the Ml condition began Weeks 2 and 3 with 
$25.00. In a manner similar to Harms et al. (2007), the bonus declined by 3 cents every 
6-second period that the driver was 5-8 mph over the limit. The penalty increased to 6 
cents if the driver was 9 mph or more over the limit during any segment of the six 
second period when they were at least 5 mph over the limit. In other words, if the driver 
drove 5-8 mph over the limit but slowed to 4 mph over the limit or slower before 6 
seconds elapsed then they would not lose any of the incentive. A visual display, 
analogous to a meter in a taxi cab, provided updated bonus amounts. This display 
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activated for five seconds after the driver turned the ignition on or off. The visual display 
box consisted of five, red seven-segment LEDs that were approximately .4" H x .2" W. 
Advisory Display. The display box that presented the updates about the incentive 
also displayed the visual speed alert and housed the speaker that annunciated the 
auditory component of the speed feedback. The automated feedback (AF) provided two 
tones and one visual signal to drivers assigned to the conditions associated with AF. 
Each auditory signal consisted of a 400 Hz pure tone. Based on recommendations 
provided by Sorkin (1987) and Jones and Broadbent (1987), the strength of the auditory 
signal should be between 6 and 15 dB above the masked threshold, defined as the point 
at which a target auditory stimulus can be heard 50% of the time in the presence of 
other ambient noise (e.g., engine noise or stereo system.) The designer amplified the 
tone to approximately 70dB. The research assistant ensured that the alert was audible 
from the driver's seat in the presence of the ambient noise of popular music playing at a 
level deemed to be "loud." This testing indicated that the initial design was not loud 
enough in the presence of loud music. Drilling holes in the display boxes amplified the 
alert sufficiently so that the signal was audible in the presence of significant ambient 
noise. 
The temporal pattern of the auditory alert varied as a function of the magnitude 
of speed violation, i.e., one alert for violations from 5 to 8 mph (Alert A) over the limit 
and one alert for 9 mph or more (Alert B) over the speed limit. Each alert lasted for 
three seconds. Alert A consisted of 4 bursts with 2 pulses per burst (beep-beep-—beep-
beep-—beep-beep-—beep-beep); Alert B consisted of 4 bursts with 3 pulses per burst 
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(beep-beep-beep—beep-beep-beep—beep-beep-beep—beep-beep-beep). The design 
of these alerts stemmed from the intent to increase urgency and minimize annoyance. 
(Edworthy et al., 1991; Marshall et al., 2007; Spain & Bliss, 2008). Biding and Lind (2002) 
reported that drivers who experienced the auditory feedback suggested a pulse rate 
that cued them to more excessive speed violations would be preferable to a binary 
alert. A final effort to reduce annoyance was the termination of the auditory alert after 
three consecutive presentations without a change in speed, with the exception of 70 
mph roads. Specifically, if drivers drove at 79 mph or faster, then Alert B would continue 
to sound. The project team decided upon this configuration because 70 mph roads 
provided the only situations in which drivers could drive for minutes at a time without 
stopping. Experimenters wanted to avoid having drivers maintain speeds above 79 mph, 
ignore the three warnings and then continuing to speed above 79 mph to avoid hearing 
the alert trigger again. Figure 2 depicts several potential speed scenarios and how the 
auditory alert system would react to each scenario; Figure 3 is an image of the display 
box for the AF and Ml, in this instance the LEDs display the bonus amount. 
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Alert for lower speed violation 
to 










6s 12s 18s 24s 
Time Driving in Same Speed Limit Zone 
6s 12s 18s 24s 
Time Driving in Same Speed Limit Zone 
30s 
6s 12s 18s 24s 30s 
Time Driving in Same Speed Limit Zone 
Figure 2. Potential speed scenarios. 
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Figure 3. AF and Ml display showing a bonus amount ($23.35). 
In contrast to the auditory signal, the visual alert continued to display at six 
second intervals as long as the driver was over either speed violation threshold. The 
alert was displayed on the same interface as the monetary incentive. The display flashed 
the speed limit that the driver violated at the same time that the auditory alert 
sounded. In sum, the auditory and visual advisory, although a separate system than the 
monetary incentive system, was designed to be conceptually similar to the incentive 
system, so that participants who received both Ml and AF would feel that the two 
systems were related. 
Data Recording System. The engineering team designed the data logger, 
specified the information recorded by the data logger, and created an interface 
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between the data logger and the experimenter. The data logger was programmed using 
Microchip Pic Assembler and received inputs from the experimental vehicles and the 
GPS system. Based on participant assignment, the logger provided output to the Ml and 
AF displays. The data logger sampled at a 2 Hz rate for status changes in 62 monitored 
data elements, including speed limit and speed of vehicle. If there were no changes in 
the data elements, as when the speed limit was not changing and the driver was driving 
below the limit, then the data logger recorded all data elements once every six seconds. 
However, the data logger recorded all data elements if there were a change in system 
status. The device initially stored information on the EEPROM (data logger memory 
chip). For example, the data logger recorded vehicle speed, speed limit, time stamp, 
activation of Alert A or B, and vehicle speed being over or under speed threshold 1 (>4 
mph over) or 2 (>9 mph over). 
Input from the GPS system to the data logger and output to the Ml and AF 
display were transmitted through custom made serial cables. Vehicle inputs fed into a 
custom wire harness connected to the data logger. The wiring harness design varied as a 
function of the input for vehicle speed, with four vehicles obtaining vehicle speed from 
their vehicle speed sensors, three vehicles from their anti-lock brake sensors, and one 
vehicle from the GPS system. Data was stored on the EEPROM and output through a 
cellular modem, which was connected to the data logger by an RS232 interface. 
The project engineer used Visual Basic (VB) to design an interface for access to 
the data logger via a PC that connected to cellular modem (see Appendix A). The VB 
interface allowed the research assistant to activate the experimental conditions at the 
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beginning of each week, to monitor the AF and M! system during pilot testing and 
throughout the study, to download the raw data, and to reduce the raw data to a 
summary file used for analysis. Each download of raw data resulted in access to an Excel 
file. Similarly, the data reduction program produced a summary data file from which 
data could be transferred to SPSS for statistical analysis. Figure 2 contains an image of 
the data logger box with input and output as well as the wireless modem. 
Figure 4. Data logger and cellular modem. 
Procedure 
System Development. The NHTSA project team began developing the speed map 
and the data logger in September of 2008. Bench testing of the data logger components 
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began in January of 2009. Road tests for functional reliability of the system began in 
March of 2009 and ended in July of 2009. During this period several improvements and 
corrections were made to the ISA system. For example, some of the roads within the 
mapped area were coded incorrectly by the GPS system, which resulted in faulty input 
to the data logger. The faulty input, in turn, created false advisory alerts or faulty 
reductions to the Ml. However, at the end of the functional reliability testing period, 
each system in each vehicle was working in a highly reliable manner. This reliability was 
verified by completing many road tests during which a member of the research team 
drove a vehicle while another member used the VB application to access the data 
logger. The interface allowed the researchers to view, in real time, the crucial data 
elements such as vehicle speed and speed limit, experimental condition, and incentive 
amount. For these test drives, the project member would select Alerts A and B to 
activate at low speed limit violations (e.g., >1 and >3 mph, respectively). This procedure 
permitted testing of the AF for valid, reliable functioning without egregious speed limit 
violations. During this testing, research team members noted slight discrepancies 
between the speedometer needle and the speed input to the data logger (+/- l-2mph). 
This occurrence was also noted in previous research (see Biding & Lind, 2002). The 
current research team addressed this issue by calibrating the data logger settings for 
each vehicle to reflect the reading on the speedometer. This decision allowed the 
experimenter to provide consistent instructions to participants in the Ml and AF 
conditions. After the first ISA system was tested and determined to be functioning 
reliably, the project engineer began building the systems for the remaining vehicles. 
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When these systems were installed, the remaining vehicles were tested for functional 
reliability using the same procedure just described. 
Pilot Testing Behavioral Effects. While waiting for system installation in the 
remaining vehicles, the researchers assigned the initial instrumented vehicle to naive 
drivers to pilot test the system for behavioral effects. This pilot testing occurred during 
July and August of 2009. Three drivers participated in the pilot test. The drivers 
operated the vehicle for approximately two weeks each. The first week provided 
baseline measures of driving. In the second week, the drivers drove with the AF 
activated and had the opportunity to earn the Ml as planned in the experiment. The 
drivers received the instructions for the second week after driving the baseline period. 
The raw data generated during this pilot test was used to validate the summary data 
produced by the data reduction program (e.g., miles driven per day by speed limit zone, 
percentage of time spent speeding 1-4 mph over the limit by speed limit zone). The 
correlations between manual computations of measures in the raw data and those 
produced by the summary data were nearly perfect (r's > .99). The combined effect of 
the AF and Ml therefore appeared promising. 
Field Study- Initial Recruitment and Week 1. Potential participants contacted the 
experimenters to begin the initial screening process. After receiving prospective 
participants' informed consent, the research assistant collected self-report driving 
exposure data and driver license numbers. The experimenter explained that the study 
period ranged from one to four weeks and after establishing eligibility, he would contact 
these individuals to schedule delivery of the test vehicles. When participants received 
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the vehicle at the beginning of Week 1, the experimenter explained the nature of the 
study in further detail without alluding to the exact nature of the project. The 
experimenter informed drivers that the study was testing an emerging system that 
could benefit traffic safety and that the vehicles had systems that recorded distance 
traveled, speed, seatbelt use, GPS, and time of day. 
After this explanation of the study, participants provided the second informed 
consent and answered self report questions mentioned previously (Appendix B). The 
experimenter provided participants an overview of the vehicle to which they were 
assigned and explained the various features, e.g., location of the wipers, gas tank, 
headlamps, and other controls and displays. The experimenter instructed participants 
that during the month-long trial they should drive as they would during normal, 
everyday driving. Participants signed an agreement not to allow anyone else to drive the 
vehicle or to drive the vehicle more than 50 miles from Kalamazoo (see Appendix C). The 
first week began after the participant had an opportunity to ask the experimenter 
questions about the study. In summary, participants were aware that a number of 
safety related driving behaviors were recorded but were not specifically told that the 
target behavior in the study was speeding. 
Weeks 2 and 3. After Week 1, participants who met the exposure criteria 
(distance and speed limit violations) continued to Week 2. The distance criterion was to 
drive approximately 100 miles during Week 1. The speeding criterion was based on the 
$25.00 bonus that participants in the incentive condition could receive. Specifically, the 
data logger was programmed to record the bonus amount regardless of a participant's 
83 
assigned condition. The team decided that participants had to drive in such a manner 
that they would have lost approximately 35% of the bonus amount ($8.00) during the 
baseline week had they been in the incentive condition. The criteria allowed the 
researchers to validate self-report measures with Week 1 baseline data. The 
experimenter retrieved vehicles from participants who did not meet the criteria and 
issued them $20 compensation. 
The experimenter met with participants who satisfied Week 1 criteria to provide 
further instructions and to have participants answer questions about sensation seeking 
and automation use and complete the NASA-TLX for Week 1. To complete the TLX, the 
researcher asked participants to consider mental workload demand associated with the 
overall driving task (steering, navigating, maintaining speed, avoiding hazards) when 
providing rankings. The research assistant also made appointments with participants to 
complete, by telephone, the NASA-TLX and Trust and Acceptance scales at the end of 
Weeks 2 and 3. After completing the Week 1 TLX and the sensation seeking and 
automation use self-report instruments, the research assistant continued with 
instructions about the following weeks of the study. 
The remaining instructions included explanations of the AF and Ml systems, 
depending on group assignment. Individuals in the Ml condition had the opportunity to 
earn the full bonus, or $25 per week during Weeks 2 and 3. The incentive system was 
explained to these participants as described above. The researcher explained the 6-
second time cushion that was built into the system, so participants knew that they 
would not lose bonus points the moment that they exceeded the 5 mph or 9 mph 
thresholds. The researcher told the Ml participants that the display would show the 
bonus amount at the beginning and end of each drive. 
The 40 participants in the Ml and no-MI groups drove for one week, either Week 
2 or 3, with the automated feedback system in active mode. The researcher used 
stratified random assignment for this condition to ensure that 10 participants in each Ml 
condition experienced active AF during Week 2, and the remaining 10 per group drove 
with AF active during Week 3. The researcher activated the system and provided 
instructions at the beginning of the appropriate week. Specifically, the researcher told 
participants what would trigger the auditory and visual alerts and that there were two 
separate alerts, with one alerting them to driving 5-8 mph over the limit and one 
alerting them to driving 9 mph over the limit. The researcher also explained the time 
threshold for triggering the alerts, so participants knew that the alerts would not 
activate until they were driving over threshold A or B for six seconds. For the 20 Ml 
participants in Weeks 2 and 3 and all participants during the AF condition, the 
researcher explained the area in which speed limits were mapped and where the system 
would become inactive. The researcher took this measure so participants did not think 
that either system was faulty. 
At the end of Weeks 2 and 3, the participants in the Ml condition provided trust 
and acceptance ratings on the Ml system. The 40 participants completed the same trust 
and acceptance scale after completing the AF condition. The full sample of 50 
participants completed the NASA-TLX at the end of Weeks 2 and 3. Participants rated 
their perceived mental workload associated with general driving rather than rating 
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workload specific to speed maintenance. The decision to frame the NASA-TLX in this 
manner was to keep the control participants naive to the purpose of the study so as not 
to affect their driving speed. 
Week 4. During the final measurement period, Week 4, participants drove their 
assigned vehicles configured in the same manner as Week 1. The AF and Ml systems 
were deactivated, but the data loggers in the vehicles recorded the same measures as in 
the first three weeks of the trials. At the end of Week 4, participants provided subjective 
workload ratings via the NASA-TLX and then completed a debriefing during which the 
researcher asked questions to gather qualitative data about participants' experience 
with the incentive and feedback systems. The researcher ended the month-long trials by 
informing participants that they would receive a full debriefing about the purpose and 
outcome of the study after the experiment was complete, reiterating their non-
disclosure form agreeing not to discuss the study with others, and then paying the 
participants the money owed them for completing the experiment. 
RESULTS 
Data Inspection and Cleaning 
For the first cohort of participants, the experimenter inspected the summary 
files for data accuracy by randomly selecting summary data elements (e.g., average 
speed in 25 mph zones for day 1) and computing the same elements by hand from the 
raw data. Another data inspection method was to inspect instances that seemed 
implausible; for example, a participant having spent driving four hours in 30 mph zones 
on a single day. This data inspection process led to the discovery of some anomalous 
occurrences. A list of these occurrences and the resulting action of the project team are 
provided in Appendix D. Some data elements in the summary files had to be re-ordered 
prior to import into SPSS, and some of the 'watchdog' data elements, not needed for 
analyses, were not imported. Additionally, the experimenter had to compute the miles 
driven per week for each speed limit zone, as these data were not in the summary files. 
This was computed from the number of seconds spent in each zone per week and 
average speed per week in each zone. The measures of average weekly speeds by zone 
and percentages of time in driving at or below the speed limit, 1 to 4 mph over the 
speed limit, 5 to 8 mph over the speed limit, and 9 or more mph over the speed limit 
were weighted by the time spent each day in each zone. This resulted in the adjustment 
of the measures for drivers who varied in how much they drove from day to day. For 
example, if a driver drove on a 55 mph road for 100 seconds on day 1 and 200 seconds 
on day 2, then the measures for that week of driving would reflect that the driver spent 
twice as much time in the zone on day 2 relative to day 1. After data inspection and 
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cleaning, the data were imported into SPSS for descriptive and inferential statistical 
analysis. 
Descriptive Analyses 
Tables 5 and 6 provide descriptive statistics for the self report demographic and 
attitudinal data elements recorded during the onset of participant trials. The 
demographic data include age, years licensed, and education level. Additional self report 
data included beliefs and behaviors about sensation seeking, driving style, and general 
use and acceptance of automation. 
TABLE 5: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables by Experimental Group 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation 








Education Level (1 = HS/GED; 5 = 
































TABLE 6: Self-report Items about Sensation Seeking, Automation and Driving Behaviors 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation 
I would like to explore strange places 
(1 = not like me, 5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 3 90 137 
Incentive 20 3 80 111 
No-Incentive 20 3 70 117 
I like to do frightening things 
(1 = not like me, 5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 2 40 107 
Incentive 20 2 55 132 
No-Incentive 20 2 90 148 
I like new & exciting experiences even if I 
have to break the rules 
(1 = not like me, 5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 2 30 1 16 
Incentive 20 2 60 105 
No-Incentive 20 2 70 130 
I prefer friends who are exciting and 
unpredictable (1 = not like me, 
5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 2 70 125 
Incentive 20 2 80 95 
No-Incentive 20 310 107 
In general, I like completing tasks manually 
(1 = not like me, 5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 3 70 116 
Incentive 20 3 50 83 
No-Incentive 20 3 95 83 
In general, I am suspicious of new technologies 
(0 = not at all, 5 = very much like me) 
Control 10 2 70 106 
Incentive 20 170 92 
No-Incentive 20 190 1 12 
Car Passing (1 = cars pass me more often than I 
pass them, 2 = I pass as many cars as pass me, 3= 
I pass cars more often that they pass me) 
Control 10 2 40 52 
Incentive 20 2 15 59 
No Incentive 20 2 05 39 
On a 55 mph or greater road, how many 
miles over the limit can you drive before 
the police gives you a ticket7 
Control 10 7 30 2 41 
Incentive 20 7 20 2 78 
No-Incentive 20 6 35 2 41 
TABLE 6 Continued 
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
On a 40 mph or greater road, how many 
miles over the limit can you drive before 




On a 35 mph or slower road, how many 
miles over the limit can you drive before 




How often do you wear your seatbelt? 































How often do you talk on cell when driving? 













Random assignment to the control, No-MI, and Ml conditions controlled for any 
potential effect that individual differences among these variables might have on the 
dependent variables that were the central focus of the study. The dependent variables 
(4 speed ranges X 9 speed limit zones X 4 weeks; 7 mean speeds by zone X 4 weeks; and 
6 NASA-TLX dimensions X 4 weeks) were inspected for outliers using the following 
approach recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2001): z-scores were generated for 
each DV; outliers were defined as having an absolute z-score greater than 3.3; outlying 
observed scores were changed to one unit greater than the next largest score. This 
process resulted with the identification and changing of 44 observed values. 
Percentage of Time Speeding by and across Speed Limit Zone 
Statistical Approach. A series of 3 (Monetary Incentive - between subjects) x 4 
(AF activation week - repeated measures) mixed factorial ANOVAs tested for the effects 
of Monetary Incentive (Ml) and Automated Feedback (AF). There were eight series of 
analyses, with four ANOVAs in each series for a total of 32 ANOVAs. The 8 series 
represent separate analyses for seven speed limit zones, i.e., 25 mph, 30 mph, 35 mph, 
40mph, 45 mph, 55 mph, and 70 mph; as well as one series to analyze the percentage of 
time speeding across all speed limit zones. The 4 ANOVAs in each series were to analyze 
the percentage of time driving in the following speed ranges: Bin 0 (percentage of time 
driving < the speed limit), Bin 1 (percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over the limit), 
Bin 2 (percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over the limit), and Bin 3 (percentage of 
time driving 9 or more over the speed limit). AF activation period was counterbalanced 
during Weeks 2 and 3 for the No-MI and Ml groups. For ease of interpretation, the 
following analyses present the AF activation period as having occurred during Week 2. In 
addition to screening and adjusting outlying scores, the approach to satisfying the 
statistical assumptions of ANOVA was based on recommendations by Tabachnik and 
Fidell (2002) to ensure appropriate use of the mixed ANOVAs. Normality was assumed 
when error degrees of freedom is greater than 20. Thus, the only analyses in which 
normality was violated were those for 55 mph roads (discussed in detail below). For 
each ANOVA, Levene's tests were computed to check for homogeneity of variance. 
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Tabachnik & Fidell state that an accepted approach to addressing instances of 
heterogeneity of variance is to reduce the alpha criterion to a more stringent level, such 
as p <. 025. In the current project the alpha criterion was set at p < .01 for all inferential 
analyses. This reduced criterion was to satisfy instances when the Levene's test 
indicated heterogeneity of variance and to establish a more conservative threshold due 
to the large number of analyses. If the assumption of sphericity was violated, then the 
Greenhouse-Geisser statistic was reported. The use of Greenhouse-Geisser will be 
evident if the within group degrees of freedom have decimal points. Trend analyses 
were used as follow-up tests for significant effects. For analyses with significant 
interactions and main effects, only interactions are interpreted (Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2001). 
Percentage of time driving at or below the Speed Limit. Statistical assumptions 
were examined prior to interpreting each 3X4 ANOVA. The ANOVA indicated a 
significant main effect for AF Week, F(3,141) = 7.85, p < .001, partial q2 = -14. The main 
effect for Incentive Group was not significant, F(2,47) = 4.91, p < .05, partial q2 = .17. The 
interaction between AF Period and Incentive Group was also significant, F(6, 141) = 8.45, 
p < .001, partial q2 = .27, observed power = 1.00. Trend analyses indicated a significant 
quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2,47) = 16.71, p < .001, partial q2 =.42, observed 
power = 1.00. Drivers in the Ml group significantly increased the percentage of time 
spent driving at or below all speed limits during Weeks 2 (M = 83.05%) and 3 (M = 
81.85%) relative to Weeks 1 (M = 68.90%) and 4 (M = 70.95%) and to the control group 
and no-MI group at each week of driving. In contrast, the amount of time spent driving 
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at or below the speed limit did not vary reliably within or between the control and no-

































Figure 5. Percentage of time driving at or below the speed limit as a function of 
monetary incentive and advisory feedback. Error bars indicate the standard errors of the 
means. 
Percentage of time driving lto4 mph over the limit. The 3X4 ANOVA revealed 
no significant main effects for AF Period, F(1.70, 73.02) = 1.05, n.s. and Experimental 
Group, F(2,43) = 1.23, n.s. The omnibus F-test of the interaction between AF Period and 
Experimental Group was not significant, F(3.40, 73.02) = .51, n.s. 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph Over the Speed Limit. The F-tests revealed 
a significant main effect for AF Week, F(3,141) = 13.78, p < .001, partial q2 = .23 and 
Incentive Group, F(2,47) = 11.83, p < .001, partial q = .34, respectively. The interaction 
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between AF Period and Incentive Group was also significant, F(6,141) = 13.15, p < .001, 
partial q2 = .36. Trend analyses indicated a significant quadratic trend for the 
interaction, F(2,47) = 35.64, p < .001, partial q2 =.60. During Week 2 (Feedback On), 
drivers in the Ml group spent a lower percentage of time driving in Bin 2 (M = 2.05%) 
relative to Week 1 (M = 9.75%), Week 3 {M = 3.65%), and Week 4 (M = 8.55%). The Ml 
group's score for Week 3 was significantly lower than Weeks 1 and 4. The Ml group's 
percentage scores for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly lower than the control and no-
MI groups' scores across each of the four measurement periods. Finally, the time spent 
driving 5 to 8 mph over the speed limits did not vary reliably within or between the 
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Figure 6. Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over all speed limits as a function of 
monetary incentive and advisory feedback. 
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Percentage of time driving 9 or more mph over all speed limits. The ANOVA 
revealed significant main effects for AF Week, F(3,141) = 11.21, p < .001, partial q2 = .19 
and Incentive Group, F(2,47) = 5.88, p < .01, partial q2 = .20, respectively. The interaction 
between AF Period and Incentive Group was also significant, F(6,141) = 5.03, p < .001, 
partial n2 = .18. Trend analyses indicated a significant quadratic trend for the 
interaction, F(2,47) = 7.17, p < .01, partial q2 =.23. Drivers in the Ml group spent 
significantly less time driving 9 mph or more over the limit during Week 2 (M = .35%) 
and Week 3 (M = .60%) relative to Week 1 (6.45%) and Week 4 (4.75%). The Ml group's 
scores for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly lower than the control and no-MI groups' 
scores across each of the four measurement periods. The no-MI group spent a lower 
percentage of time driving 9 or more mph over the speed limit during Week 2 when the 
AF was active (M = 5.05) relative to Week 1 (M = 7.15), Week 3 (M = 8.60), and Week 4 
{M = 8.95). The no-MI group spent more time driving 9 or more mph over the limit 
during Week 3 than the control (M = 5.80), but did not differ from the control group at 
other measurement periods. The control group's scores for Bin 3 did not vary across the 
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Figure 7. Percent of time driving 9 or more mph over all speed limits as a function of 
monetary incentive and advisory feedback. 
Percentage of time driving at or below 25 mph speed limits. The main effects for 
Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.48,116.72) = 3.47, n.s. and F(2, 47) 
= 4.54, n.s. The interaction between Week and Incentive was significant, F(4.97,116.72) 
= 7.86, p < .001, partial q2 = .25. Trend analysis indicated a significant quadratic trend for 
the interaction, F(2, 47) = 14.50, p < .001, partial q2 = .38. Drivers in the Ml group 
significantly increased the percentage of time driving at or below 25 mph speed limits 
during Week 2 (M = 87.65%) and Week 3 (A/7 = 87.25%) relative to Week 1(M = 78%) and 
Week 4 (M - 79.70%). The Ml group's values for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly 
greater than the no-MI group's and the control group's percentages at all four weeks. 
The Ml group's percentage of time at or below the speed limit on 25 mph roads during 
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Week 4 was also greater than the no-MI group's percentages during Week 2 (M = 
72.80%), Week 3 (M = 74.05%), and Week 4 (M = 74.2%). The no-MI group's percentage 
of time driving below 25 mph limits during Week 2 was also significantly lower than the 
Ml group's and the control group's (M = 78.40%) percentages during Week 1. Finally, 
the percentage of time driving at or below 25 mph speed limit roads did not vary 
significantly within the month of driving for the control group (Range = 76.9 - 78.4%) or 
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Figure 8. Percent of time driving at or below 25 mph speed limits as a function of 
monetary incentive and advisory feedback. 
Percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph above 25 mph speed limits. Neither the 
main effect of Week nor Incentive Group or the interaction between the two were 
significant, F(2.47,116.25) = .36, n.s.The F(2, 47) = .80, n.s.; F(4.95, 116.25) = 1.12, n.s., 
respectively. 
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Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph above 25 mph speed limits. The main 
effects for Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(3,141) = 1.88, n.s. and F(2, 
47) = 4.93, n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant F(6,141) = 8.02, p < .001, partial q2 = .25. Trend analysis indicated a 
significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 47) = 25.56, p < .001, partial q2 = .51. 
The Ml group's percentage of time spent driving 5 to 8 mph over 25 mph roads was 
significantly lower during Weeks 2{M = 2.15%) and 3 (M = 2.80%) than Weeks 1 [M = 
5.90%) and 4 (M = 5.55%) and relative to the control (Range = 5.50% - 6.90%) and no-MI 
groups'percentages (Range = 5.80% - 7.25%) for all weeks. The no-MI group's 
percentage during Week 2 when the AF was active (M - 7.25%) was significantly higher 
than Week 1 (M - 5.80%) and the control group's average percentage during Week 1 (M 
= 5.80%). Finally, the no-MI group's percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 25 mph 
limits during Weeks 2 (M = 7.25%) and 3 (M = 6.95%) was significantly higher than the 
Ml group's percentage during Week 4 (A/7 = 5.55%). Control group scores did not differ 
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Figure 9. The effect of Monetary Incentive (Ml) and Automated Feedback on the 
percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 25 mph limits. 
Percentage of time driving 9 or more mph above 25 mph speed limits. The main 
effects for Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(1.84, 86.29) = 1.52, n.s. and 
F(2, 47) = 2.53, n.s., respectively. Due to the violation of sphericity and the reduced 
alpha criterion, the interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not significant 
F(3.67, 86.29) = 3.27, n.s.. 
Percentage of time driving at or below 30 mph speed limits. The main effects for 
Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.29, 78) = .22, n.s. and F(2, 34) = 
1.19, n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant, F(4.59, 78) = 4.11, p<.01, partial q2 - .20. Trend analysis indicated a 
significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 34) = 6.87, p<.01, partial q2 - .29. The 
Ml group significantly increased the percentage of time driving at or below the speed 
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limit during Weeks 2 (M = 65.27%), 3 {M = 65.80%), and A (M = 62.20%), relative to 
Week 1 (M = 54.20%). The Ml group's percentages for Weeks 2-4 were significantly 
greater than the control group's percentages for the same 3 weeks (Range 52.13 to 
52.50%). The no-MI group spent significantly less time driving at or below the limit 
during Week 2 (M = 56.79%) than the Ml did during Week 2 and 3. During Week 1 the 
no-MI group spent significantly more time at or below the speed limit (M = 61.07%) 
than the control group at Weeks 2, 3, and 4; and the Ml group during Week 1. Neither 
the control group nor the no-MI group significantly increased or reduced their 
respective amounts of time driving at or below the speed limit on 30 mph roads from 
week to week (See Figure 10). 
Figure 10. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving at or below a 30 mph limit. 
Percentage of time driving lto4 mph over 30 mph speed limits. The main effect 
for Incentive Group was not significant, F(2, 34) = .99, n.s. The interaction between 
Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(6,102) = 1.79, n.s. The main effect of 
Week was significant, F(3,102) = 6.19, p<.01, partial q2 = .15. The Bonferroni post-hoc 
test indicated that averaging across the three incentive groups, drivers spent 
significantly less time driving 1 to 4 mph over 30 mph roads during Weeks 1 (M = 
19.24%) and 4 (A/7 = 19.23%) than Week 2 when the AF was active (M = 24.84%). 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 30 mph speed limits. The main effect 
of Week was not significant, F(3, 102) = 1.78, n.s. The main effect for Incentive Group 
was significant, F(2, 34) = 4.47, p<.01, partial q2 = .21, as was the interaction between 
Week and incentive Group, F(6,102) = 5.00, p<.001, partial q2 = .23. Trend analysis 
indicated a significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 34) = 10.08, p<.01, partial 
q2 = .37. Drivers in the Ml group spent significantly less time driving 5 to 8 mph over 30 
mph limits during Week 2 (M = 6.07%) and Week 3 (M = 7.33%) relative to Week 1 (M = 
16.40%) and Week A(M = 11.53%). The amount of time drivers in the Ml group spent in 
this speed range during Week 4 remained significantly lower than Week 1. The amount 
of time that the Ml group spent driving 5 to 8 mph over 30 mph roads during Weeks 2 
and 3 was significantly lower than the control group (Range 13.00-16.00%) and no-MI 
group (Range 11.57-13.36%) at any of the four weeks. The Ml (M = 16.40%) group spent 
significantly more time driving 5 to 8 mph over 30 mph roads during Week 1 than the 
no-MI group did during Weeks 1 (M = 11.86%), 2 (A/7 = 13.21%), and 3 (M = 13.36%). 
The no-MI group spent significantly less time driving 5 to 8 mph over 30 mph limits 
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during Week 1 and Week 2 than the control group did during Weeks 2 (A/7 = 15.88%), 3 





















Figure 11. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 5 to 8 mph over a 30 mph limit. 
Percent of time driving 9 or more mph over 30 mph speed limits. The main effects 
for Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(3,102) = 3.47, n.s. and F(2, 34) = 
2.87, n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant, F(6, 102) = 5.97, p< .001, partial q2 = .26. Trend analysis indicated a 
significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 34) = 10.50, p< .001, partial q2 = .38. 
The Ml group spent significantly less time driving 9 mph or more over 30 mph speed 
limits during Week 2 (A/7 = 1.00%) and Week 3 (A/7 = 1.13%) than they did during Week 1 
(A/7 = 10.60%) and Week A (M = 6.13%), and Week 4 was significantly lower than Week 1. 
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The Week 2 and Week 3 average percentages of the Ml group were significantly lower 
than Weeks 1-4 for the control group (Range 6.13 to 12.25%) and no-MI groups (Range 
6.43 to 8.57%). In contrast, the control group increased the amount of time driving 9 
mph or more over 30 mph roads such that Week A (M = 12.25%) was significantly 
greater than Week 1 (M = 6.13%). The percentage of time that the no-MI group spent 
driving 9 mph or more over the limit did not vary across the four weeks of driving. 
However, the no-MI group spent significantly less time in this speed range during Week 
1 (M = 7.07%) and Week 2 (M = 6.43%) than the Ml group during Week 1 (M = 10.60%) 
and the control group during Week A(M = 12.25%). Finally, during Week 4 the no-MI 
group spent significantly less time in this speed range (A/7 = 8.07) than the control group 


































Figure 12. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 9 or more mph over a 30 mph limit. 
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Percent of time driving at or below 35 mph speed limits. . The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group were significant, F(3,138) = 8.22, p< .001, partial q2 = .15 and 
F(2, 46) = 12.47, p< .001, partial q2 = .35; respectively. The interaction between Week 
and Incentive Group was significant, F(6,138) = 10.91, p < .001, partial q2 = .32,. Trend 
analysis indicated a significant quadratic trend, F(2,46) = 23.91, p< .001, partial q2 = .51. 
The Ml group spent significantly more time driving at or below 35 mph roads during 
Week 2 (M = 80.65%) and Week 3 (M = 82.65%) than Week 1 (A/7 = 64.90%) and Week 4 
(M = 70.5%). The mean percentages of the Ml group for Weeks 2 and 3 were 
significantly higher than all measurement periods for the control group (Range 61.2% to 
64.8%) and no-MI group (Range 58.21% to 61.84%). During Week 4, the Ml group spent 
more time (M = 70.5%) at or below the speed limit than Week 1, and this Week 4 
percentage was significantly greater than all four Weeks of the no-MI group and Weeks 
1, 2, and 4 of the control group. The percentage of time that drivers in the no-MI group 
spent at or below 35 mph limits during Week 2 (M = 58.21%) and A (M = 59.68) was also 
less than the time drivers in the Ml group spent at or below 35 mph limits during Week 
1 (A/7 = 64.90%). Neither the control group nor the no-MI group varied between or 
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Figure 13. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving at or below a 35 mph limit. 
Percent of time driving lto4 mph over 35 mph speed limits. The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.06, 94.71) = 2.99, n.s.; F(2, 46) = 
1.85, n.s.; respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant, F(4.12, 94.71) = 3.97, p < .01, partial q2 = .15. Trend analysis indicated a 
significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 46) = 5.37, p < .01, partial q2 = .19. 
Drivers in the no-MI group significantly increased the amount of time driving 1 to 4 mph 
over the limit during Week 2 (M = 22.74%) relative to Week 1 (A/7 = 18.42%), Week 3 (A/7 
= 17.95%), and Week 4 (A/7 = 17.21%). The no-MI group's percentage during Week 2 was 
significantly greater than all four weeks of Ml group (Range 13.55 to 19.60%) and Week 
1 of the control group (A/7 = 19.30%). In contrast, drivers in the Ml group spent 
significantly less time driving 1 to 4 mph over the limit during Week 2 (M = 16.15%) and 
Week 3 (M = 13.55%) than they did during Week 1 (M = 19.60%). During Week 3, drivers 
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in the Ml group spent less time driving 1 to 4 mph over the limit (M = 13.55%) than 
Week 4 (M = 18.30%) and less time than the control group (Range 19.3% to 21.1%) and 
no-MI group at all four weeks. Drivers in the Ml group also spent less time in the 1 to 4 
mph over the limit speed range during Week 2 than the control group did during Week 4 
(A/7 = 21.10%). The amount of time that drivers in the control group drove 1 to 4 mph 





















Week 1 Week 2 (AF) Week 3 
Trial Week 
Week 4 
Figure 14. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 1 to 4 mph over 35 mph roads. 
Percent of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 35 mph roads. The main effects of Week 
and Incentive group were significant, F(3, 138) = 6.37, p < .001, partial q2 = .12; and F(2, 
46) = 15.20, p < .001, partial n2 = .40, respectively. The interaction between Week and 
Incentive Group was significant, F(6,138) = 7.60, p < .001, partial q2 = .25. Trend analysis 
indicated that there was a significant quadratic trend for the interaction F(2, 46) = 21.26, 
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p < .001, partial q = .49. Drivers in the Ml group spent significantly less time speeding 5 
to 8 mph over 35 mph limits during Week 2 (M = 1.71%) and Week 3 (M = 2.07%) than 
Week 1 [M = 9.38%) and Week A(M = 7.36%). Throughout the month of driving, drivers 
in the control group (Range 10.0% to 12.9%) and no-MI group (Range 10.25% to 11.84%) 
spent significantly more time driving 5 to 8 mph over the limit than the Ml group during 
Weeks 2 and 3. Drivers in the Ml group spent significantly less time driving 5 to 8 mph 
over the limit during Week A(M = 8.65%) than the no-MI group did at each 
measurement period and the control group during Weeks 2, 3, and 4. Drivers in the no-
MI group spent significantly more time driving 5 to 8 during Week 1 (M = 12.74%) and 
Week 4 {M - 12.84%) than the control group during Week 1 (M = 10.00%) and Ml group 
during Week 1 (A/7 = 10.25%). Drivers in the no-MI group did not significantly change the 
percentage of time spent driving in this speed range from week to week across the 
month of driving. Drivers in the control increased the amount of time driving 5 to 8 over 





































Week 2 (AF) Week 3 Week 4 
Trial Week 
Figure 15. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 35 mph roads. 
Percent of time driving 9 or more mph over 35 mph roads. The main effect of 
Week and Incentive Group were significant, F(3,138) = 5.44, p < .01, partial q2 = .11; and 
F(2, 46) = 7.17, p < .01, partial q2 = .24, respectively. The interaction between Week and 
Incentive Group was significant, F(6,138) = 2.99, p < .01, partial q2 = .12. Trend analysis 
indicated a significant linear trend for the interaction, F(2, 46) = 5.83, p < .01, partial n2 = 
.20. Drivers in the Ml group significantly decreased the percentage of time driving 9 or 
more over 35mph speed limits during Weeks 2 [M = .55%) and 3 (M = .65%) relative to 
Weeks 1 (A/7 = 5.25%) and A(M = 2.55%) and relative to all 4 Weeks of driving completed 
by drivers in the control (Mean Range 4.4% to 5.3%) and no-MI group (Mean Range 
5.89% to 9.21%). Drivers in the Ml group spent significantly less time driving 9 or more 
over the limit during Week 4 than Week 1. In contrast, drivers in the control group did 
not significantly vary the percentage of time spent driving 9 or more mph over the limit 
during their month of driving. Drivers in the no-MI group spent significantly less time 
driving 9 or more over the limit during Week 2 (M - 5.89%) relative to Week A(M = 
9.21%). Finally, drivers in the no-MI group spent significantly more time speeding 9 or 
more mph over the limit during Week 3 [M = 7.68%) and A (M = 9.21%) than the Ml 








































Week 1 Week 2 (AF) Week 3 
Trial Week 
Week 4 
Figure 16. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 9 or more mph over 35 mph roads. 
Percent of time driving at or below 40 mph roads. The main effect of Week was 
significant, F(3,129) = 5.71, p < .01, partial q2 = .12. The main effect for Incentive Group 
was not significant, F(2, 43) = 2.78, n.s. The interaction between Week and Incentive 
Group was significant, F(6,129) = 3.24, p < .01, partial q2 = .13. Trend analysis indicated 
that there was a significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 43) = 8.56, p < .01, 
partial q2 = .29. Drivers in the Ml group significantly increased the percentage of time 
driving at or below the speed limit during Week 2 (A/7 = 83.72%) and Week 3 (A/7 = 
84.78%) relative to Week 1 (A/7 = 69.06%) and Week A (M = 74.78%). The amount of time 
that the Ml participants spent driving in this speed range during Weeks 2 and 3 was 
significantly higher than any week driven by the control group (Mean Range 69.00% to 
75.7%) and the no-MI group (Mean Range 69.06% to 70.56%). The within group 































Figure 17. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving at or below 40 mph roads. 
Percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over 40 mph roads. The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group and the interaction between Week and Incentive Group 
were not significant, F(3,129) = 2.17, n.s.; F(2, 43) = .44, n.s.; and, F(6,129) = 2.01, n.s.; 
respectively. 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads. The main effect of 
Week was significant, F(3,129) = 5.48, p < .01, partial q2 = .11. The effect of Incentive 
Group was not significant, F(2, 43) = 4.54, n.s. . The interaction between Week and 
Incentive Group was significant, F(6,129) = 4.66, p < .001, partial q2 = .18. Trend analysis 
indicated a significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2, 43) = 13.73, p < .001, 
partial q2 = .39. Drivers in the Ml group significantly reduced the mean percentage of 
time spent driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads during Week 2 (M = 1.94%) and Week 
3 (M = 2.94%) relative to Week 1 (M = 9.50%) and Week A (M = 7.61%). The mean 
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percentage of time that Ml participants spent driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads 
during Weeks 2 and 3 was significantly lower than any week driven by the control group 
(Mean Range 7.5% to 10.0%) and the no-MI group (Mean Range 7.61% to 10.22%). 
Drivers in the no-MI group spent significantly less time driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph 
roads during Week 2 (M = 7.61%) than during Week 3 (M = 10.22%). The mean 
percentage of time control group drivers spent driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads 
did not vary significantly during the four weeks of driving. Drivers in the control group 
did not differ significantly from drivers in the no-MI group with respect to the time 
driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads during the four weeks of driving (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 40 mph roads. 
Percent of time driving 9 or more mph over 40 mph roads. . The main effect of 
Week was significant, F(2.38,102.38) = 5.12, p < .01, partial q = .11. The Bonferroni 
I l l 
post-hoc test indicates that all drivers spent a significantly higher percentage of time 
driving 9 or more mph during Week 1 (M = 4.57%) than Week 2 (M = 2.09%) or Week 3 
(A/7 = 4.57%). The main effect of Incentive Group and the interaction between Week and 
Incentive Group were not significant, F(2, 43) = 4.62, n.s.. and F(2, 43) = 2.69, n.s., 
respectively. 
Percentage of time driving at or below 45 mph roads.The main effects of Week 
and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.42, 101.55) = 3.78, n.s. The interaction 
between Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(4.84,101.55) =.96, n.s. 
Percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over 45 mph roads. The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.29, 96.04) = 2.47, n.s. and F(2, 42) 
=3.01, n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not 
significant, F(4.84,101.55) =.96, n.s. 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 45 mph roads. The effect of Week 
was significant, F(2.47,103.76) = 6.25, p < .01, partial q2 = .13, observed power = .93. 
Drivers significantly decreased the amount of time they drove 5 to 8 mph over 45 mph 
roads during Week 2 (M = 1.15%) relative to Week 1 (M = 2.61%) and Week 3(A/7 = 
2.28%). Additionally, drivers spent significantly less time driving 5 to 8 mph over the 
limit during Week 4 (A/7 = 1.63%) relative to Week 1 (A/7 = 2.61%). 
Percentage of time driving 9 or more mph over 45 mph roads. . The main effects 
of Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2.10, 88.20) = 1.89, n.s. and F(2, 42) 
= 1.98, n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not 
significant, F(4.84, 101.55) = 1.51, n.s. 
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Percentage of time driving at or below 55 mph roads. The analysis of speeding in 
55 mph zones is based on a limited number of participants having driven on roads with 
this speed limit. Eleven (3 control participants, 4 Ml participants, and 4 no-MI 
participants) of the 50 participants drove on 55 mph roads during each week of driving. 
Thus there were > 20 degrees of freedom for the within-group error term, but only 8 for 
the between group error term, so the assumption of normality for each ANOVA 
associated with 55 mph roads was violated for the between subjects comparisons. With 
regard to the ANOVA to test for differences for the percentage of time driving at or 
below the speed limit, the assumption of sphericity was satisfied, but homogeneity of 
variance was violated. The main effect of Week and Incentive Group were not 
significant, F(3, 24) = .75, n.s.; and F(2, 8) = 4.70, n.s., respectively. The interaction 
between Week and Incentive Group was significant, F(6, 24) = 4.81, p < .01, partial q2 = 
.55. Trend analysis indicated a significant cubic trend for the interaction, F(2, 8) = 6.25, p 
< .01, partial q2 = .54, observed power = .61. Drivers in the Ml group significantly 
increased the percentage of time that they drove at or below the 55 mph speed limit 
during Week 2 (A/7 = 91.00%) and Week 3 (A/7 = 88.75%) relative to Week 1 (M = 68.25%). 
In contrast, the control group significantly decreased the percentage of time driving at 
or below 55 mph speed limits during Week 2 (M = 58.67%) and Week 3 (M = 61.67%) 
relative to Week 1 (A/7 = 84.33%). The percentage of time driving at or below 55 mph 
limits did not vary significantly during the month for drivers in the no-MI group (Range 
44.50% to 59.75%). Comparisons of the Ml group with the no-MI group and control 
group indicated that drivers in the Ml group spent significantly more time driving at or 
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below the limit during Weeks 2 (M = 91.00%), 3 {M = 88.75%), and A(M = 83.00%) than 
the no-MI group did at all four weeks and the control group at Weeks 2 (M = 58.67%), 3 

























Figure 19. The effect of monetary incentive and automated feedback on the percentage 
of time driving at or below the 55 mph speed limit. 
Percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over 55 mph roads. The main effect of 
Week and Incentive Group and the interaction between the two were not significant, 
F(3, 24) = .62, n.s.; F(2, 8) = 1.64, n.s.; and F(3.38, 13.52) = 1.86, n.s, respectively. 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 55 mph roads. The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group and the interaction between the two main effects were not 
significant, F(1.69, 13.52) = .62, n.s.; F(2, 8) = 1.64, n.s.; and F(6, 24) = 1.93, n.s. 
respectively. 
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Percentage of time driving 9 or more mph over 55 mph roads. The main effects of 
Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(3, 24) = 1.07, n.s. and F(2, 8) = 2.99, 
n.s., respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive group was not 
significant, F(6, 24) = 1.60, n.s. 
Percent of time driving at or below 70 mph roads. The main effect of Week was 
significnant, F(3, 72) = 6.84, p < .001, partial q2 = .22. Drivers spent significantly more 
time driving at or below the speed limit during Week 3 (M = 65.06%) than Week 1 (A/7 = 
51.23%) and Week 4 (A/7 = 50.31%). There was no significant difference between the 
mean percentage of time drivers drove at or below 70 mph roads during Week 2 (M = 
64.66%) and the other 3 weeks of driving. The main effect of Incentive Group and the 
interaction between Incentive Group and Week was not significant, F(2, 25) = 2.85, n.s. 
and F(6, 72) = 1.62, n.s, respectively. 
Percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over 70 mph roads. The main effects of 
Week, Incentive Group, and the interaction between the two terms were not significant, 
F(2.23, 53.47) = 1.19, n.s.; F(2, 24) = .14, n.s; and F(4.46, 53.47) = .56, n.s., respectively. 
Percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over 70 mph roads. The main effect of 
Week was significant, F(3, 72) = 8.55, p < .001, partial q2 = .26. Drivers spent significantly 
less time driving 5 to 8 mph over 70 mph limits during Week 2 (A/7 = 8.19%) than Weeks 
1 (A/7 = 16.13%) and A (M - 16.64%), and drivers spent significantly less time driving 5 to 
8 mph over 70 mph in Week 3 (M = 11.29%) than Week 4. The effects of Incentive 
Group and the interaction between Week and Incentive Group were not significant F(2, 
24) = 3.86, n.s.; and F(6, 72) = 2.45, n.s., respectively. 
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Percentage of time driving 9 or more mph over 70 mph roads. The main effect of 
Week was significant, F(3, 72) = 6.84, p < .001, partial q2 = .22. Drivers spent significantly 
less time driving 9 or more mph over 70 mph limits during Week 2 (M = 7.70%) relative 
to Week 1 (M = 16.03%). The main effect of Incentive Group and the interaction 
between Week and Incentive Group were not significant, F(2, 24) = 2.44, n.s.; and F(6, 
72) = 1.13, n.s., respectively. Table 7 presents a summary of the percentages of time 
spent driving within the four speed ranges in the above results. These percentages are 
grouped by Incentive Group, Week of driving, and speed limit zone. The last column 
indicates the results of the omnibus statistical tests. 
TABLE 7: Mean Percentage of Time Driving within Speed Ranges by Week and Ml group 
Speed Range Week 1 Week 2(AF) Week 3 Week 4 Sig. Effects* 
At or below limit 
































1-4 mph over limit 























































































































W x M I 
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Week 
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W x M I 
Wk 
W x M I 
n.s. 

































5-8 mph over limit 
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Week 
Ml 
W x M I 
TABLE 7 Continued 
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Speed Range 
5-8 mph over limit 
















9 mph or more over limit 




























































































































































W x M I 
n.s. 
W x M I 
Week 
Ml 
W x M I 
Week 
n.s. 
TABLE 7 Continued 
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Speed Range 
9 mph or more over limit 







































*Significant effects for the 3X4 ANOVAs: Week = significant main effect for AF week, Ml = 
significant main effect for Monetary Incentive Group, W x Ml = significant interaction between 
AF week and Ml, n.s. = the main effects and interaction were not statistically significant. 
Analysis of Variance for Mean Speeds by Speed Limit Zone 
Statistical approach and assumptions. The same approach used for the analysis 
of the percentage of t ime speeding was used to compare differences between the 
control, no-MI, and Ml groups within the four weeks of driving. The computation of 
average speed used for the analysis excluded speed of zero. This resulted in seven 3 X 4 
mixed ANOVAs, with one for each speed limit zone with sufficient degrees of freedom, 
i.e., 25 mph, 30 mph, 35 mph, 40 mph, 45 mph, 55 mph, and 70 mph. Outlying scores, 
defined as raw score values with z-scores greater than absolute 3.3, were changed so 
the new value was one unit greater than the next greatest score. The assumptions of 
normality, homogeneity of variance, and sphericity were evaluated using the same 
methods as the analyses for percentage of t ime speeding. 
Mean speed on 25 mph roads. The main effects of Incentive Group and Week 
were not significant, F(2,47) = 3.86, n.s. and F(3,141) = 2.26, n.s., respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Experimental Group was significant F(6,141) = 4.53, 
p<.001, partial q2 =.16. Trend analysis indicated a significant quadratic trend for this 
interaction, F(2,47) = 19.29, p<.001, partial q2 =.28. Drivers in the Ml group significantly 
reduced their mean speed during Weeks 2 and 3 (A/7 = 14.80 mph) relative to Weeks 1 
(M = 16.60 mph) and 4 [M = 16.40 mph). The Ml group's mean speed during Weeks 2 
and 3 was lower than the mean speeds of the control group and no-MI group at each 
measurement period. The mean speed of the no-MI group during Week 4 (M - 18.2 
mph) was also significantly higher than the Ml group's mean speed at Week 1 (A/7 = 16.6 
mph) and Week A(M = 16.4 mph). Mean speed of the control and no-MI groups did not 
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Figure 20. Average speed on 25 mph roads as a function of monetary incentive and 
advisory feedback. 
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Mean speed on 30 mph roads. The main effects of Week and Experimental 
Group were not significant, F(3,102) = 2.26, n.s.; F(2,34) = 2.26, n.s., respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Experimental Group was significant, F(6,102) = 4.11, 
p<.01, partial q2 =.20. Trend analysis indicated a significant quadratic trend for this 
interaction, F(2, 34) = 4.06, p<.05, partial q2 =.19. During Week 1, the Ml group drove 
significantly faster (M = 26.33 mph) than the no-MI group (A/7 = 24.64 mph), but the 
difference between the mean speed of the control group (M = 24.86 mph) and the other 
two groups was not statistically significant. The control group's mean speed increased 
significantly during Weeks 2 (M = 27.0 mph), 3 (M = 27.0 mph), and 4 (A/7 = 27.63 mph) 
relative to Week 1 (M = 24.86 mph). In contrast, drivers in the Ml condition had a 
significantly lower mean speed during Weeks 2 (A/7 = 24.53 mph) and 3 (M = 24.86 mph) 
than Week 1 (A/7 = 26.33 mph). The Ml group's mean speed during Weeks 2, 3, and 4 
was significantly lower than the control group's average speed during the same weeks. 
In contrast, drivers in the no-MI group significantly increased their mean speed during 
Week 2 (M = 26.00 mph) relative to Week 1. The no-MI group's mean speed during 
Week 1 was significantly lower than the control group's mean speed during Weeks 2, 3, 
and 4. The no-MI group's mean speed during Week 2 was significantly lower than the 
control group's mean speed during Week 4 and the Ml group during Week 1. The no-MI 
group's mean speed during Week 3 (A/7 = 25.36 mph) was significantly lower than the 
control group's mean speed during Weeks 2 and 4. Finally, the no-MI group's mean 
speed during Week 4 (A/7 = 26.07 mph) was significantly faster than the Ml group's mean 
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Week 4 
Figure 21. Average speed on 30 mph roads as a function of monetary incentive and 
advisory feedback. 
Mean Speed on 35 mph roads. The main effect of Week was not significant, F(3, 
141) = 3.95, n.s. The main effect of Incentive Group was significant: F(2, 47) = 10.25, 
p<.001, partial q2 =.30, respectively. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group 
was significant, F(6,141) = 5.68, p<.001, partial q2 =.20. Trend analysis indicated a 
significant cubic trend for the interaction, F(2, 47) = 10.25, p<.001, partial q2 =.30. 
Drivers in the Ml group significantly reduced their average speed during Week 2 (M = 
26.05 mph) and Week 3 (A/7 = 26.15 mph) relative to Week 1 (M = 28.45 mph) and Week 
4 (M = 27.30 mph). For the Ml group, average speed during Week 4 was significantly 
lower than Week 1. The Ml group's average speed during Weeks 2 and 3 was 
significantly lower than the average speed of the control group (Range 28.45 to 29.30 
mph) and no-MI group (Range 28.95 to 30.15) during each week of driving. The mean 
speed of the no-MI group during Week A (M = 30.15 mph) was also significantly greater 
than the no-MI group's mean speed during Week 3 (A/7 = 28.95 mph) and the control 
group s mean speed during Week 1 (A/7 = 28.20 mph) and Week 3 (M = 28.70 mph). The 
mean speed of the control group did not vary significantly during the month of driving 
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Figure 22. Average speed in 35 mph zones as a function of monetary incentive and 
automated feedback. 
Mean Speed on 40 mph roads.. The main effects of Week and Incentive Group 
were not significant, F(3,129) = 3.61, n.s. and . F(2, 43) = 1.17, n.s., respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(6,129) = 1.63, n.s. 
Mean Speed on 45 mph roads. The main effects of Week and Incentive Group 
were not significant, F(3,126) = 1.34, n.s.; F(2, 42) = 1.69, n.s., respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(6,126) = 1.63, n.s. 
Mean speed on 45 mph roads did not differ significantly within or between groups 
during the 4 weeks of driving. 
Mean Speed on 55 mph roads. Given the reduced number of participants who 
drove on 55 mph roads during each week of driving, there were greater than 20 degrees 
of freedom for the within-subjects comparison of Week and the interaction between 
Week and Incentive Group, but only 8 degrees of freedom for the between-subjects 
comparison. Thus, the assumption of normality was violated. Sphericity and 
homogeneity of variance were satisfied. The main effects for Week and Incentive Group 
were not significant, F(3, 24) = 1.32, n.s. and F(2, 8) = 2.00, n.s., respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(6, 24) = 2.71, n.s. 
Mean speed on 70 mph roads. The main effects of Week and Incentive Group 
and the interaction between the two terms were not significant, F(3, 72) = 3.66, n.s.,F{2, 
24) = 1.79, n.s., and F(6, 72) = .89, n.s, respectively. 
Miles driven per week 
A 3 (Incentive Group) X 4 (Week) mixed ANOVA assessed if miles driven by each 
Incentive Group varied from week to week. The test of sphericity was not violated, but 
the Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was significant. The effect of Week was 
significant, F(3,141) = 6.16, p < .01, partial q2 = .12, observed power = .96. The 
Bonferroni post-hoc test indicated that drivers drove significantly more miles during 
Week 1 (M = 167.91) than Week 2 (M = 141.90), Week 3 (M = 141.92), and Week A (M = 
132.37) (See Figure 26). The interaction between Incentive Group and Week was not 
significant, F(6,141) = 1.83, n.s. The effect of Incentive group was not significant, F(2, 
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Figure 23. Average total miles driven per week by incentive group. 
Perceived Mental Workload 
Statistical approach and assumptions. The six dimensions of the NASA-TLX, 
mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and 
frustration, were analyzed with a series of 3 (Incentive Group) X 4 (Week) mixed 
ANOVAs. The automated feedback system was coded as active during Week 2 and 
inactive for weeks 1, 3, and 4. The incentive was available for the Ml group during 
Weeks 2 and 3. The statistical assumptions of normality, absence of outliers, 
homogeneity of variance, and sphericity were satisfied, with the exception of 2 
instances. Specifically, the Levene's test for homogeneity of variance for Week 3 ratings 
of temporal demand was significant. However, Tabachnik and Fidell (2001) state that if 
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the F-max test is less than 10 then ANOVA is robust to this violation. The F-max value in 
this instance was 1.06. The second assumption violated was sphericity for the DV of 
physical demand. Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser statistic is reported for this 
dimension. In the following text, tests with significant interactions are reported and 
interpreted. Main effects are interpreted when the interaction between Incentive Group 
and Week was not statistically significant. Trend analyses were used as follow-up tests 
for significant effects. 
Mental Demand. The 3X4 ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for Week, 
F(3, 141) = 8.98, p < .001, partial q2 = .16. The effect of Incentive Group was not 
significant, F(2, 47) = 3.37, n.s. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant, F(6,141) = 3.68, p < .01, partial q2 = .14. The results of the trend analysis 
indicated a significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2,43) = 8.21, p < .01. The Ml 
group's ratings of mental demand were significantly higher during Weeks 2 (A/7 = 6.00) 
and 3 (A/7 = 6.25) relative to Weeks 1 (A/7 = 4.75) and 4 (A/7 = 3.80). Additionally, the Ml 
group's ratings for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly higher than the control and no-MI 
groups' ratings at all four weeks. The trend analyses also indicated that the no-MI 
group's perceived mental demand during Week 2 [M = 4.15) was significantly higher 
than the ratings for Weeks 3 (A/7 = 3.30) and A{M = 2.95). In contrast, the perceived 
mental demand of the control group decreased across the four weeks such that the 






















Week 1 Week 2 (AF) Week 3 Week 4 
Trial Week 
Figure 24. Perceived mental demand as a function of monetary incentive and 
automated feedback. 
Physical demand. The ANOVA for the ratings of physical demand indicated the 
main effects for Week and Incentive Group were not statistically significant. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was not significant. 
Temporal demand. The ANOVA for the ratings of temporal demand indicated 
that the main effect for Week was statistically significant, F(3,141) = 4.29, p < .01, partial 
q2 = .08. The main effect for Incentive Group was not statistically significant. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was significant, F(6,141) = 5.94, p < 
.001, partial q2 - .20. The results of the trend analysis indicated a significant quadratic 
trend for the interaction, F(2,47) = 15.83, p < .001, partial q2 = .40. The Ml group's 
ratings of temporal demand were significantly higher during Weeks 2 (M = 4.50) and 3 
(M = 4.75) relative to Weeks 1 (M = 2.45) and A(M = 2.65). Further inspection of the 
estimated marginal means indicated that the Ml group's ratings of temporal demand for 
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Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly higher than the no-MI groups' ratings during these two 
weeks (A/7 = 3.20 M = 2.90 for Weeks 2 and 3, respectively). The control group's ratings 
of temporal demand for Weeks 3 and A(M = 3.30 for each week) was significantly lower 
than the Ml group's Week 2 and Week 3 ratings. The controls within-group ratings did 
not vary reliably across the four weeks of driving nor did they vary significantly from the 
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Trial Week 
"-•—Control 
- » - N o M I 
•Ml 
Week 4 
Figure 25. Perceived temporal demand as a function of monetary incentive and 
automated feedback. 
Performance. The main effects for Week and Incentive Group were not 
significant, F(3,141) = 3.88, n.s. and F(2,47) = 1.26, n.s., respectively. The interaction 
between Week and Incentive Group was not significant, F(6,141) = 2.38, n.s. 
Effort. The 3 by 4 ANOVA indicated significant main effects for Week and 
Incentive Group, F(3,141) = 8.43, p < .001, partial q - .15, observed power = .99 and 
F(2, 47) = 5.30, p < .01, partial q = .18, observed power = .81, respectively. The 
interaction between Week and Incentive Group was also significant, F(6,141) = 5.11, p < 
.001, partial q2 = .18, observed power = .99. The results of the trend analysis indicated a 
significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2,43) = 10.61, p < .001. Examination of 
the group means at each measurement period indicated that the Ml group's ratings of 
effort were significantly higher during Week 2 (M = 5.60) and 3 (M = 6.10) relative to 
Weeks 1 (A/7 = 3.65) and 4 (A/7 = 3.30). Additionally, the Ml group's ratings of perceived 
effort for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly higher than the control and no-MI groups' 
ratings at all four weeks (Range = 2.60 to 3.60). The trend analyses also indicated that 
the no-MI group's perceived effort during Week 2 (A/7 = 3.60) was significantly higher 
than ratings for Week 1 (M = 2.60) but not Weeks 3 (M = 3.30) or 4 (M = 3.30). The 
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Figure 26. Perceived effort as a function of monetary incentive and automated 
feedback. 
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Frustration. The 3X4 ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for Week, F(3, 
141) = 20.43, p < .001, partial q2 = .30. The main effect for Incentive Group was not 
significant, F(2, 47) = 3.82, n.s. The interaction between Week and Incentive Group was 
significant, F(6,141) = 4.75, p < .001, partial q2 = .17. The results of the trend analysis 
indicated a significant quadratic trend for the interaction, F(2,43) = 9.64, p < .01. 
Inspection of the group means at each measurement period indicated that the Ml 
group's ratings of frustration were significantly higher during Week 2 (A/7 = 6.05) and 3 
(M = 5.35) relative to Weeks 1 (A/7 = 2.90) and A(M = 2.35). Additionally, the Ml group's 
ratings for Weeks 2 and 3 were significantly higher than the control groups' ratings at all 
four weeks (Range = 2.90 to 3.90); the Ml group's Week 2 rating was significantly higher 
than the no-MI group's Week 2 (A/7 = 4.90) rating. The no-MI group's rating of frustration 
during Week 2 was higher relative to Week 1 (M = 2.05), 3 (M = 2.80), and 4 (A/7 = 2.35) 
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TABLE 8: Analysis of Variance for the Six Dimensions of the NASA-TLX. 
Source JL. partial n 
Dimension 1: Mental Demand 
Between Subjects 
Group (G) 2 3 34* 
















Dimension 2: Physical Demand 
Between Subjects 
Group (G) 2 1 31 
Error 47 (15 20) 
05 28 
Within Subjects 
Week (W) 3 2 62 
GXW 6 2 34* 


























*p< 05 **p< 01 ***p< 001 Values in parentheses are mean square errors The Between Subjects variable 
"Group" represents the control, incentive, and no incentive/feedback only groups The Within Subjects variable 
"Week" represents the four consecutive weeks of driving, with feedback coded as occurring in Week 2 or 3 Only tests 
with p values < 01 were interpreted as statistically significant 
TABLE 8 Continued 
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Source df partial n 
Dimension 4: Performance 
Between Subjects 
Group (G) 2 126 
















Dimension 5: Effort 
Between Subjects 




Dimension 6: Frustration 
Between Subjects 
Group (G) 3 82* 




































Trust and Acceptance of Automated Feedback. 
Participants in the Ml and no-MI group completed the eight item Trust and 
Acceptance scale at the end of the week that they drove with AF. The participants rated 
each item on a scale from 1 to 10 with one indicating complete disagreement and 10 
indicating complete agreement. Independent samples t-tests were conducted on each 
item of the scale to test for differences in perceived trust and acceptance of the AF 
system as a function of incentive group. Miscommunication between the experimenter 
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and research assistant about the administration of the scale resulted in five missing data 
sets for the Ml group. Specifically, during the AF week, the Ml participants were to 
complete the trust and acceptance scale twice. The first iteration was to provide ratings 
about the feedback system, and the second iteration was to provide ratings about the 
monetary incentive system. However, the first five Ml participants completed the scale 
only once, and the research assistant did not specify which system these participants 
were rating. Therefore it is unclear whether these five individuals were rating the AF 
system, the Ml system, or a combination of the two systems. Thus, the five data sets 
were removed from the analysis prior to completing the t-tests. 
Of the eight analyses, only the test for the statement, "the speed warning 
system was trustworthy" was marginally statistically significant, t(33) = 2.44, p < .05. 
Drivers in the Ml group rated the system as being less trustworthy [M = 6.80) than 
drivers in the no-MI group (M = 8.40). The remaining seven analyses were not 
statistically significant (see Table 5). Seven of the eight items (perceived reliability, 
predictability, trust, acceptability, annoyance, accuracy, and agreeability) received mean 
ratings above six for both groups. Both groups' ratings for perceived pleasantness were 
less than five. 
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TABLE 9: Mean Ratings and (-coefficients for Trust and Acceptance of the AF system. 
Item N Mean (Std Dev) t d_f_ 

























* p < .05 
Trust and Acceptance of Monetary Incentive System. 
Participants who were in the Ml group completed the trust and acceptance scale 
at the end of each week that they drove with the opportunity to earn the cash incentive. 
A paired sample t-test assessed whether ratings of the incentive system differed as a 

















































miscommunication between the experimenter and research led to five missing data sets 
for the analysis. None of the t-tests were statistically different (see Table 6). 
TABLE 10: Mean Ratings and t-coefficients for Trust and Acceptance of the Ml system. 
Item N Mean (Std Dev) df 









































































Debriefing Survey Results 
At the end of the four week trial each participant completed an eight item 
questionnaire designed to gather feedback from the participants about the AF and Ml 
conditions that they experienced. Participants rated on a scale from 1 to 10, the extent 
to which they agreed with statements about the systems' overall usefulness, safety 
benefits, and their hypothetical willingness to keep the systems given various 
conditions. Participants in the no-MI condition rated their experience with the AF 
system. Participants in the Ml condition rated the combined experience of the Ml and 
AF systems. Thus, descriptive analyses were completed separately for the Ml and no-MI 
conditions (see Tables 7a and 7b). One item, "I would keep the system if I had to pay for 
it," had an open ended follow-on question, which was, "How much would you pay?" 
Only two of the 20 no-MI participants indicated that they would pay for such a system, 


























TABLE 11: Descriptive Analysis of Responses to Debriefing Survey, no-MI participants. 
Item* N Mean Std. Dev. 
"I found the system useful." 
"The system improves traffic safety." 
"The system makes me a better driver." 
"I would keep the system if it were free." 
"I would pay to keep the system." 
"How much would you pay?" 
"The system would be helpful for novice drivers." 
"I would keep system if offered an insurance discount." 
* All items except "How much would you pay to keep the system" were answered on a scale of 1 to 10, 
with 1 indicating full disagreement and 10 indicating full agreement. 
TABLE 12: Descriptive Analysis of Responses to Debriefing Survey, Ml Participants. 
Item N Mean Std. Dev. 
"I found the system useful." 
"The system improves traffic safety." 
"The system makes me a better driver." 
"I would keep the system if it were free." 
"I would pay to keep the system." 
"How much would you pay?" 
"The system would be helpful for novice drivers." 
"I would keep system if offered an insurance discount." 
Responses to open-ended questions at debriefing meeting 
The final portion of the debriefing meeting consisted of the research assistant 
asking participants a series of questions to gather information about their approval of 


























indicated that the auditory component of the AF system was unpleasant. However, 
there were some individuals who indicated that the auditory component was acceptable 
and should have been louder. Participants reported that the incentive system was 
acceptable and was largely responsible for their reductions in speeding. Suggestions for 
improvement largely focused on the AF system, although there were some 
recommendations associated with the incentive system (see Table 8). The complete 
responses as transcribed by the research assistant, are in Appendix B. 
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TABLE 13: Sample Responses to Open-ended Debriefing Quesitons. 
Question Sample Responses 
What features of the system did you like7 "Information of speed limits " "It was effective the visual 
and auditory component that acted as a flag " "The 
incentive based part of the system, but I also liked that the 
tone wasn't overwhelming " "that it was very accurate and 
reliable " "Uhm I mean know when to slow down when I 
was speeding " "Useful going downhill with speed change" 
"some roads had no signs, I liked knowing the limit " 
"Getting paid to do normal behaviors - made me more 
cognizant of how fast I was going " "It beeped and gave 
me enough time as a buffer " "None " 
What features of the system did you dislike7 "It was not built into the vehicle " "Auditory component 
was punishing " "Sometimes (the beep) would make me 
feel a little stressed out " "That once I was over it would 
immediately take money, it would be nice if I could slow 
down if there was a time delay " "The inability to turn the 
system of f " "The audio tone - there was some situations 
that I would rather speed and take the risk but couldn't 
because of the irritation of the noise " "Some-times the 
numbers were inaccurate so that was more distracting 
than helpful " "The loud beeping scared the crap out of me 
several times, and how it didn't display the money all the 
time " "Too quiet and the hardware is ugly " "That it 
wasn't optional " "Errors in feedback and stressful " "On 
the highway it seemed set too low " 
How would you change to make it more effective7 "Have the sound run through the speakers of the car " 
"Make it so you could change the beep" "Maybe if it 
weren't such an aversive sound, maybe just a bell to 
remind you maybe it would be a little bit more 
acceptable " "Make it a voluntary thing, you could flip the 
switch and turn it on when you needed it " "Make audio 
alert not so annoying "a larger (visual) display " "Less 
aversive tone maybe ""Make it louder, and make it so it 
won't go away unless you do something about it " Brighter 
more beeps " "Make tone more annoying " "More 
accuracy about the speed " 
How would you make it more acceptable7 "Would not change " "Offer a selection of warning tones " 
"Make it less aversive " "Just make the incentive to drive 
the speed limit more just the fact that it is the safer thing 
to do rather than just annoy the piss out of you " "No 
beeps but I don't know if it would be as effective " "Have it 
start beeping at 9 over instead of 6 over " "Ability to turn 
off and on " "Get rid of audible, just visual " "Voice 
instead of the beep " 
Do you have any other feedback about the system7 "It would be good for if you were under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol so that you could know when you were 
speeding to avoid being pulled over " "It would also be 
good for informational purposes for new cities to know 
TABLE 12 Continued 
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speed information." "it was very straight forward it did 
what it was said it was going to do, I think it could be 
useful in certain changes and circumstances." "Second 
beep not as helpful because by that point I knew." "Pretty 
sweet, maybe a breathalyzer tied in." 
What affected your decision to speed? "Self competition and the money." "Need vs reward thing -
in the moments I sped I did so knowing I would lose 
money but I did because I needed to be somewhere 
faster." "The penalty." "Trying to be successful not about 
money I didn't want to fail the test." 
Tests of correlations 
Self report and behavioral measures. At different times during the experimental 
trials, participants provided responses to many self-reported questionnaire items, and 
tests of the Pearson's correlation coefficient were completed to examine relationships 
of interest. These tests of correlation were completed to assess the relationships 
between attitudes about sensation seeking, self-reported non-speeding related risky 
driving behaviors, self-reported beliefs about speeding, and observed speeding 
behaviors. A second set of correlations assessed the relationships between self-reported 
computer use, general trust in technology, and ratings of trust and acceptance of the AF 
and Ml. Tests of correlation were also completed to determine the extent of the 
relationship between NASA-TLX ratings and Trust and Acceptance ratings of the AF and 
Ml. Finally, correlations were computed to assess the relationship between the trust 
and acceptance ratings and responses provided during the debriefing session at the end 
of the trials. Only relationships with a p value < .01 were considered statistically 
significant. 
Self-reported beliefs about speeding, seatbelt and cellular phone use, observed 
speeding. At the end of the first week of experimental trials, participants answered 
questions about speeding, seatbelt use, and cellular phone use. Four questions asked 
participants to indicate how fast they could drive before police pulled them over for 
speeding on roads that were 55 mph or faster, 45 mph or faster, 40 mph or greater, and 
35 mph or slower. Participants also indicated on a scale of 1 to 5 how often they wore 
their seatbelts, with 1 indicating never and 5 indicating always. Participants also 
indicated how often they talked on cellular phones while driving with 1 indicating on all 
trips and 5 indicating they never talked while driving. These self-report items were 
correlated with 12 measures of observed speeding. The 12 measures were the 
percentage of time spent driving (1) 1 to 4 mph over the speed limit, (2) 5 to 8 mph over 
the speed limit, and (3) 9 or more mph over the speed limit. There was one score for 
each of these percentages for each week of driving. There were few significant 
correlations between the self-report beliefs about speeding and observed speeding, and 
only the significant results are discussed in text. 
There were 72 tests of the Pearson's correlation coefficient to assess the 
strength of the relationship between the 12 observed measures of speeding behavior 
and the 6 self-report measures of beliefs about speeding and use of seatbelts and 
cellular phones. There was one significant positive correlation between the self report 
measures of driving behavior and observed speeding. The two correlated variables were 
self-reported frequency of seatbelt use and the percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph 
over all speed limits during Week 4, r(50) = .33, p < .01. Drivers who indicated that they 
wore their belt more frequently tended to spend a greater amount of time driving 5 to 8 
mph over all speed limits during Week 4. 
Sensation seeking and observed speeding. At the end of the first week of the four 
week trial, participants completed an abbreviated 4-item sensation seeking measure. 
Scores for these four items were correlated with 12 observed measures of speeding. 
The measures of observed speeding were the percentages of time spent driving 1 to 4 
mph over the limit, 5 to 8 mph over the limit, and 9 or more mph over the limit. The 
statement, "I like to explore strange places" was significantly negatively correlated with 
the percentage of time spent driving 1 to 4 mph over the speed limit during Week 2, 
r(50) = -.38, p < .01. Drivers who indicated a preference for exploring strange places 
tended to spend less time driving 1 to 4 miles per hour over the limit during the second 
week of driving. The statement, "I like new and exciting experiences even if I have to 
break the rules" was significantly positively correlated with the percentage of time 
driving 9 or more mph over the limit during Week 4, r(50) = .37, p < .01. Participants 
who indicated a preference for new and exciting experiences tended to spend more 
time driving 9 or more mph over the limit during the final week of driving. 
Correlations between acceptance of technology and trust and acceptance of AF. 
At the end of the first week of the trials, participants completed five questions about the 
extent to which they felt comfortable using a computer for browsing the web, writing 
email, programming, gaming, and word processing. Three additional questions were 
included to gather data about participants' trust and acceptance of technology in 
general. These additional questions included preference for self checkout lines, manual 
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completion of tasks, and general suspicion of new technologies. There was one 
significant positive correlation between preference for using self checkout lines and how 
agreeable the participants found the AF system, r(50) = .37, p < .01. Individuals who 
found the AF system to be agreeable tended to indicate a preference for self checkout 
lines. 
Correlations between Perceived Mental Workload and Trust and Acceptance of 
AF. Pearson's correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship 
between the 6 dimensions of the NASA-TLX (i.e., mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration) and the eight items of the trust 
and acceptance scale (i.e., ratings of reliability, predictability, trustworthiness, 
acceptability, pleasantness, annoyance, accuracy, and agreeability). Thus, there were 48 
tests to compare each item on the NASA-TLX with each item of the trust and acceptance 
scale. Ratings of mental demand were negatively correlated with ratings of 
trustworthiness, r(35) = -.44, p < .01. Individuals who rated the AF system as mentally 
demanding tended indicate that the AF system was not trustworthy. Ratings of temporal 
demand were negatively correlated with ratings of predictability, r(35) = -.59, p < .001. 
Individuals who rated the AF system as temporally demanding tended to give low 
ratings for predictability. 
Correlations between trust, acceptance, usefulness, and willingness to keep AF. 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were computed to test the relationships between the 
eight ratings of trust and acceptance of the AF system and six ratings provided by 
participants at the end of the experimental trials. The six items were to gather data 
about perceived use and willingness to keep the system. Participants rated the following 
statements, "I found the system useful;" "The system improves traffic safety;" "The 
system makes me a better driver;" "I would keep the system if I had to pay for it;" "I 
would keep the system if it were free;" and "I would keep the system if offered an 
insurance discount." There were no significant correlations between the trust scale and 
the ratings of perceived usefulness and willingness to keep. 
Correlations between perceived mental workload, usefulness, and willingness to 
keep. A final set of significance tests of Pearson's correlation coefficients assessed the 
relationships between mental workload ratings of the AF system and the six ratings of 
perceived usefulness and willingness to keep the system. Ratings of mental demand 
were positively correlated with perceived improvement to driving, r(40) = .55, p < .001. 
Participants who indicated that the AF system was mentally demanding tended to 
report that the system improved their driving. Ratings of temporal demand were also 
positively correlated with perceived improvement to driving, r(40) = .56, p < .001. 
Participants who indicated that driving with the AF system was temporally demanding 
tended to indicate that the system made them better drivers. Ratings of effort were 
positively correlated with perceived improvement to driving, r[A0) - .55, p < .001. 
Participants who found driving with the AF system to be effortful tended to perceive 
that the system improved their driving. 
Summary of Results 
The four sets of eight ANOVAs that tested the effects of Ml and AF on the 
proportion of time in various speed ranges indicated several significant effects for the 
incentive and limited effects for the automated feedback system. Six of eight ANOVAs 
indicated interactions in which drivers in the Ml group significantly increased the 
amount of time driving at or below the limit during Weeks 2 and 3 relative to the 
baseline week. In contrast, the control and no-MI drivers did not change the amount of 
time driving at or below the limit across the four weeks. Two of eight analyses indicated 
that drivers increased the percentage of time driving 1 to 4 mph over the limit during 
Week 2. 
Eight of the 16 ANOVAs that tested the percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph 
over the limit and 9 or more mph over the limit indicated significant interactions 
between Ml and AF. In each interaction, drivers in the Ml group significantly decreased 
the percentage of time driving 5 to 8 mph over and 9 or more mph over the limit during 
Weeks 2 and 3. In one of these interactions (percent of time driving 5 to 8 mph over all 
speed limits combined), drivers in the Ml group spent a lower percentage of time during 
the week with AF than Week 3 with Ml only. Otherwise, the differences between Ml + 
AF and Ml only conditions were not statistically significant. Four of these eight 
interactions indicated that drivers in the no-MI group decreased the percentage of time 
spent driving in these speed ranges during Week 2 when they drove with AF. Of the 
eight ANOVAs that did not show a significant interaction, five indicated a significant 
effect for the repeated measure of Week. Drivers reduced the amount of time driving 
over the limit, primarily during Week 2 when the AF was active for the Ml and no-MI 
group. Three of the eight ANOVAs that tested the effects of AF and Ml on average 
speeds indicated that drivers in the Ml group had lower average speeds in weeks 2 and 
3 relative to their baseline week and to the no-MI and control groups. 
The analyses of perceived mental workload as measured by the NASA-TLX 
included six ANOVAs to test the effects of Ml and AF on each of the six dimensions of 
mental workload (i.e., mental demand, physical demand, performance effort and 
frustration.) Drivers in the Ml group indicated that driving during Weeks 2 and 3 was 
more mentally demanding relative to Week 1 or Week 4 or to the Control or no-MI 
groups. The higher perceived mental workload of the Ml group during Weeks 2 and 3 
was apparent from the analysis of four of the six workload dimensions. Results from the 
analyses of the dimensions of effort and frustration provided some indication that 
drivers in the no-MI group found Week 2 to be more demanding than other weeks of 
driving. The control group's ratings of perceived mental demand generally remained 
unchanged during the trial. 
T-tests assessed differences of perceived trust and acceptance of the AF system 
as a function of assignment to Incentive Group (Ml or no-MI). Of the eight tests, only 
one was marginally significant. Participants in the Ml group rated the AF system as less 
trustworthy than the no-MI group. Both groups of participants tended to agree that the 
AF system was reliable, predictable, accurate, agreeable, trustworthy, and acceptable, 
but they also agreed that the system was annoying and indicated it was not pleasing. 
Paired sample t-tests assessed differences in trust and acceptance ratings of the Ml 
system as a function of the presence or absence of AF. The tests of the eight items 
indicated that the differences between ratings of Ml during Week 2 (with AF) and Week 
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3 were not statistically significant. Ml participants indicated a high degree of agreement 
with each of the eight statements, with one exception: they disagreed with the 
statement, "The Ml system was annoying." 
Several tests of correlation assessed the strength of relationships between 
several constructs and observed measures. Self report beliefs about speeding were 
generally not related to observed speeds. There were several significant correlations 
between sensation seeking and observed speeding, with individuals who scored high on 
sensation seeking items tending to spend less time speeding in the 1 to 4 mph range and 
more time in the 9 mph or more over the limit range. There were few significant 
correlations between questions about acceptance and familiarity with technology in 
general and trust and acceptance of the AF system, although there was some indication 
that acceptance of the AF system increased with preference for technology. In contrast, 
there were significant correlations between perceived mental workload and trust and 
acceptance of the AF system that indicated increases in perceived workload were 
accompanied by decreases in trust and predictability. Finally, there were several 
correlations that indicated increased mental demand was associated with increased 
perceived improvement to driving. 
DISCUSSION 
There were two linked goals in this test of a prototype ISA system. Principles of 
behavioral psychology were used to construct the contingency associated with the 
monetary incentive in such a manner that would maximize the reduction of speeding 
behavior. The theoretical constructs of mental workload and trust in automation were 
measured throughout the study to assess the extent to which the prototype system 
might threaten traffic safety or be unacceptable to drivers. Based on the literature 
review several hypotheses were generated regarding the expected effects of the 
automated feedback and monetary incentive on speeding behavior, mental workload, 
and trust and acceptance of the prototype system. Thus, the following discussion of the 
results is presented in conjunction with the related hypotheses. 
Effects of Monetary Incentive and Automated Feedback on Observed Speeding 
The first predictions were about the expected effect of monetary incentive (Ml) 
and automated feedback (AF) on observed speeding. There was an interaction predicted 
between the monetary incentive (Ml) and the automated feedback (AF). The 
combination of Ml and AF was predicted to result in significantly lower speeds than the 
Ml-only, AF-only conditions, baseline, and control conditions. The three experimental 
conditions (Ml only, MI+AF, and no-MI + AF) were predicted to result in lower speeds 
during the treatment periods than the control group. The independent variables were 
manipulated in a manner that resulted in a 3 X 4 factorial design, with three incentive 
groups (Ml, no-MI, and control) and 4 weeks of driving (with AF coded as occurring 
during Week 2 for the Ml and no-MI groups). Therefore, the greatest effect was 
expected for the Ml group during Week 2. 
The results indicated large effects for the interaction between Week and 
Incentive group. However the interactions obtained from the inferential tests were, with 
one exception, different from the predicted interaction. Specifically, drivers in the 
incentive group dramatically changed their speeding behavior during Weeks 2 and 3, 
relative to Week 1 and to the control group's measures during all four weeks of driving 
measures and, typically, the no-MI group's measures at all four weeks. The incentive 
was in place during Weeks 2 and 3 only. The reduction in speeding behavior during 
these two weeks was manifested by several measures. These measures included 
speeding at 5 to 8 mph over the limit, 9 or more over the limit, driving at or below the 
speed limit, and analyses of average speed at several different speed limits. In fact, 
drivers in the Ml group essentially eliminated speeding that would have resulted in a 
reduction to their bonus amount: these drivers drove at 9 or more mph over all speed 
limits less than 1% of the time during Weeks 2 and 3. The change in the Ml group's 
speeding behavior during Week 2 was very similar to the change observed during Week 
3. There was only one instance in which the combination of Ml and AF resulted in less 
speeding than the Ml condition alone. 
Given the results, it is clear that there was little added effect of the AF system for 
the participants in the incentive group, and it is reasonable to conclude that the 
incentive condition as used in the current study (to include the incentive display) 
provided strong motivation to adhere to the speed limits. This finding was the primary 
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difference between the predicted and observed results. The hypothesized interaction 
was based on literature that indicates pairing feedback in conjunction with a reward 
results in optimal behavior change (e.g., Balcazar et al., 1986). One possible explanation 
for the lack of difference between the Ml-only and the Ml +AF conditions could be the 
design of the Ml system. The incentive amount was displayed to drivers in the Ml group 
at the start and end of every trip made during Weeks 2 and 3. This manner of presenting 
information about the incentive to the drivers may have constituted a form of 
immediate feedback to the drivers. In other words, providing the incentive amount at 
the start and end of every trip may have been sufficient information for participants to 
gauge their performance on maintaining speed limits, and thus the incentive display 
may have become a stronger conditioned reinforcer than the AF system. An interesting 
research question is the extent to which speeding behavior differed as a function of the 
presence or absence of this incentive display. It would be necessary to demonstrate that 
the change in speeding behavior without the incentive display was similar to the change 
with the display to conclude that the incentive alone was the causal mechanism. 
As to whether the change in speeding behavior observed among the drivers in 
the Ml group was due to the incentive alone or the combination of the incentive display 
and incentive itself, there were several comments made by the participants made 
during the debriefing interview that support the conclusion that the incentive condition 
effectively changed behavior. However, the comments reveal differing explanations for 
why the incentive condition affected their driving. Some participants in the incentive 
group indicated that the agent for their behavior change was self-competition. These 
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individuals indicated that what changed their behavior was the notion that they were 
trying to "win" or trying not to "fail", which the drivers defined as keeping the full 
incentive. Thus, it appears that for some participants in the Ml group, driving and 
keeping the incentive became a form of internal motivation. Researchers such as Deci et 
al (1999) argue that external motivators undermine intrinsic motivation, stating that the 
rewards undermine self-determination and competence. However, in the current 
project, the presence of the external motivator seems to have resulted in exactly what 
Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) argue in opposition to theorists such as Deci. 
Specifically, the comments made by participants suggest that the incentive presented an 
opportunity for them to use the incentive to bolster their self-determination to observe 
the speed limit. Thus, the external reward actually increased intrinsic motivation for 
these individuals. 
In contrast to drivers in the Ml group who indicated they changed speeding 
behavior as a result of making the contingency a challenge, other drivers in the Ml group 
indicated that it was either the opportunity to earn money or the threat of losing it that 
caused them to change their speeding behavior. These findings do not support 
opponents of external motivators, nor do these statements indicate that the quality-
dependent reward led to an increase in intrinsic motivation. However, the results do 
support Benabou and Tirole (2003), who reviewed studies in which monetary incentives 
were used to motivate behavior. The reviewers concluded that when an individual finds 
a task to be relatively unpleasant, such as helping someone move furniture, incentives 
are successful in motivating individuals to complete the desired task. In the current 
project many drivers indicated that they would have preferred to speed but were 
motivated by the incentive to adhere to the posted speed limits. 
A potential future application of this research, provided that the technology 
continues to become more viable, is for insurance companies to offer premium 
discounts for drivers who have this type of alerting technology in their vehicles. The 
current results have implications for the structure of the incentive system. Specifically, 
the responses indicate that some drivers changed their behavior because of the intrinsic 
reward of "performing well" rather than "making twenty-five dollars." The motivation to 
change driving behavior for the former reason may allow a reward structure that 
maximizes behavior change with minimal cost to insurers. For example, drivers may be 
motivated if performance and any subsequent discount were based on the percentage 
of time that they were within a certain range of the speed limit, rather than a finite 
dollar amount. However, future research would be needed to determine optimal 
incentive structure because only a segment of the participants indicated that there was 
intrinsic motivation to lower speed. 
Minimizing the cost to insurers would be a key factor if this type of system were 
to be applied in real world settings because the results provided mixed support for a 
persistence effect of the incentive. If the change to speeding behavior exists only in the 
presence of the incentive then the implications for insurance discounts are clear - the 
incentive may have to be offered indefinitely. In the current project during the return to 
baseline period, speeding frequently returned to levels recorded during the first week of 
the trial. However, there were several analyses in which levels of the dependent 
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variables for drivers in the incentive condition during Week 4 indicated less speeding 
than Week 1. Thus, the prediction of no residual effects during Week 4 was not entirely 
correct, and these findings contrast with Regan et al. (2006) who found no persistence 
effect in their study of advisory and interactive ISA. 
One explanation for the finding of some persistence effect in the current study 
may be that the presence of the monetary incentive led to a lasting behavior change for 
individuals in the Ml group. Another reason for the finding is that the return to baseline 
period in the current project was not as long as those in the Regan et al. study. A final 
explanation for the limited persistence effect is that a portion of drivers in the Ml group 
made a lasting change to their speeding behavior, and the remaining participants in the 
Ml condition returned to baseline speeding behaviors. This explanation would be 
supported by Geller, Berry, Ludwig, Evans, et al. (1990) who suggest that lasting safety 
related behavior change takes varying degrees of effort, with significantly more effort 
needed for high risk individuals than low risk individuals. Further research would be 
needed to determine which of these explanations for the persistence effects is valid. 
However, the mixed support for lasting behavior change and the large effect that the 
incentive had when in place during Weeks 2 and 3 indicate that it may be necessary for 
real world insurance premium reductions to be in place for a long period of time to 
maintain the change in speeding behaviors. For example, it may be necessary to keep 
such a system in place from age 16 to 24, when crash rates are highest, to achieve 
continued behavior change. 
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The incentive had a clear, strong impact on speeding behavior, but the same 
conclusion cannot be made about the AF system. Based on previous research on 
advisory level ISA (e.g., Biding and Lind, 2002; Harms et al. 2007) and on research that 
suggested a significant portion of drivers ticketed for speeding were unaware of the 
speed limit when they were caught, it was hypothesized that there would be a reduction 
in speeding due to the AF alone. There was limited evidence to suggest that the 
presentation of the alert provided an added benefit to drivers in the Ml group, and 
there was limited evidence to suggest that the AF alone had the predicted reduction in 
observed speeding. For example, across all speed limits drivers in the no-MI condition 
decreased the amount of time spent driving 9 or more mph over the limit during the 
week with the system relative to the 3 weeks when these drivers drove without the 
system. In contrast, drivers in the control group did not significantly change the 
proportion of time driving 9 or more mph over the speed limit. There were also findings 
that indicated drivers in the no-MI group significantly increased the amount of time 
spent driving 1 to 4 mph over the limit. This speed range was the speed at which one 
could speed without activating the alert system. Thus, it appears that the participants in 
the no-MI group changed their speeding behavior to avoid the alert, which corresponds 
with comments made about the aversive nature of the alert provided by the AF during 
the debriefing interview. 
However, the reduction in speeding among the no-MI participants during the AF 
period was not as consistent as predicted based on the results of European studies that 
tested the effects of advisory level ISA. For example, Harms et al. (2007) and Biding and 
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Lind (2002) completed field experiments that found consistent, significant reductions in 
speeding behavior when drivers experienced advisory level ISA. In fact, the Harms et al. 
study had several similarities to the current project, including a condition in which 
participants were offered economic incentives to reduce speeding. However, the 
researchers reported that the reductions in speeding during the ISA-only condition was 
greater than the incentive-only condition, whereas the current project found that the 
monetary incentive alone had nearly the same large effect as the incentive plus 
feedback condition. 
The divergent results between the current and previous field experiments 
caution against assuming that findings in one culture will consistently apply to others. 
Cultural differences abound in many realms of human behavior, including traffic safety. 
For example, Warner, Ozkan, and Lajunen (2009) completed a study that compared 
cultural differences between Turkish and Swedish drivers with regard to attitudes about 
speeding and self reported speeding behavior. The researchers found that drivers in 
Sweden indicated a greater degree of compliance with speed limits and favorable 
attitudes towards their country's speed limits than drivers in Turkey. Warner et al. 
suggested that a primary reason for the differences in attitudes about speeding is that 
the roadways are much safer in Sweden than Turkey, as evidenced by the lower fatality 
rate in Sweden. As a result, Swedish drivers perceive that it is normal to obey laws of 
the road, including speed limits, whereas Turkish drivers perceive the norm to be to 
violate speed limits. A similar difference in attitudes about speeding may exist between 
drivers in the United States and Sweden, the country in which Biding and Lind 
completed the large scale evaluation of ISA, and between the United States and 
Denmark, where Harms et al. completed their field test of advisory ISA and incentives. 
Specifically, if Danish and Swedish drivers' attitudes are more favorable toward obeying 
the speed limit than drivers in the United States, then they may have been more likely 
to reduce their speeds when alerted by the advisory ISA. 
An alternative explanation for the limited effect of the AF system on reduced 
speeding may be the "cry wolf" effect. As reviewed by Bliss, Gilson, and Deaton (1995), 
the cry wolf effect describes the non-responses to alerts that occur due to alarm 
mistrust. Alarm reliability is one factor shown by Bliss et al. to result to induce this 
effect. In the current project, participants indicated that the speed warning was 
generally accurate, but some individuals stated that the alert was occasionally 
inaccurate. There is the possibility that drivers who experienced false alerts may have 
ignored the true alerts as a result. However, participants did not explicitly state that 
they purposely ignored alerts because of false alarms. 
In summary, the monetary incentive had a powerful effect on speeding behavior, 
whereas the AF system had some evidence to indicate it resulted in a moderate 
reduction in speeding. Thus, there was partial support for the hypotheses made about 
the separate and combined effects of Ml and AF on speeding behavior. The results 
clearly indicate that a speed monitoring and incentive system can be an effective 
countermeasure. However, other results from this experiment, specifically those related 
to perceived mental workload, indicate that there could be some drawbacks to 
implementing the AF with or without incentives. 
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Perceived Mental Workload 
Several hypotheses were made about the expected effects of Ml and AF on 
drivers' perceived mental workload. Specifically, drivers in the Ml and no-MI conditions 
were expected to indicate that workload increased during the period that they drove 
with AF. Individuals in the no-MI condition were expected to indicate higher levels of 
frustration and temporal demand relative to the control groups and individuals in the Ml 
condition. Drivers in the Ml group were expected to indicate a higher degree of effort 
and mental demand than the control group because of the extrinsic motivation to 
reduce speeds. Further, drivers in both Ml and no-MI conditions were expected to 
indicate lower effort and mental demand during the AF period because of the 
expectation that they would be able to offload the task of speed monitoring. 
The results clearly support the hypothesis that the extrinsic motivation of the 
cash incentive resulted in an increase in mental workload for the participants in the Ml 
group. Drivers in the Ml condition indicated that the two weeks when they had the 
opportunity to earn the incentive resulted in increased mental demand, temporal 
demand, frustration, and effort relative to the first and last weeks of the trial and, 
generally, to the control and no-MI participants. Drivers in the no-MI condition indicated 
that effort and frustration were the only dimensions affected by the presence of AF. 
There was a slight trend for drivers in the Ml group to indicate that frustration was 
lower and mental demand, temporal demand, and effort were higher when they were in 
the Ml-only condition relative to the Ml + AF condition. However, while these findings 
were in the direction that would suggest that drivers offloaded the speed monitoring 
158 
task and experienced lower workload as a result, none of these trends were statistically 
significant. 
In contrast to the limited evidence to suggest that AF lowered mental workload, 
the hypothesis that AF would increase frustration was supported. There was a clear 
increase in the no-MI and Ml participants' ratings of frustration during the week they 
drove with AF relative to the baseline week and to the control group. However, this 
increase in frustration was not predicted for drivers in the Ml group. Rather, it was 
expected that the presence of the AF would be desirable because the system would 
make observing the speed less frustrating, and the drivers in the Ml group would realize 
that the alert was helping them keep the cash incentive. A related hypothesis that did 
not receive support was the expectation for temporal demand to increase for drivers in 
the no-MI group during the AF period (Week 2). A possible explanation for the failure to 
confirm this hypothesis may be that drivers in the no-MI condition ignored the AF in 
many instances. In other words, it was expected that temporal demand would increase 
to the extent that drivers reduced their driving speed. If drivers in the no-MI group were 
frequently ignoring the alert by failing to adjust their speed when alerted, then they 
may not have felt temporal demand to be any different than when they were driving in 
the absence of AF. This explanation is supported by the results of observed speed of 
drivers in the no-MI condition and the drivers in the Ml condition, with the latter 
condition having rated temporal demand significantly higher during Weeks 2 and 3 and 
also having reduced their speeding behavior significantly during the same measurement 
periods. 
Considering the above, four of six dimensions of perceived mental workload 
measured by the NASA-TLX increased significantly as a result of the monetary incentive, 
and there were increases to frustration and effort as a result of the automated feedback 
system. These changes were relative to perceived workload during baseline periods and 
to the control group. Although the effect sizes of significant analyses were rather large, 
the absolute values on the NASA-TLX rating scale may not indicate extreme levels of 
mental workload. The finding that participants who were in the Ml group rated each 
dimension as more demanding during the weeks when they were offered the bonus 
suggests that keeping their speed within the tolerance range increased the overall 
processing demands of the driving task. Further, the lack of a significant reduction in the 
workload indices during the AF period suggests at least two possible conclusions about 
speed monitoring, which is the primary function of the AF. These conclusions are based 
on the work of Parasuraman and Riley (1997) who predicted that automation can lower 
workload if individuals trust a system and allocate what was a manual task to the 
system. Given the results, drivers either (1) failed to allocate speed monitoring to the 
system or (2) allocated this task to the system, but failed to realize a benefit to 
processing resources. The first conclusion is discussed further in the trust and 
acceptance section. 
The increase in frustration and effort observed with the no-MI group during the 
AF period was significant; however, the highest ratings did not exceed the mid-point 
anchor of 5 on the NASA-TLX dimensions. This relatively low subjective rating provides 
support that the task of speed monitoring, in the absence of an incentive to refrain from 
speeding, may require limited processing demands compared to other aspects of the 
driving task. Finally, the increases in frustration and effort associated with the no-MI 
group during the AF period might be closely linked with the auditory component of the 
system. Specifically, during the debriefing interview, several participants commented 
that the auditory component was stressful and annoying. Thus, it is interesting that 
there was a failure to find some of the predicted correlations between the workload 
dimension of frustration and some of the measures of driver trust and acceptance of the 
system. 
Trust and Acceptance 
Ratings of automated feedback. The favorable ratings that participants in both 
incentive conditions provided about reliability, predictability, accuracy, agreeableness, 
trustworthiness, and acceptability indicate that the AF system may be acceptable if it 
were to be deployed widely, particularly if the auditory signal could be redesigned. 
Based on some of the comments during the debriefing interview, participants did 
indicate there were a few instances when the system was inaccurate, i.e., participants 
stated that the AF system occasionally indicated that the speed limit was different than 
the posted limit. Despite these few errors, the high ratings for system reliability and 
accuracy suggest that participants felt that the system generally worked as designed. 
However, the ratings of the remaining two items on the scale, those regarding how 
pleasing and annoying drivers found the system, suggest that auditory component of 
the system needs considerable attention. 
In the current project, an original design goal was to create a graded auditory 
signal that would alert drivers to moderate and egregious speed limit violations, so the 
project team decided that the temporal patterns of the two signals would be 
manipulated to differentiate the two levels of speed limit violations. A second goal was 
to create an auditory signal that would be considered relatively pleasing. Both design 
goals came directly from participant feedback from the European studies of advisory ISA 
(e.g., Biding & Lind, 2002; Harms et al., 2007; Hultkrantz & Lindberg, 2003). The first 
design goal was achieved by altering the pulse rate; the signal for the moderate 
violation had two pulses per burst, whereas the signal for the egregious violations had 
three pulses per burst. The four members of the design team and three pilot 
participants agreed the two signals were distinct, and the signal for the egregious 
violation was more urgent than the signal for the moderate violation. However, the goal 
of using a mellow or pleasing tone was not met due to time, budget, and physical 
constraints. The hardware and software purchased and used for the study had limited 
capability to annunciate the warning; the system was limited to playing pure tones 
rather than "softer" chimes or bongs. The costs to upgrade the hardware and the time 
and cost required to recode the software were prohibitive. This limitation resulted in 
the selection of a relatively harsh beep. The physical environment presented an 
additional obstacle to the generation of a pleasing tone. Specifically, the masking 
potential of the test vehicles' stereo systems and other ambient noise resulted in the 
need to amplify the AF speakers so that the warning would be heard in worst case 
scenarios, such as listening to loud music with the windows down and the experimental 
vehicle next to a loud truck. This created an auditory stimulus that had a presentation 
level that was well over the masked threshold in many situations, and this situation 
likely explains a great deal why the participants rated the AF as annoying and 
displeasing. 
The negative ratings about how annoying and displeasing drivers found the AF 
system were somewhat expected given the characteristics of the auditory component, 
yet it was surprising to find that there were few differences between the incentive 
conditions with respect to the other six items rated on the trust and acceptance scale. 
The one item that was rated differently indicated that drivers in the no-MI condition 
found the AF system to be more trustworthy than drivers who received the incentive. 
This difference in the ratings may help explain the failure to find the predicted 
reductions in perceived mental workload ratings among the drivers in the Ml condition 
during the week that they drove with AF. As discussed in the section about findings 
associated with mental workload, Parasuraman and Riley (1997) state that 
experimenters could expect a benefit to workload in situations when individuals trust a 
system sufficiently to allocate tasks to the system. The marginal (p < .025) finding that 
drivers in the Ml group rated the AF system as less trustworthy would support the 
hypothesis that mental workload was higher for the incentive group because they were 
reluctant to allocate the task of speed monitoring to the AF system and continued to 
perform it manually. In addition to the difference between the incentive groups and 
their ratings of trust, the significant correlations between items on the trust and 
acceptance scale and the mental workload scale also support Parasuraman and Riley's 
hypothesis. The negative relationships that existed between mental demand, temporal 
demand, trustworthiness, and predictability further suggest that participants who found 
the AF system to create higher levels of workload tended to have less trust in the 
system. 
Trust and Acceptance of Monetary Incentive. The ratings of trust and acceptance 
of the Ml system that drivers provided at the end of Weeks 2 and 3 lead to the 
conclusion that the experience with the system was very favorable. During the 
debriefing period, a few drivers indicated that there were a couple times when their 
bonus decreased because of an error in the speed limit data base. However, based on 
the high ratings of the acceptance and trust in the system, these errors appear to have 
been anomalies. In sum, the drivers in the Ml condition found the prospect of earning a 
weekly incentive to keep their vehicle speed within the tolerance range used in the 
current study to be acceptable. 
Perceived Usefulness and Willingness to Keep 
At the end of experimental trials, participants completed a debriefing session, 
which included a segment of questions to provide further information about the 
system's overall acceptability. Based on responses provided by the individuals in the no-
MI condition, the deployment of the AF system would not be considered useful. The 
responses also suggest that drivers would not pay to have the AF system in their vehicle, 
unless they were to receive an insurance discount. Given the moderate effect on 
speeding behavior found for the automated feedback alone in the current project, it is 
doubtful if any insurance company would want to give a discount in the absence of 
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some contingency. Drivers in the no-MI and Ml groups indicated that novice drivers 
would benefit from the AF system. However, only drivers in Ml group indicated that 
they believed their driving improved during the two weeks they drove with the 
incentive. 
The significant correlations between responses to questions in the debriefing 
interview and ratings of trust and acceptance were straightforward. Individuals who 
agreed that the system was useful and improved their driving tended to rate the system 
as pleasant and acceptable. However, the significant positive correlations between the 
debriefing questions and mental workload were somewhat surprising. Specifically, 
drivers who found the AF system to be mentally and temporally demanding, frustrating, 
and effortful indicated that the system was also useful and improved their driving. 
These correlations may have implications for deploying safety based technologies on a 
wide scale. If a system can be shown to have some inherent worth, then drivers may 
grow to accept them over a period of time. For example, the general attitude toward 
wearing seat belts during the 1970s and 1980s was negative, and use rates were 
approximately 15%. Drivers complained about the discomfort of wearing belts and some 
argued that wearing them could be less safe than driving unbelted, e.g., by getting 
trapped in a vehicle after a crash. However, belt use in 2010 is estimated to be 85% 
nationally, and many drivers now express discomfort when they are not wearing their 
seat belt (NHTSA, 2010a). 
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Implications from Correlational Analyses 
A number of predictions about relationships between self reported and observed 
dependent variables were made prior to the data collection process. One set of tests 
concerned testing relationships between self reported attitudes and behaviors about 
speeding and observed measures of speeding. The failure to find a significant 
relationship between self reported and observed speeding may be evidence of the 
social desirability bias, which describes situations when individuals self report answers 
are dishonest because they believe that the experimenter would view them disfavorably 
(see Fisher, 1993). This phenomenon occurs frequently in traffic safety research. 
Specifically, the traffic safety community acknowledges that individuals under-report 
behaviors that are perceived as negative (speeding, talking on a phone while driving) 
and over-report behaviors seen as positive (buckling seatbelts). For example, Li, Kim, & 
Nitz (1999) reviewed the over-reporting of seatbelt use in police reports and conclude 
that it is a significant enough problem to warrant a statistical procedure to adjust for the 
over estimate. Similarly, NHTSA (2010b) acknowledges that estimates of cell phone use 
during crashes are like to be underestimated due to the same phenomenon. 
Finally, the lack of relationships between self-reported and observed speeding 
call into question some of the research discussed in the literature review. Specifically, 
Blincoe et al. (2006) reported that a significant proportion of 500 drivers ticketed for 
speeding indicated that the reason they were speeding was that they were unaware of 
the speed limit. The findings of Blincoe et al. provided partial support for predicting an 
effect of the AF system in the current project. The results of observed speeding behavior 
and the lack of a correlation between observed and self reported speeding call into 
question the value of self report information, particularly when individuals are reporting 
about behaviors that might result in a negative judgment about them. 
In contrast to the lack of a relationship between self reported and observed 
speeding, there were several significant relationships between the short, four item 
sensation seeking scale and observed speeding. These findings provide further 
validation for the abbreviated sensations seeking measure. These relationships may 
indicate that those who score relatively high on self reported sensation seeking have a 
propensity to engage in risky driving behaviors relative to individuals with lower scores. 
Future research might determine the extent to which this relationship extends to other 
traffic safety behaviors. This finding may have implications for further research about 
systems designed to improve safety. For example, rather than examining correlations, it 
may be of interest to block a sample of participants into groups based on sensation 
seeking scores to determine if behavior change varied as a function of this trait. 
Future Research 
Mental Workload. This project was a first test of ISA in the United States. Thus, 
there are many future research projects that could and should follow the current effort. 
One future endeavor should be to look more closely at the effect of ISA on mental 
workload to understand whether the changes in subjective workload measures 
evidenced in this project present a situation that would offset the safety benefits of 
reduced speeding. Secondary task paradigms would be difficult to carry out in field 
settings, as these methods typically are designed to introduce some performance 
decrement. The current project was completed on public roadways; to add a secondary 
task paradigm in the same field settings may present a safety risk to drivers. 
In contrast, it may be possible to conduct a study to determine whether a 
physiological measure of workload, such as heart rate variability, changes as a function 
of the variables tested in the experiment. The need for more in-depth research 
concerning the impact on mental workload would be particularly crucial in situations 
that include external motivation because the push to refrain from speeding may conflict 
with a driver's desire to speed, as indicated in the current study. Given the results that 
suggest the increase in perceived workload, future research must thoroughly evaluate 
the effect of this prototype system on processing resources before it might be 
recommended for wide scale deployment. 
Other unintended consequences. In addition to increased mental workload, other 
unintended negative consequences could negate the safety benefits of ISA. One concern 
is that the level of automation may remove the driver from loop of speed monitoring. 
Sheridan (1980) discussed several reasons why individuals may become alienated by 
automation. Some of these reasons discussed by Sheridan are particularly threatening 
for automation that assumes control over decision making processes and would not 
apply to the level of automation studied in the current project. For example, in some 
human machine interactions in which the human simply activates a system, the 
operator may not experience the end product, resulting in alienation. In contrast, the 
alienation that might occur from the advisory level speed feedback studied in the 
current project may result from individuals becoming resentful because the AF system is 
perceived as a threat to replace the monitoring completed by the driver. An additional 
cause of concern discussed by Sheridan is that the AF system may degrade skills because 
the nature of the driver's task has changed. Some of the European ISA researchers 
indicated that skill degradation of speed monitoring occurred. Drivers committed mode 
errors when they assumed that their ISA systems were active when, in fact, the vehicles 
were in the inactive mode (Hjalmdahl & Varheiyi, 2004). 
In addition to the potential for driver alienation and complacency, a host of 
negative behaviors could be predicted from risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1988). 
According to Wilde, individuals seek a certain level of risk. If a person perceives that a 
given situation has a perceived risk that is lower than the optimal level, then the 
individual will make some behavioral change to increase the risk to the homeostatic 
level. Thus, for the current study Wilde might predict that drivers who reduce speeding 
might increase red light running or tailgating or reduce seatbelt use. As discussed in the 
literature review, Comte (2000) completed simulator research that provided some 
support for Wilde's predictions. 
The work of Geller and colleagues contrasts with risk homeostasis theory. Geller 
suggests that specific safety behaviors may transfer to others and provides interventions 
that should increase the likelihood of their generalization. The example in the previous 
paragraph presents a situation in which the driver reduces speeding but continues to 
tailgate. However, Geller and colleagues would predict the opposite occurrence. Based 
on findings that indicate a correlation among safety behaviors, Ludwig and Geller (Geller 
et al., 1990; Ludwig & Geller, 2000; Ludwig, 2001) provide support for the NHTSA (2007) 
169 
report that indicates a relationship between speeding and other crash risk factors. 
Geller and colleagues argue that risky driving behaviors cluster together, and that any 
one behavior, i.e., speeding, is a component of a general behavior pattern. These 
authors worked to improve the safety behaviors of delivery drivers and implemented 
interventions using verbal feedback to target specific behaviors such as making full stops 
at stop signs. The intervention successfully changed the target behavior, and the 
authors noted changes in other safety relevant driving behaviors such as an increased 
use of turn signals. Thus, a possible effect of ISA would be that driving more slowly may 
generalize to other safe driving behaviors such as increased following distance and 
increased seatbelt use. Future research could include video recording in a research 
design that is otherwise similar to the current study. Such a project might provide 
support for risk homeostasis theory or support the work of Geller and colleagues. The 
presence of video would also allow researchers to filter out situations in which drivers 
did not have the opportunity to speed, such as heavy traffic, or to determine if the 
reduced speeds of participants introduced conflicts with other vehicles in the traffic 
flow. 
Testing Other Levels of ISA Automation. This demonstration indicated that an 
incentive and advisory ISA effectively reduced speeding of a small sample of young US 
drivers while showing a fair degree of driver acceptance. The findings support further 
testing of these systems in the United States. One research area that would provide 
valuable information would be the testing of additional levels of ISA automation. 
Sweden's ISA effort showed that advisory, interactive, and mandatory ISA systems 
significantly reduced speeds (Biding & Lind, 2002), while also showing that each level 
had some negative effects. Carsten and Tate (2005) recommended that the United 
Kingdom adopt mandatory ISA. Future research should investigate these other levels 
within the United States. The moderate effect found for the automated feedback in the 
current study conflicted with results reported in European studies and underscores the 
importance of studying the effect each level of automation has on United States drivers. 
NHTSA is currently testing an interactive level ISA system in which drivers will 
experience counter force to accelerator pedals when they exceed the posted speed 
limit. Future research on ISA could also test the effect of ISA among different sub-
populations within the United States. For example, the "average" driver may benefit 
from and even desire an automated feedback, particularly if the system included a 
monetary incentive such as insurance discounts. Further, if automated enforcement 
continues to increase, then so would the probability of being caught speeding. In this 
circumstance, drivers may desire such an automated feedback. In contrast, parents or 
government officials may mandate higher levels of ISA automation for novice drivers, 
reckless drivers, or perpetual speeders. 
Future projects using the independent variables used in the current project could 
address many unanswered research questions. Regarding the monetary incentive, 
insurance companies may be interested in knowing the price point necessary to induce 
customers to install this sort of monitoring system and to make enough profit to keep 
their business thriving. Researchers might also use different reinforcement schedules, 
although the current project achieved near complete extermination of observed 
speeding using the current delayed incentive contingent upon avoiding an immediate 
disincentive. An important research question that should be answered is how speeding 
behavior would be affected by the incentive and ISA over a longer period of time. The 
trial period in the current project was one month, and this time included a baseline, 
treatment, and return to baseline periods. Understanding the effects of incentive and 
ISA over a longer time would be essential before any recommendation could be made 
about deploying this system. Future research endeavors should certainly include 
development of a more acceptable auditory warning. The technology currently exists to 
present an array of signals to drivers, and the feedback from the participants clearly 
indicates that efforts to present different alerts are warranted. Given individual tastes, 
designers might create a number of warnings from which drivers could select the most 
pleasing to them. Alternatively, research could test a more aversive stimulus than the 
graded alert used in the current project. For example, an auditory signal could be 
presented that does not go away until the drivers slow the vehicle, and some currently 
available off-the-shelf systems purposely present such an aversive stimulus to drivers. 
However, given the negative reaction that drivers had to the current system, using a 
harsher stimulus might annoy or anger a driver to the point of automation disuse. In 
fact, the results of this study seem to indicate that participants perceived the auditory 
component of AF to be more urgent than the actual situation. Thus, making the alert 
even more urgent would counter researchers who advise designers to map the urgency 
of a signal to the true urgency of the situation (see Edworthy et al., 1991 and Marshall et 
al., 2007). Additionally, the alert is supposed to advise drivers that they are over the 
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limit, and the choice to adjust speed is then placed upon the driver. Given that the 
capabilities exist for mandatory ISA, it would make more sense to use this higher level of 
automation if the goal is to force drivers to drive at the posted speed limit rather than 
forcing them to do it by presenting an aversive alert. 
Conclusion 
Speeding is a serious threat to traffic safety. Thirty-one percent of fatal crashes 
in the United States in 2008 were related to speeding. This percent means that in 2008 
nearly 12,000 people were killed in the United States in speeding related crashes 
(NHTSA, 2009). This project tested the effects of a monetary incentive and automated 
feedback on speeding behavior, and the results indicate that the drivers who received a 
monetary incentive to drive within 4 mph of the speed limit complied almost completely 
with the behavioral contingency. Moderate reductions in speeding resulted from the 
automated feedback system. In addition to the near elimination of speeding, drivers 
indicated a high degree of acceptance for the Ml system. If further research indicates 
that behavior change endured beyond the one month period in this study, then 
providing a modest cash incentive, possibly in the form of an insurance discount, could 
prove to be an effective countermeasure for speeding. 
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Appendix A. Screen Shots of Visual Basic Interface for Datalogger, Michigan Map, and 
Speed Mapped Area of Kalamazoo/Portage. 
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Appendix B: Self report data elements 
Screen Questionnaire 
Thank you for your interest in participating in this study of on-road driving behavior. 
How did you hear about the study? 
There are 4 eligibility requirements that will need to be verified with your driving 
abstract. To obtain the abstract we will need your driver's license number. Your DL# will 
be kept completely confidential. If you participate we will assign you a unique code. 
Most results of the study will be discussed in terms of how the whole group of drivers 
performed. Information about individual drivers will refer only to the unique code. 
Absolutely no information from this study can or will be used against you in any way. 
Before I get your DL#, I quickly want to review the requirements listed on the 
recruitment flyer, and then ask a few other questions and we'll be finished, ok? 
Male or Female 
List your age (must be between 23 & 40 to be eligible participate) 
List # of years with driver's license? (Must have license for 5 years to be eligible) 
Has it been suspended for moving violations? (stop if "yes") 
« Have you been convicted of either impaired or reckless driving? (Stop if "yes") 
Do you drive 20 miles per day or more at least 5 times per week? (stop if "no") 
• Do you share your vehicle with another individual or use your vehicle for work 
purposes (i.e., delivery driving)? (stop if yes) 
• Do you drive 8 miles per day on roads with speed limits of 45 mph or greater? 
If you participate would you agree to be the sole driver of the car you get assigned? 
Ok, just a few more questions. Please answer them as truthfully as possible, as there is 
no right or wrong answer. 
1. Before getting your driver's license, did you take a driver's education course? 
1 Yes 2 No 
2. Which of the following statements best describes your driving? 
a. I tend to pass other cars more often than other cars pass me 
b. Other cars tend to pass me more often then I pass them 
c. (Both/About equally) 
3. Thinking of a typical week, how often do you drive on the following types of roads? 
Do you drive on this type of road: 
1 Frequently (at least 5 times a week) 2 Sometimes (at least 2 times a week) 
3 Rarely (no more than Ice a week) 4 Never 
190 
i. Multi-lane interstate-type highways with posted speed limits of 55 miles per 
hour or above 
ii. Two-lane roads, with one lane of traffic traveling in each direction, with 
posted speed limits of 45 miles per hour or higher 
iii. Local streets with posted speed limits of 35 miles per hour or less 
iv. Non-interstate, multi-lane roads with posted speeds of 45mph or greater 
4. In your opinion, how many miles per hour OVER THE SPEED LIMIT can you go before 
police will normally give you a speeding ticket if they see you on the following roads 
and speed limits: 
1. Interstates 55mph or greater 
2. Two lane roads 45mph 
3. Non-interstate roads 45mph or greater 
4. local roads 35 mph 
5. How often do you wear your seatbelt? 
(5) Always (4) Frequently (3) sometimes (2) rarely (1) never 
6. When you drive a motor vehicle, do you usually have a wireless phone of some type 
in the vehicle with you? Yes No 
7. How often do you talk on the phone while you are driving? Would you say you talk on 
the phone while driving during ? 
1 All trips 
2 Most trips 
3 About half your trips 
4 Fewer than half your trips, or 
5 Never 
8a When you are talking on the phone while driving, do you tend to hold 
the phone with your hand or do you tend to use the phone hands free? 
1 Hold phone 
2 Use hands free 
Appendix B: Self report data elements (Cont.) 
End of Week 1 Questionnaire. 
Participant Code 
I. Demographics: 
d) How many miles do you drive during a normal week? 
e) How many trips do you make during a normal week (count a round trip as 2 
trips)? 
f) Please circle the highest level of education completed. 
1) High school/ GED 2) Some college courses 
3) Associates degree 4) Bachelor's degree 
5) Some graduate courses 6) Master's degree 
7) Some post-masters courses 8) Post-master's degree 
II. Please rate the following statements. Mark 5 to indicate the statement is "very much 
like me" and 1 to indicate the statement is "not like me at all" 
(a) I would like to explore strange places 
(b) I like to do frightening things 
(c) I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules 
(d) I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable 
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Acceptance & Trust completed via phone at the end of the AF week and Ml weeks. 
Consider the speed warning system. Rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 10, 
with "1" indicating complete disagreement and "10" indicating complete agreement. 
1) The speed warning OR incentive OR speed warning & incentive system was reliable. 
1 10 
Disagree Agree 












5) The speed warning OR incentive OR speed warning & incentive system was pleasing. 
1 10 
Disagree Agree 
6) The speed warning OR incentive OR speed warning & incentive system was annoying. 
1 10 
Disagree Agree 




8) The speed warning OR incentive OR speed warning & incentive system was agreeable. 
1 10 
Disagree Agree 
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NASA-TLX (to be explained and filled out by hand at end of week 1 before the ISA 
instructions and completed via phone at the end of weeks 2 and 3. Also filled out by 
hand at end of week 4.) 
Four times during the experiment you will be asked to complete ratings of mental 
workload demand associated with the overall driving task (steering, navigating, 
maintaining speed, avoiding hazards, and so forth). You will complete the ratings at the 
end of each week of driving. There are 6 mental workload dimensions to rate, and the 
definitions are provided below. Before completing the rating, think about the mental 
workload you experienced when driving throughout the week taking into consideration 
the vehicle you operated. 
The first time they fill it out, the participant will place an "X" on each line to indicate the 
rating for each dimension. The second and third time they respond to the survey will be 
over the phone. The experimenter will explain that they will have to provide these 
phone interview ratings verbally. The final time it will be completed by hand when they 
return the vehicle. 
(1) Mental demand: How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., 
thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.) Was the task Easy 
or demanding, simple or complex, exacting or forgiving? Low/High 
1 10 
low High 
(2) Physical demand: How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, 
turning, controlling, activating, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, 
slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? Low/high 
1 10 
low High 
(3) Temporal demand: How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at 




(4) Performance: How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of 
the task set by the experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your 
performance in accomplishing these goals? Poor/good 
10 
low High 
(5) Effort: How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your 
level of performance? Low/high 
1 10 
low High 
(6) Frustration level: How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed versus 




APPENDIX B (continued) 
Final Debriefing Questionarre 
Participant Code 
End of week 4. For individuals assigned to the AF condition: We value your opinion 
about the system you experienced. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with 
these statements. 






























5a. If answered yes - How much would you pay? 








For Ml and No-MI participants: 
8) What features of the system did you like? 
9) What features of the system did you dislike? 
10) How would you change the system to make it more effective? 
11) How would change the system to make it more acceptable? 
12) Do you have any other feedback about the system? 
For Ml participants only: 
13) Did you feel that the incetive lowered your speed? 
14) If 13 = yes, then, think about how the bonus system was structured. What 
affected your decision not to speed? 
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Complete Responses to Debriefing Questionnaire 
Speed Study Final Questionnaire Subjective 
PI 
Q7. A. Information of speed limits. 
Q8. A. Did not dislike. 
Q9. A. Have the sound run through the speakers of the car. 
Q10. A. Would not change. 
Ql l .A. It would be good for if you were under the influence of drugs or alcohol so that 
you could know when you were speeding to avoid being pulled over. It would also be 
good for informational purposes for new cities to know speed information. 
Further Questions are N/A 
P2 
Q7.A. It was effective and I liked the visual and auditory component that acted as a flag. 
Q8.A. It was not build into the vehicle. Auditory component was punishing. 
Q9.A. see the dislikes (q8) and make the display bigger and salient. 
QIO.A. put the display in the dashboard and offer a selection of warning tones like ring 
tones. 
Qll .A. No other feed back. 
Further Questions are N/A. 
P3 
Q7.A. The incentive and the ability to control the amount received through feedback. 
Q8.A. The beep 
Q9.A. I would make it so you could change the beep. 
QIO.A. Same as above question 
Ql l .A. Over the speed limit more accurate triggers. I would try to self compete even 
when the system was inactive. 
Incentive Questions 
1. yes 
2. self competition and the money. I was more restrictive on my driving when the 
incentive was in play. 
P5- Final Questionnaire N/A 
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P6 
Q7.A. I liked that it would tell me the speed I'm supposed to be going because a lot of 
the time I'm not sure about that. 
Q8. A. The beep was pretty annoying, sometimes it would make me feel a little stressed 
out. 
Q9.A. Maybe if it weren't such an aversive sound, maybe just a bell to remind you 
maybe it would be a little but more acceptable. 
QIO.A. I guess id make it a little less aversive 
Qll .A. over all think it was pretty accurate and I think that is about all I have to say. 
P7 
Q7.A. it was helpful to know how fast I was going and what the speed limit was when I 
didn't know, about the system that is about it 
Q8.A. I didn't like that once I was over it would immediately take money it would be nice 
if I could slow down if there was a time delay. Because sometimes you don't really know 
how fast you are going and you would have to slam on your brakes, or not slam on 
them, or pump them which was a little annoying and dangerous depending on where 
you were. 
Q9.A. I would give a time delay to get back to your speed a to the correct speed so if you 
were passing some one or you had to spped up you could slow down without losing 
money. 
QIO.A. I was thinking during the excperiement if it were tied into the insurance. 
Qll.A.no. 
Q l . It for sure lowered the peeding, but for sure I was trying to cover the cost of gas to 
ride for free for the month. 
Q2. The price of gas. 
P9 
Q7.A. I think that I liked the incentive based part of the system, but I also liked that the 
tone wasn't overwhelming. 
Q8.A. the inability to turn the system off 
Q9.A I think I would make it a voluntary thing, you could flip the swicth and turn it on 
when you needed it. But if you were in the city driving you could turn it off 
QIO.A. I think it was acceptable 
Qll.A no 
Qlyes 
Q2 It became a sort-a need vs reward thing so in the moments when I sped I did so 
consciously knowing I would lose money but I did because I needed to be somewhere 
faster. 
P l l 
Q7.A. I liked that it was very accurate and reliable 
Q8.A I disliked the audio tone there was some situations that I just made the decision 
tthat I would rather speed and take the risk but I just couldn't because of the irritation 
of the noise 
Q9.A. I would give a visual indication that you were speed 5 miles over and then maybe 
set the tone at 10 miles over 
QIO.A again just make the incentive to drive the speed limit more just the fact that it is 
the safer thing to do rather than just annoy the piss out of you. Because when you are 
irritated by something you tend to drive more aggressively at least that is what I felt 
Ql l .A. other than that no it was very straight forward it did what it was said it was going 
to do, I think it could be useful in certain changes and circumstances 
Q l yes somewhat I'm not saying the effect was all due to just wanting to avoid the noise 
the money definitely did help. 
Q2. The decision not to speed was based mostly on not listening to the noise, but also 
the knowledge I was getting the money. At the end of the two weeks id say my driving 
was where is was going to be regardless of the money incentive. 
P13 
7. uhm, I liked being notified immediately when I was speeding. I didn't like that it 
persistent when I was aware when I was speeding. 
8.i didn't like that the tones persistent when letting me know I was speeding 
9.i would make it, an option to control the volume of the speaker unit so it goes under 




Q7.A. uhm I mean know when to slow down when I was speeding. 
Q8.A. it was annoying 
Q9.A. maybe more a tune or some kind of audio alert that was something that wasn't so 
annoying as this was. 
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QIO.A. maybe more like a radio tune or something 
Qll .A. it was useful if definitely let me know when I was speeding or going to fast. Uhm, 
there was actually some not precise areas there was areas where it went from 25 to 
thirty five and it would take like a mile to switch over, but other than that it was pretty 
good. 
P15 
Q8.A. The visual display is good it was like "here is the speed limit" 
Q9.A. the beeps they were annoying. 
QIO.A. a larger display in or on the dash 
Qll .A. no beeps but I don't know if it would be as effective. 
Q12.A.no, not really. Just the beeps messed with my radio time. The visual was 




Q8.A. I liked that I knew when I was going too fast. 
Q9.A the noise, it was annoying 
QIO.A. I would probably have it start beeping at nine instead of 6 over 
Ql l .A I would change the system to have it start beeping at 9 over instead of 6 over. 
Q12.A no 
P21. 
8.urn I liked be told I was going over the speed limit because sometimes I don't relize it 
or am too distracted to realize it 
9. some times the numbers were innacuarte so that was more distracting then helpful 
uhm for instanve if it was telloing me it was a 25 zone whennit was really 35 so I didn't 
like that very much, but I liked it when it was accurate 
10.first I would make sure everything it right and accurate with all the different zones, I 
would also change the sound that comes out because it is pretty aberasive and it could 
be distracting in that kind of a oud an abrasive sound sortalike the alarm youdont want 
to hear in the morning soyou would listen tonthe radio 
11.make sure everything was accurate with hnumbers and then also possibly the 
placement as well, it was a little distracting to have something by your face so maybe 
something lower by the dash or the radio so it isn't distracting 
12. 
L i t did 
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2. just knowing there was an incentive and knowing if I would stay withing the four 
miles an hour and still stay there so I wlouldmgomas fast as I could to still not lose 
anythi9ng and definitely not go higer in the 5-8 so not lose more than three cents. 
P22 
Q8.A. The incentive 
Q9.A. Beeping 
QIO.A. less aversive tone maybe 
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Qll.A.it is acceptable 
Q12.A. The incentive is what controlled my driving, the beeping is good for teaching. 




8.1 guess, like, the flashing 
9. the beeping 




2. the money. 
P24 
8. I liked the fact that it displayed the number every time I turn on the car of how much 
money I had. I liked the fact it told me I was speeding in week two, I think that is when 
it beepedbut after a while the beeping got annoying. 
9. Definitely the loud beeping scared the crap out of me several times, and I guess I 
didn't like how it didn't display the money all the time when it didn't do that 
10. make the beeps less annoying or maybe some other type of npoise or vibrate or 
something and have the money displayed all the time 
11. the same 
.12. no, it was interesting 
1. uhm yeah it definitely lowered my speeding 
2. obviously the money and knowing if I did not have to be somewhere then there 
is no reason for me to be speeding and losing money, if I had to be somewhere 
and was running late then maybe I will just let go of the 50 cents or whatever it 
might be for me to get there. 
P29 
8. the feedback was ok, but I don't know if anything else I found liking 
9. too quiet and the hard ware is ugly 
10. louder, and make it so it wont go away unless you do something about it. 
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11. make the hardware more a part of the car. During the day it was sametimes hard to 
see the display. 
12. no, it was ok,- no complaints. 
P34 
8. incentive, uhm, when it did beep and also It would tell me the speed 
9. when it beeped at a stop light. 
10 sometimes I would get on a road it would tell me the speed w/o seeing a sign or 
reminders. 
11. it didn't bother me but the box location on the dash . maybe a louder beep that I 
could turn (change). 
12. There were a few times if it would beep it would last very long. To be honest it 
would have been interesting if I were just on the beeping - for me it was the money. 
1. yes 
2. I feel it worked for me, I don't know if I would change 
anything. 
P35. 
8. it was very acurate. Useful going down hill with speed change. 
9. that it wasn't optional 
10. n/a 
11. option of volume control 
12.1 don't think so, I think it is effective. 
P37 
8. liked the limit alert and beeping and incentive. 
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9.1 would like the incentive feedback continually even if not beeping 
10. increase incentive loss per 6 seconds 
11. different beep 
12. not that I can think of 
1. yes 
2. avoid bonus reduction to get the 
bonus, but mostly I didn't want to 
hear the beep. 
P38 
8. some roads had no signs I liked knowing the limit. 
9. heard to see or hear because I am short 
10. raise volume 
11. keep volume the same 
12. if more effective make louder and display higher or in the dash. 
P39 
8.1 liked participating 
9.1 didn't like it announcing at me 
10. gps more accurate in spped limits 
11. make it quieter and shut of after a certain point 
12.no 
1. yes 
2. I wanted the money. 
P40 
8. notification of speeding 
9. if I were in a rush I intended to speed and didn't want to hear the beeps 
10. brighter more beeps 
11. adjust the beep for speed to your choice (of speed) 
12. second beep not as helpful because by that point I knew - maybe just an occasional 
reminder. 
P41 
8. getting paid to do normal behaviors - made me more cognizant of how fast I was 
going and speeding. 
9. errors in feedback and stressful 
10. 
activate audible feedback always. Help to keep FB illuminated over a longer time 
11. get more money 
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12. pretty sweet, maybe a breathalizertied in. 
1. yes 
2. the money and trying to keep it. 
P45 
8. let me know when I was speeding a lot when I didn't know 
9. hard when you are going with the flow of traffic 
10. ability to turn off and on 
11. ability to turn off and on 
12. no, I think we covered it. 
P48 
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8. notification alert 
9. how loud it was 
10. n/a 
11. make it quieter 
12.no 
p49 
8. good to get reminders of speeding. 
9. the level over when you would get the buzzer 
10. make the tone more annoying 
11. get rid of audible, just visual 
12. no, there were a couple errors. 
P51. 
8. alert 
9. frequency of the tones 
10. change the tone 
11. less time, maybe 1 burst 
12. really annoying 
p52. 
8. that I knew when I was speeding 
9. the non-stop annoying tone - incessant 
10. none 
11. more pleasant tone, less frequent - once you hear it you know. 
12.1 didn't like no front speakers. 
P53 
8. audible beeping to alert you when you were speeding 
9. nothing 
10. on/off button like traction control 






9.some places need more flex time for the posted speed changes 
10. none 
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11. make the incentive more 
12.no 
l.yes 
2. just the money 
p54 
8.1 don't know 
9. noise level too loud, warning period was too short, you cant respond in time with out 
slamming on the breaks 
10. longer warning period, choose tones or vocal or voice saying you are speeding, 
(maybe "caution") 
11.same as last 
12. make it something similar to a gps system that was built in - similar to the ford flex 
1. yes 
2. trying to be successful not about 
money I didn't want to fail the test. 
P58. 
8.1 liked that it beeped and gave me enough time as a buffer 
9. on the highway it seemed set to low 
207 
10. display could be bigger 
11. different tone, not so annoying 
12.no 
p59 
8. the beeping telling me to slow down 
9. none 
10. more accuracy about the speed 
11. none 
12.1 think it helped me to know when to drive slower 
l.yes 
2.1 think the deduction was so minor I didn't slow down, I didn't freak out - if I lost I 
would increase the deduction. 
P61 
8. none 
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9. the sound 
10. make it more accurate 









8. that it would tell me the speed limit with the alert. 
9.1 felt pressure to get the incentive. 
10. none 




2. when the chime went I felt that I was losing money 
p65 
8. it did not make me aware of how fast I was going especially around school zones. 
9. the beeping consistently 
10. 
a bigger visual, eliminate sun glare and make it more accurate. 





10. just give an incentive and leave the decision to the driver 




Appendix C Informed Consents and Participant-Experimenter Agreements 
PROJECT TITLE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Driving Study 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this form is to give you information that may affect your decision 
whether to say YES or NO to allow us to evaluate whether you qualify to participate in 
this study and to give you an overview of the study. 
RESEARCHERS 
Responsible Principal Investigator: Ron Van Houten, PhD, Arts & Sciences, Psychology, 
Western Michigan University 
Co-Responsible Principal Investigator: James P. Bliss, PhD, College of Sciences, 
Psychology, Old Dominion University 
Other Investigators: Ian J. Reagan, College of Sciences, Psychology, Old Dominion 
University and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
Bryan Hilton, Arts & Sciences, Western Michigan University 
DESCRIPTION OF PRE SCREENING PROCEDURE 
Prescreening will involve two elements. First we need to check your driving abstract 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles to ensure your driving license is valid and that 
you have not been convicted of Impaired Driving, more than 3 moving violations in the 
preceding 12 months, Reckless Driving, or previous suspension of your license for 
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repeated driving infractions or any other safety issue that would disqualify you from 
participating in the study. This information will be kept entirely confidential. An 
isolated traffic offence will not exclude you from participation. 
We also are requesting permission to collect some survey material to indicate the 
amount of driving you do and other driving related information. The survey information 
is also entirely confidential. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The researchers will take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as 
questionnaires, driving history. These steps include removing identifiers from the 
information, destroying driving records after coding the necessary information, and 
storing information in a locked filing cabinet in the Dr. Van Houten's office. The results 
of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications; but the researcher 
will not identify you. 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to test a new traffic safety system in a real word-driving 
environment. If you qualify to participate in the study you will be given a vehicle to use 
for up to a month. To qualify you must pass the screening procedure mentioned above 
and drive at least 20 miles per day. You may take passengers in the vehicle provided 
you do not let them drive but you may not use it for trips beyond a 50 mile radius from 
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Western Michigan University. You will be given a free tank of gas and do not need to 
refill the vehicle before returning it. Various driving behaviors will be digitally recorded 
throughout the study such as seatbelt use, braking information, vehicle speed, and trip 
duration. All of the logged data will be kept anonymous and confidential. Some 
participants will drive vehicles that will provide an audible and visual alerts while you 
are driving. These will be fully explained to you before they are introduced and you may 
withdraw from the study at any point. Other drivers will simply drive the provided 
vehicles for the duration of the study without experiencing the alerts. We will randomly 
assign drivers to different groups and you will find out which group you were assigned 
to after the first week of the study. Participants will receive $20 for completing a one 
week version of the study and a minimum $60 for completing the 4 week version of the 
study. If you participate in the study you will complete a few questionnaires on driving 
and your trust in technology at the start of the study and two 7 minutes telephone 
questionnaires during the study. You will be paid $10 for completing each telephone 
questionnaire. 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE 
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and 
terminate the involvement in the study at any time. Your decision will hot affect your 
relationship with Western Michigan University, or otherwise cause a loss of benefits to 
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which you might otherwise be entitled. The researchers reserve the right to withdraw 
your participation in this study, at any time, if they observe potential problems with 
your continued participation. 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read 
this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this 
form, the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have 
answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any 
questions later on, you may contact: Dr. Ron Van Houten, 269 387 4471; Bryan Hilton, 
269 387 4471. 
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
allow us to determine whether you qualify to participate in this study. The researcher 
should give you a copy of this form for your records. 
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects 
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of 
the board chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the 
stamped date is older than one year. 
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HSIRB Contact Information 
You may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (387-8293) 
or the Vice President for Research (387-8298) if questions or problems arise during the 
course of the study 
Subject's Printed Name & Signature Date 
Witness' Printed Name & Signature (if Applicable) Date 
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INVESTIGATOR'S STATEMENT 
I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of screening. I have 
described the rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing 
to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I have answered the 
subject's questions and have encouraged him/her to ask additional questions at any 
time during the course of this study. I have witnessed the above signature(s) on this 
consent form. 
Investigator's Printed Name & Signature Date 
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Main informed Consent Document 
PROJECT TITLE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Driving Study 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this form is to give you information that may affect your decision 
whether to say YES or NO to participation in this research, and to record the consent of 
those who say YES. This research project will take place in the Kalamazoo and Portage 
areas. 
RESEARCHERS 
Responsible Principal Investigator: Ron Van Houten, PhD, Arts & Sciences, Psychology, 
Western Michigan University 
Co-Responsible Principal Investigator: James P. Bliss, PhD, College of Sciences, 
Psychology, Old Dominion University 
Other Investigators: Ian J. Reagan, College of Sciences, Psychology, Old Dominion 
University and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
Bryan Hilton, Arts & Sciences, Western Michigan University 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
Several studies have been conducted looking into the subject of new technologies that 
may improve highway traffic safety. The technology that is the focus of this study has 
not been evaluated in the United States but has shown promise in Europe and Australia. 
If you decide to participate, then you will join a study involving research of driving 
behavior in a real world setting. The research is to test a new traffic safety system. You 
will be provided a vehicle that you will drive for the duration of the study. The study will 
last either one or four weeks. Participants are randomly assigned to different groups 
after the first week. Various driving behaviors such as miles driven per trip, time of trip, 
vehicle speed, and seatbelt use will be digitally recorded throughout the study. The 
experimenter will explain the forms of compensation to the participants. You will need 
to provide subjective answers at 4 separate times during the study; twice in person and 
twice via phone. The risks associated with the study are no more than those present 
during the participants normal daily driving. One group of drivers will drive cars that 
have a system that gives auditory (sounds) and visual alerts to drivers while driving. 
Other drivers will simply drive the provided vehicles for the duration of the study 
without experiencing the alerts. We will randomly assign drivers to the different groups, 
and you will find out the condition to which you are assigned after the first week of the 
study. When you are assigned to the group, further information will be provided. If you 
say YES, then your participation will last between one to four weeks. At the end of the 
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fourth week of the study we will interview you about your experience during the study 
and will tape record the interviews. Approximately 50 participants will be participating 
in this study. 
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EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA 
You should have completed the telephone screening instrument. The fact that you are 
here indicates that you met the criteria associated with your driving record (age, years 
of licensure, no impaired driving citations, no reckless driving citations, and no license 
suspensions for moving violations.) Additionally, to the best of your knowledge, you 
should drive at least 20 miles per day, and you should drive at least half of these miles 
on roads with speed limits of 45 mph or greater. Not meeting these criteria would keep 
you from participating in this study. You also must agree to sign a statement that says 
you will be the only person who drives the vehicle. You may take passengers in the 
vehicle provided you do not let them drive but you may not use it for trips beyond a 50 
mile radius from Western Michigan University. 
RISKS AND BENEFITS 
RISKS: If you decide to participate in this study, then you may face a risk of becoming 
involved in a car crash in the provided vehicle. However, this risk should not be more 
than your normal driving risk. If you are involved in a crash you will be covered by the 
Insurance policy (a copy is in the glove compartment). The collision deductible will be 
paid by the research contract and the remainder by the insurance policy. As in all 
research, there may be unforeseen risks to the participant. If an accidental injury 
occurs, appropriate emergency measures will be taken; however, no compensation or 
additional treatment will be made available to you except as otherwise stated in the 
consent form. The vehicles are equipped with standard safety equipment (air bags, 
seatbelts, and antilock brakes.) You will be familiarized with the vehicle and the 
operation of the various options such as lights, windshield wipers, etc. Regarding the 
feedback systems, the researcher took steps to reduce risks by minimizing startling 
responses associated with the sound alerts and by limiting opportunities for visual 
distraction. And, as with any research, there is some possibility that you may be subject 
to risks that have not yet been identified. If the vehicle is damaged in a crash the Grant 
will pay for repairs up to the deductible limit and the insurance will pay for the 
remainder of the repairs. 
BENEFITS: The main benefit to you for participating in this study is that it may assist you 
in being a safer driver and it may help the National Traffic Safety Administration in 
selecting improved safety standards for vehicles 
COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
The researchers want your decision about participating in this study to be absolutely 
voluntary. Yet they recognize that your participation may pose some inconvenience, 
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such as time to respond to various questionnaires and not letting others drive the test 
vehicle. To help defray your costs you will receive $20 for completing the one-week 
version of the study and a minimum of $60 for completing the 4 week version of the 
study. In addition, individuals in the 4-week version of the study can receive $20 for 
completing 2 short telephone questionnaires ($10 each; each lasting about 7 minutes). 
You will receive a free tank of gas in the vehicle you will drive during the month. You 
will pay for any gas required beyond this, but you will not 
need to fill the vehicle up upon return. Because you are driving the government owned 
vehicle during the study, you will save wear and tear upon your personal vehicle. 
NEW INFORMATION 
If the researchers find new information during this study that would reasonably change 
your decision about participating, then they will give it to you. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The researchers will take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as 
questionnaires, driving history, and research findings, confidential. The researcher will 
remove identifiers from the information, destroy driving records after coding the 
necessary information, and store information in a locked filing cabinet in the Principal 
Investigator's office prior to its processing. All data will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet in the principal investigator's office for 3 years after which time it will be 
destroyed. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and 
publications; but the researcher will not identify you. 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE 
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and 
walk away or withdraw from the study -- at any time. Your decision will not affect your 
relationship with Western Michigan University, or otherwise cause a loss of benefits to 
which you might otherwise be entitled. The researchers reserve the right to withdraw 
your participation in this study, at any time, if they observe potential problems with 
your continued participation. 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 
If you say YES, then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal 
rights. However, in the event of harm, injury, or illness arising from this study, Western 
Michigan University, nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance 
coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event 
that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any research project, you may 
contact Dr. Ron Van Houten at 269 387 4471 who will be glad to review the matter with 
you. 
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VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read 
this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this 
form, the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have 
answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any 
questions later on, you may contact: Dr. Ron Van Houten, 269 387 4471; Bryan Hilton, 
269 387 4471. 
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. The researcher should give you a copy of this form for your 
records. 
Appendix C (Continued) 
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects 
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of 
the board chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the 
stamped date is older than one year. 
Subject's Printed Name & Signature 




I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, 
including benefits, risks, costs, and any experimental procedures. I have described the 
rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing to pressure, 
coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I have answered the subject's 
questions and have encouraged him/her to ask additional questions at any time during 
the course of this study. I have witnessed the above signature(s) on this consent form. 
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Appendix C (cont.) Non-Disclosure and Initial Debrief Document 
At the end of the study you will receive a debriefing summary that will inform you of the 
results of the study. This summary will be a couple of pages long and will include some 
graphs of the results. 
Please, indicate whether you want the debriefing summary sent via email or regular 
mail. 
Regular mail e-mail 
Please provide the corresponding address: 
I pledge that I will not discuss the details of the study until I receive the debriefing 
summary. 
Printed Name Signed Name Date 
Agreement between the study participant and Western Michigan University. 
I agree that I will not allow anyone else to drive the 
test vehicle. I also agree not to drive the vehicle outside of a 50 mile radius from the 
main Western Michigan University campus. I further agree to lock the vehicle when it is 
not in use and to immediately report any damage to the vehicle. I have been informed 
that I am permitted to drive with passengers provided they do not drive the vehicle. 
Signature Date 
Appendix D: Technical and procedural issues during data collection and resolutions. 
Issue 
1. Misaligned memory chip 
caused missing raw data in 
pilot participant 1 baseline 
week beginning in row 2048 
and 6144. 
m<mt«? t m^ i 
2. Pilot participant 1 drove 
outside of speed mapped 
area; default speed limit 
became 25mph, but actual 
speed zone was higher, so 
"incentive remaining" 
reduced incorrectly, e.g., the 
participant was in a 55mph 
zone and driving 55mph but 
the datalogger said speed 
was 25. 
I IP V1JH ' HI. 'S ~M "V Q 
3. Accuracy of dependent 
variables proportion of time 
over the limit, mean speed, 
time in speed limit zone in 
data reduction analysis 
program. 
MTM. 'I'^IP:*! 
4. Coding of intersecting 
roads with 2 different speeds. 
Higher speed was chosen so 
as not to trigger false alarms. 
This created some incorrect 
data points for 70mph roads 
, {participant never drove OR 
interstate) 
s» » ^ * 
^ iiinc Siarnps OUL OI oroer 
for P9 Week 1 Day 8 @15:30. 
This is the same point in time 
when the GRA explained 
Week 2 instructions, but 
didn't start Week 2 treatment 
until beginning of day 9 
• 
6. Driving exposure. 
Concern that drivers may not 
use the vehicle enough or 
may not speed enough. 
^^^M^'-\^^^^^-~h.h-^^-^^^^^^^-'-'-'-'''-:% 
Action 
Data logger boxes were returned to Novatronix to adjust one 
memory line of chip so the second half of data could be accessed 
properly. Data was retrieved without adding extra days of data 
collection 
r -m-. m ^m-:m W > : M : *mn&;:\& 
Automate (the company that made the speed limit/GPS system) 
made all areas outside the speed zone "0 mph" and the project 
engineer essentially turned the speed monitoring off when speed 
zone input was Omph. 
•-. ,%>. ,.. i & v .,-«$•-, jJIfe,. cm. %m.-, v \ ^ . i - * « k .... /&* 
Data were spot checked and proportions were computed by hand 
until high degree of correlation (r=.998) was found between hand 
and automated proportions. 
Examined summary data, if data indicated participant drove less 
than 20 seconds on 70 mph roads in a day then removed that data 
Deleted all data that occurred after 15:35 on week 1 day 8. This 
happened periodically during the study. Experimenter manually re-
ordered raw data and research assistant re-ran data analysis 
program 
->~ - • * 
Although the incentive was not given to participants until weeks 2 
and 3, the data logger tracked what the incenitve amount would be 
if they had been given the incentive, participant had lose 8.00 during 
week 1 to continue into weeks 2, 3, & 4. Twenty-three individuals 
completed the first week of driving but did not meet the exposure 
criteria. 
tere-;>i;.<##*-;>***^>-"-*rf^ 
7. Some participants 
traveled out of town and left 
the vehicle (e.g., went home 
for the holidays). 
8. Deleted data 
Such participants picked up where they left off. To the extent 
possible we tried to schedule such that the stoppage occurred at the 
end of a week/condition 
P2 - Drove out of zone and the system should have swithched to 0 
mph but instead got a faulty 25 mph zone. This resulted in false 
alarms. 
9. Inclement weather made 
driving at normal speeds 
impossible. 
10. Faulty or bad input or 
connection to autounit 
GRA accessed data loggers and switched speed study mode to "0" 
for the period of time that the roads were poor. GRA notified any 
participant in the treatment period of the action. For each of the 4 
weeks, Participants had the vehicle for 7 days when the roads were 
ok for travel. Similarly, if participant went out of town or had a 
prolonged illness, days were added onto each week of driving to 
allow for 7 days. 
Speed limit Code 71 - not communicating with autounit ex. Cable 
unplugged- Speed limit Code 72 - No GPS lock on autounit; 0 = 
outside of zone. 
11. Participants in first 
cohort drove out of geofence 
and the system did not shut 
down - speed zones outside 
the geofence were supposed 
to turn to zero, but instead 
they defaulted to 25mph. In 
some instances the actual 
speed limit was much higher 
than this. This resulted in an 
over-calculation of the 
percentage of time the 
participants sped. The GPS 
coordinates that were written 
into the datalogger were 
scrambled, which prevented 
inputing data points to 
determine if the participant 
was inside or outside the 
geofence. This resulted in 
deleting the data of one 
participant (P2 see above). 
Three participants were kept 
because it was possible to 
match the data recorded by 
the data logger to the data 
recorded by the GPS system. 
1. Phone conference with GRA to determine exact boundaries of 
geofence and exceptions (for example certain areas of battle creek, 
a city about 20 miles from Kalamazoo were included in the speed 
data base.) 2. Matched Datalogger data to GPS data. GPS time 
stamp was in GMT datalogger time stamp was in EDT and EST. In 
addition to the 4 & 5 hour time difference, there were time 
differences that varied from a few seconds to a few minutes. Data 
sets had to be matched by taking sections of data where there were 
transitions between speed limit zones other than 25 mph. For 
example, the datalogger file might have the person in a 30 mile per 
hour zone for 185 seconds, then a 45 mph zone for 55 seconds, 
followed by a 35 mph zone. To match the data, I would inspect the 
GPS data file, starting by looking at times that were 4 hours later 
than the datalogger timestamps. A match was defined as the data 
from the GPS file being approximately 4 hours (or five for the week 
that was driven during EST) having the same pattern of transitions 
from speed limit zone to speed limit zone as the data logger file, the 
same amount of time spent in each speed limit zone, the 
acceleration/deccelation patterns, and the same max speed (plus 3 
mph, as the GPS did not always match the speed recorded by the 
datalogger.) Once the match was made, each time that the 
datalogger data indicated that particpants were in a 25 mph zone 
and had a travel speed greater than 30mph for 2 consecutive data 
points, these points were then found in the GPS file and the 
corresponding GPS coordinates were put into mapquest to 
determine if the participant was inside or outside of the zone. There 
were 15 instances of participants having traveled outside of the 
geofence when the system failed to shut down. For these intances, I 
manually changed the datalogger speed limit to zero and set the bits 
that track "over limit", "over speed trigger 1". and "over speed 
trigger 2" to zero to indicate that the participant was not speeding. 
12 Sometimes impossible 
speeds would be picked up 
(>175mph). Occurs less than 
.01% of time. 
13. Participant 28 was 
slated to receive feedback 
only condition during week 2 
(the feedback only 
intervention is 
counterbalanced between 
weeks 2 and 3). The 
experimenter gave the 
proper instructions about the 
feedback system but set the 
program that initiates the 
experimental condition as the 
baseline condition. Therefore 
the system did not activate 
during the week. 1 noticed a 
problem when the speed 
profile of week 2 was 
essentially the same as the 
week 1 baseline. 1 noticed 
that the summary datafile 
name, which is generated by 
visual basic based on the 
input provided during the 
initiation of each week, did 
not match the 
counterbalance sheet. The 
These raw data files were then run through the data reduction/ 
summary analysis program. GPS auto serial number and logger serial 
numbers were added to facilitate tracking from the raw data. 
If participant speed is >100 then Code speed limit at 73; speed from 
previous speed reading (one second before hand) would be 
recorded in the data; this data point is effectively eliminated from 
the raw data. 
1 first confirmed that the participant was supposed to be in the 
feedback only group. 1 implemented a procedure in which the GRA 
sends me the file name generated by the VB program. 1 verify that 
the file name matches the counterbalance sheet. This procedure 
builds in some redundancy to keep the error from recurring. For 
participant 28, we activated the feedback for week 3 and the GRA 
repeated the instructions; week 2 was coded as a 'no treatment' 
week. And a later participant slated to receive the feedback during 
week 3 will receive the feedback during week 2 to re-balance the 
potential confound of feedback order. 
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